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ABSTRACT: The thesis examines the philosophical and foundational
significance of Cohen's Independence results. A distinction is made
between the mathematical and logical analyses of the ·set· concept. It
is argued that topes theory is the natural generalization of the
mathematical theory of sets and is the appropriate foundational
response to the proble_ raised by Cohen's results. The thesis is
divided into three part.. The fir.t i. a discussion of the
relationship between ·inforaal· aathe.atical theories and their formal
axiomatic realizations this relationship being singularly
problematic in the case of set theory. The second part deals with the
development of the set concept within the _the_tical approach. In
particular Skolem's reformulation of ZerJlelo's notion of "def infte
properties·. In the third part an account is given of the emergence
and development of topes theory. Then the considerations of the first
two parts are applied to demonstrate that the shift to topos theory,
specifically in its guise of LST (local set theory>, is the
appropriate next step in the evolution of the concept of set, within
the mathematical approach, in the light of the significance of Cohen's
Independence results.
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lOT ATION:
lTxP(x)
1:xP(x)
#0.
'for all XI P(x)'
'exists an XI such that P(x)'
'not a'
For sets IIY:
IH 'I is a subset of Y'
XUY Union of X and Y
I6Y Intersection of X and Y
f·g Composition of the function f with g where cod(g>=dom(f)
ifI Restriction of the function f to X
rl-a 'there is a proof of a from r'
rl=a 'a is a logical consequence of r'
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IITRODUCTIOI
In 1963 Paul Cohen proved the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis
and the Axiom of Choice from ZF set theory. A major task for
contemporary philosophy of mathematics is to analyse the significance
of Cohen's results, particularly for the nature and viability of set
theory as a foundation for _the_tics. To achieve his independence
results Cohen developed the ..thod of forcing. The forcing technique
has proved to be an extre ..ly powerful tool for providing independence
resul ts across a wide spectrum of _the.tical disciplines. Jlany
important open questions in, for example, topology, group theory and
measure theory, 1.e. questions generated by concerns within these
disciplines rather than set theory, have been shown to depend on the
underlying universe of sets presupposed. Thus the foundational import
of Cohen's results per.ate. _the_tics - a fact which underscores
the importance of the aforementioned task. This thesis is intended as
a contribution to this task.
Although in the JI1d-sixties several viewe on the foundations of
_the_tics were offered in response to the independence resul ts,
usually by philosophically lIinded _theaaticians, subsequently, little
philosophical work arising directly fro. the.. results was undertaken.
Chief a~ngst the vie.,. put forward were the followiD8:
a) we should adopt a foraalistic attitude <Robinson 1ge4, Cohen 1971)
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b) we should adopt a second-order axiomatization of set theory
(Kreisel 1967)
c) we should adopt a constrained relativism i.e. adopt as a foundation
the class of consistent extensions of ZF, e.g. ZF+CH, ZF+#CH
(Xostowski 1967)
d) we should adopt an alternative to set theoretic foundations e.g.
<Lawvere 1966, XacLane 1968, 1971)
Ky contention is that none of the above are satisfactory as a
progressi ve response to the foundational challenge offered by the
independence results. Rather, a combination of elements from c) and d)
is needed. )(ore specifically, we should: in essence retain a set
theoretical foundation, adopt a relativistic view, but rather than
Kostowsk1' s version, employ the generalized set theory yielded by
topos theory, i.e. local set theory.
In this thesis, then, I aim to establish that topos theory is the
natural generalization of the mathematical theory of sets and is the
appropriate foundational response to the issues raised by Cohen's
results. The thesis comprises three parts. The first two parts derive
froD the following comment of Bernays on Xostowski's 1967:
The first essential thing which e_rges froD his paper is that the
results of Paul J. Cohen on the independence of the continuum
hypothesis do not directly concern set theory itself, but rather the
axiomatization of set theory; and not even Zermelo's original
axiomatization. but a sharper axiomatization which allows of strict
formalization. [1967 p.1091
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In part I I discuss the relationship between 'informal' mathematical
theories and their formal axiomatic realizations. In part II I turn to
the transformation of Zermelo's axioms into ZP, in particular Skolem's
reformulation of Zermelo's notion of 'definite properties', i.e. "the
sharper axiomatization which allows of strict formalization". Parts I
and II provide the appropriate context in which to deterll1ne the
philosophical and foundational significance of Cohen's independence
results. In part III after an account of the emergence and development
of topos theory the considerations of the first two parts are applied
to underpin the shift to topas theory.
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PART I: PROBLBXS OF FORMAL IZATIOB.
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(1) It is important to analyse the relationship between informal
and formal mathematics.
Amongst philosophers of mathematics there are to be found widely
varying attitudes towards the relationship between formal systems and
informal mathematics, the status of axioms, and indeed, the nature of
informal mathematics. As examples we may cite the different opinions
on these matters evinced by Frege and Hilbert. As well as differing
views allOngst
ambiguities, if
philosophers of mathematics, there are often
not outright contradictions, within the work of
individual commentators. Of greatest relevance to the relationship in
question are the following two views:
i) the subject matter of the informal body of mathematics is
understood to be a given realm of objects e.g. a universe of abstract
sets;
ii) the formal system is construed as an implicit definition.
Xy aim is to show that these views face severe problems and in certain
instances are untenable. It is important to stress, however, that I am
not directly concerned with criUcist ng, for example, commitment to
realms of abstract mathematical objects, but rather the views
concerning the relationship between such realDS and formal systems. We
will be able to identify one such view that, given my analysis of the
genesis of ZF in Part II, is the DOst viable in the case of that
theory. Xoreover. it underlines my claim as to the appropriate
foundational response to Cohen's independence results .
•
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Since the work of the 'founding fathers' Cantor, Frege, Russell,
Zer:melo and Skolem, we may recognise three clear landmarks for the
three interrelated disciplines of foundational studies, mathematical
logic and set theory. These are:
(I) Godel's Completeness Theorem (1930),
(II) Godel's Incompleteness Theorem (1931),
(III) Cohen's proof of the independence of the Continuum Hypothesis
and the Axiom of Choice from Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory
(1963).
Xathematical logic, set theory and the various foundational studies
are highly developed mathematical disciplines in their own right: each
generating internal programmes of growth and problem solving, though
with an equally important web of relations between them. Set theory,
in particular, may be taken as a pure mathematical theory apart from
any consideration of its foundational role. However, it needs only a
brief retracing of steps to see that the major importance of these
diSCiplines is philosophical. It is only in the context of
mathematical philosophy that the results (I), (II) and (III) may be
reasonably judged to be landmarks.
The major results in these diSCiplines are not merely technical
achievements. Their interpretation and analysis is a vital task for
the philosophy of mathematics, particularly for contemporary
philosophy of mathematics because of the high degree of formalization
and axiomatization in twentieth century mathematics. Formalization is
firmly entrenched within the methodology of contemporary mathematics
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and we need to examine whether formalization poses any special
problems for a foundational discipline. An analysis of the relation
between informal and formal mathematics is an indispensable component
of this task. In this part of my thesis I discuss the relevant
features of this relation. For it is the general topic of
axiomatization and formalization of informal mathematics that is
fundamental to the analysis of the foundational and philosophical
significance of Cohen's independence results. Kare specifically, after
laying so_ groundwork in chapter 2, I exalline the difficulties
following from what is initially an intuitively plausible account of
this relation. But to begin with let us briefly look at the results
(1), (II) and (lID, indicating their significance for the issue of
the relationship between formal and informal mathematics.
Let us construe our intuitive notion of classical first-order logical
truth as "true in all structures". The Completeness Theorem for
first-order predicate logic establishes that if a sentence is a
first-order logical truth then it is derivable from the axioms of
first-order predicate logic. In the context of formal metamathematics
the generalized completeness theorem is equivalent to an algebraic
result, namely that every filter in a Boolean algebra may be extended
to an ultrafilter, so the strict formalist could take the completeness
of first-order predicate logic as nothing DOre than a purely algebraic
result. However, this would mask the fact, important for philosophy
of mathematics, that in some sense we have established a "matching" of
certain important semantic and syntactic notions. Or, more
suggestively, that the formal system of logic has "captured" our
- 13-
intuitive concept of logical truth. I have said that a -matching" has
been established "in some sense". (One issue here is that the notion
of an "arbitrary structure" or, lIIJregenerally, that of putative model
is problematic.) low it is part of the objectives of an analysis of
the relationship between formal and informal mathematics to make this
sense perspicuous.
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem states that any first-order theory
whose set of axioms is recursive and rich enough to contain first-
order Peano arithmetic as a subtheory is either inconsistent or is
incomplete in the sense that there is a true arithmetical sentence
which is independent of the theory. Thus, in particular, first-order
Peano arithmetic fails to capture all the truths of arithmetic.
Historically, this theorem is important as it was seen to demonstrate
the impossibility of fulfilling Hilbert's PrograJll1le.It is recognised
that the theorem is much more than an historical curiosity, yet its
full philosophical significance still remains elusive and very much a
controversial issue. This issue essentially involves the relationship
between a formal system 1. e. first-order Peano arithmetic and some
underlying informal or intuitive notion of natural number.
It is the relations of an informal notion of set to various possible
codifications which underpins the philosophical Significance of the
independence of the Continuum Hypothesis froD Zermelo-Fraenkel Set
Theory (ZF). The following is roughly what I have in mind. Our
starting pOint is an informal theory of sets which we consider
sufficiently developed to decide what are taken to be basic questions,
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such as the cardinality of the continuum. The informal theory is then
turned into a formal axiomatic theory. The next step is the
recognition that the formal sentence which corresponds to the
continuum hypothesis is not derivable, nor is its negation. The
interest, here, arises from the understanding that the result informs
us about the relation between our informal notion of set and the
structure of the continuum. Have we found a weakness in the informal
set theory or is our choice of formalism inadequate?
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(2) MAthematical Intuition and Informal Mathematics
In analyzing the relationship between informal and formal mathematics
it is important to consider the taxonomy of informal mathematics.
Different sorts of informal mathematics may determine differences in
what may be properly attributed to their relations to their putative
formal realizations. However, the whole question of characterizing
informal mathematics is extremely problematic and I shall not address
it directly nor shall I offer a survey of extant views pertaining to
the nature of informal mathematics and formalization other than the
"snapshots- in the appendix. [see chapter (7)]. But what I believe is
clear is that formalization, in general, is, and is recognised to be,
a matter of degree. However, given the tools of contemporary
mathematical logic and foundational studies a significant jump in the
degree and character of formalization is evident and merits special
investigation.
There is a distinction to be made between informal mathematics and
intuitive mathematics. What I refer to as intuitive mathematics is,
simply, mathematics that derives from some form of mathematical
intuition. Intuitive mathematics is informal mathematics but only a
proper part of informal mathematics. A full discussion of
mathematical intuition, a notoriously difficult area, is beyond the
scope of this chapter, but I will indicate the sort of thing I have in
mind. According to Steiner
... there is evidence that the great mathematicians have been able to
convince themselves of the truth of various mathematical propositions
without knowing their proof. The Indian mathematician A. K. Ramanujan
is perhaps the Dest striking example. Completely unlettered in
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Western rigor, even later exposure to Western standards of proof did
him no good, he had the ability to conjecture the most complicated
formulas in the theory of elliptic functions, many of which were later
proved. [1975] p.1351
The above passage suggests the following approximate characterization
of mathe_tical intuition: IJathe_Ucal Intuition is that mode of
cognition through which we _y come to recognise the truth of a
mathematical proposition independently of any proof of that
proposition. This is clear enough for our present purpose. But, of
course, the questions, "what constitutes a proof" and "when is a
proposition a mathematical proposition· have by no means been settled.
When a body of informal mathematics is realized as a formal axiomatic
system, or rather, when a given formal system is a putative
formalization of a body of informal mathematics, certain propositions
are distinguished in that their formal counterparts are taken to be
the axioms of the system. Xy distinction between intuitive
mathematics and the more general informal mathematics plays a part in
locating a source ofaxioJlS. That it plays such a part is evident
from my characterization of intuitive mathematics as independent of
proof and is underlined below in the quotation from Godel. [See also
Zermelo on the axiom of choice in his 1904 p.141 and 1908 pp.186-7]
An important example of matheuatical intuition is to be found within
the philosophy of the epistemological platonist.
follows:
Resnik explains as
Let us call an ontolo8ic~1 pl~tonist someone who recognises the
existence of numbers, sets, and the like as being on a par with
ordinary objects and who does not attempt to reduce them to physical
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or subjective mental entities. An epistemological platonist is
someone who also believes that our knowledge of matheDatical objects
is at least in part based upon a direct acquaintance with them, which
is analogous to our perception of physical objects. [1980 p.162]
In particular, in the epistemological platonist view, we might come to
know certain propositions of set theory via Dathematical intuition.
In Godel's words:
Despite their remoteness froD sense experience, we do have something
like a perception also of the objects of set-theory, as is seen from
the fact that the axioJlS force theJlSelves upon us as being true.
[1947 pp.483-4841
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(3) Plausible Desiderata for Formalization
To provide a framework for a largely gener~l discussion of the
relationship between formal systems and informal mathematics I take a
formal axiomatic system as consisting of three basic components; (F1)
A language, and in this I include the syntactic categories, formation
rules for the symbols and rules of inference; (F2) A set of axioms;
(F3) The Semantics. The adjunction of (F3) is a necessary feature if
we are to discuss the relationship between formal and informal
mathematics. Without it, little sense could be made of any view
construing the formal system as a formalization of a body of
mathematics. However this component is to be understood quite
generally. That is, as any means of interpreting the sentences of the
formal system. In particular, there is no reason to confine ourselves
to a formal semantics such as Tarski's for classical logic or Kripke's
for intuitionistic logic.
low suppose a given formal system is a formalization of some body of
informal mathematics. It would seem plausible that the following two
features are credited to that formal system. First, that it is a
codification of the informal mathematics. Second, that it is a
precisiflcation of the informal mathematics. It is enough for my
purpose to state these as plausible desiderata but it is a fact that
the overwhelming majority of commentators on axiomatization and
formalization accept these as obvious, if not necessary. Focusing on
these two desiderata emphasizes the necessity of including (F3) in the
characterization of a formal system - without it it there is no sense
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in asking whether the formal system has made the informal mathematics
precise and certainly not whether it has codified the informal
mathematics.
We could, of course, construe a formal system as only comprising (Fl)
and (F2). But in what sense could such a formal system be said to be
a formalization of a body of informal mathematics? One answer is the
following: at one point we started with an informal theory and
rendered it into a formal system according to my characterization of
formal system, i.e. with an associated semantics e.g. a la Tarski or
perhaps some informal naturalistic interpretation, and subsequently to
have discarded the semantics. But without some sort of semantics to
begin with how could we even begin the process of codification?
Now once we have (Fl>, (F2) and (F3) we are at liberty to vary them.
For example, if (Fl) is a first-order language, we might change (F3),
if appropriate, from a Tarskian to Kripkean style semantics.
According to my characterization the result would consU tute a new,
different formal system. Further, a new judge_nt as to whether or
not the resulting formal system constitutes a formalization of a given
body of informal mathematics would be called for. In particular,
whether the new formal system codified and precieified that
mathematics. It is because I am interested in codification and
precisification as required features of a formalization that I have
included (F3) into my characterization. Without the adjunction of
(F3) there is no sense in asking whether the formal system codified
and precisified the informal mathematics. (Fl) and (F2>, then,
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constitute no more than a calculus of symbols and without a semantics
of some sort adjoined to them cannot be evaluated in regard to their
relations to a given body of informal mathematics in the relevant
respects.
Having provided a general characterization of a formalization together
with two plausible desiderata we may go on to specify certain
constraints on the former and distinctions with respect to the latter
that are relevant in the given context.
A distinction needs to be _de between wbat I shall call sYDtactic
precision and se_Dtic precision. Consider the first-order theory of
groups. The language of this theory, that is the items indicated in
(Fl), and also its axioms <F2) are given recursively. In other words,
notions such as ·axioDr, •proof" etc. are effective and we may
effectively perform logical operations on them, e.g. apply the rules
of inference, concatenate proofs, etc. The precision of the first-
order theory of groups is here judged with reference to the theory
qua calculus of symbols. Syntactic precision, then, refers to the the
formal system qua calculus of symbols and the degree of effectiveness
of that calculus. This is a relatively unproble_tic notion and may
even to some extent be treated mathe_tically. for example, by the
theory of Turing degrees.
Semantic precision is rather more difficult to characterize.
Intuitively, it is the degree to which the formal system renders the
informal mathematics clear and unambiguous and the degree to which it
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is "faithful to the meaning". The emphasis here is on the perspicuity
of the notions of the semantic component relative to those of the
informal mathematics. But as Vedberg paints out
The sentence-forms of a formalized language should have a meaning
which is 'clear', 'sharp', 'precise', or 'exact'. What is meant by
these words may be felt, but has not, to my knowledge, been
satisfactorily clarified by anyone. If the meaning of a formalized
language is given through the method of translation, the meaning will
be of the same degree of clarity as the meaning of the language into
which the translation is done. [1984 Vol. III p. 272)
We cannot, unlike in the case of syntactic precision, offer a
mathematical characterization of semantic precision. At the same time,
unless we forego interpretation of our formal systems and in
particular eschew discussion of the relationship between informal and
formal mathematics, in effect succumbing to formalism, semantic
precision must be taken to be an important issue, especially so where
we are formalizing a foundational discipline. (Incidentally, Russell
recognised that this issue could cause problems for a foundational
system such as Principia XatbeJ1latica. [See for example Russell 1923
and Rolf 1982])
As Lakatos has eloquently pointed out, in 'live' mathematics concepts
are often in a process of modification or rigorization or both. Often
the process of rigorisation, or rather putative rigorization, is
facilitated by a reduction. For example, during the period referred to
as the 'arithmetization of analysis', concepts such as 'continuity'
and 'lim! t' were defined in terms of concepts like 'natural number'
and 'set' etc. Plainly we should enquire as to the nature and
implications of this process. In what sense have we transformed the
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original concept? In what sense have we 'captured' the original
concept? Have we clarified the original concept, in particular, in the
sense that the terms used in the definiens are more perspicuous than
the definiendum? When we formalize an informal body of mathematics and
then interpret the formalism, 1.e. apply the semantics, the above
considerations re-emerge. Lakatos, who in one form or another greatly
concerned himself with these issues, posed the questions in the
following manner: he first set up his target with the rather bold
assertion that
...we should speak of formal systems only if they are formalizations
of established informal theories ...There is indeed no respectable
formal theory which does not have in some way or another a respectable
informal ancestor. [1978 p.621
and after some discussion arrived at the position that
Up to now no informal mathematical theory could escape being
axlomatized. We mentioned that when a theory has been axiomatized,
then any competent logician can formalize it. But that means that
proofs in axiomatized theories can be submdtted to a peremptory
verification procedure, and this can be done in a foolproof,
mechanical way. Does this mean that for instance if we prove Euler's
theorem in Steenrod's and Eilenberg's fully formalized postulate
system it is impossible to have any counter-example? Well, it is
certain that we won't have any counter-example formalizable in the
system (assumDdng the system is consistent); but we have no guarantee
at all that our formal system contains the full empirical or quasi-
empirical stuff in which we are really interested and with which we
dealt in the informal theory. [Ibid., p.6? Iote that Lakatos equates
formalisation with effective formal systems i.e. Hilbert style
systems. ]
Like considerations are crucial for a foundational theory where we are
attempting an across the board reduction of mathematics. For example,
the logicists Russell and Whitehead undertook such a reduction,
involving a wholesale redefinition of mathematical terms, in the
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ramified type theory of Principia Xathematica. This system, in the
tradition of logicism, was a unified theory of logic and set theory.
We may note here that a unified theory of logic and set theory, though
not on behalf of logicism, has recently been urged by Mayberry [1977]
in response to some of the problems we shall be considering below, in
particular for the reason that such a system as he proposes is more in
accord with Cantorianism. In fact, topos theory, is also such a
unified theory. But it is Brouwerian rather than Russelian in the
sense that the mathe_tics generates the logic, or in Bell's terms,
the logic is synthesized from the mathematics.
Now to a certain extent the requirement of codification begs the
question of semantic precision - at least in so far as we construe
semantic precision as "faithful to the meaning". If, for instance,
the semantics do not show the axioms to be "faithful to the meaning"
of the informal mathematics then this might be a warrant for denying
that the axioms codify that informal mathematics. In other words, it
might be argued that we cannot realise both codification and
precisification - since by precisifying Me are mutilating cDntent and
hence not: codifying ",hat was there in the first place. However, my
response is that this is a situation that cannot be judged in an
absolute manner, an all or nothing affair so to speak. Ve might take
as an analogy the choice that a translator is faced with. Several
possibilities may present themselves as a correct literal translation
of a given sentence while at the same time we may judge one
translation to be better or more faithful than another.
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If we accept that formal systems, at least in some instances,
formalize so:methillg, 1.e. that they may be emodiments of informal
mathematics, then the question of semantic precision must be taken to
be a serious and important consideration, albeit, an allusive one.
The quotation from Wedberg suggests a criterion according to which an
informal body of mathematics may be said to have been made
semantically precise by a formal theory. We may state the criterion
as follows: the formal system makes the informal mathematics precise
if the semantic component (F3) is mere perspicuous than the informal
mathematics. In other words, the notions associated with the semantics
are of a "greater degree of clarity" than those of the informal
mathematics. Of course, this criterion is pitched at only a bare
intuitive level and there is no suggestion that it is an effective
method for deciding the question of precision. Apart from switching
to an explicitly relative construal of precisificat10n it simply
states an intuitive requirement. Nevertheless, the criterion follows
straightforwardly from the, admittedly rather approximate, account of
semantic precision and will be useful in generating questions
regarding the enterprise of formalization. Iote that Wedberg confines
himself to the case where we are "translating" i .e. moving from one
language to another. Xy criterion is more general in that I allow the
possibility that the informal body of mathematics need not be
construed as a collection of propositions or in any way embodied in
language. Take, for example, the "perceptions· of the epistemological
platonist. It may be the case that certain sentences of the formal
theory "force themselves" upon him as being true without the existence
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of a linguistic intermediary between the "perceptions" and the formal
sentences.
It is helpful to make a further distinction regarding the semantic
component of a formal theory. On the one hand there is the case where
the semantics affords us an interpretation of the formal theory
sentence by sentence, so to speak. On the other hand, there is the
more holistic DOdel theory. In the first case we are dealing with a
single interpretation, e.g. as in Hilbert's reduction of Euclidean
geoDetry to real number theory or, acre generally, particular models
in a set-theoretic sense - and this also includes prescriptions for
interpreting sentences. These prescriptions may, for example, subsume
some set-theory as is the Case with a Tarsk1an style semantics.
As a particular case we might also interpret the formal sentences in
the sense of the original informal mathematics. For example, suppose
we understand ZF to be a forJlllllizationof the informal theory of the
realm of sets in Platonist heaven. A formal sentence of ZF may then
be interpreted in the sense of the informal set theory being
formalized, e.g. the terms of the formal theory may refer to sets in
the platonic realm of sets as opposed to say objects in a model. That
is the term Co) refers to the "real" set of finite ordinals. It may
also be the case that an inforJlllllset theory may not incorporate an
extensional view of properties, functions and relations. Thus, for
example, a function symbol in the formal language might not be
interpreted as a set of ordered pairs if we are interpreting the
formal theory in the sense of the informal. As a matter of historical
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fact it was Hausdorff in 1914 who first produced a set theoretical
reduction of the notions of function and relation i.e. some six years
after the axiomatization of Zermelo. So in Zermelo's !908a, for
example. functions and relations were not interpreted in terms of
ordered pairs. [See Hallett 1984 p.2651
Suppose we are satisfied that we have codified a particular body of
informal mathematics. Then the model theory provides a means of
investigating the informal mathematics or 'exploring' its concepts.
The IIIJdeltheory may make the informal theory precise in the sense
that it delimits, for example. via independence results, the scope of
the informal mathematical concepts. But here problems arise in that
the model theory is itself embedded in another theory - usually a set
theory. So for example, relative to ZFC certain important conjectures
of group theory have been found to be independent. We may now ask
whether these independence results inform us about our informal
concept of a group or are merely theorems of ZFC with no bearing on
our concept of group. Further, if we take the former attitude what do
we make of the fact that some of these conjectures are decided by ZF
set theory with the addition of the axiom of constructibility?
Having given my characterization of a formal axiomatic system and two
desiderata for such a system to be considered a formalization of a
body of informal mathematics the question whether these desiderata may
be realized arises. If not, what implications does this have for our
view of the nature and purpose of axioms, formal systems, and in
particular the formalization of foundational disciplines?
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There are a bewildering array of types of formal system currently in
use. On the other hand, there are certain constraints on formal
systems which have been, for a variety of reasons, commonly approved
and as a matter fact systems so constrained have achieved, not without
controversy, a preferred status within contemporary mathematics. Here
I refer to effective classical first-order systems and I shall confine
myself to this class of systems in addressing the above question. The
constraints in question constitute the subject of the next chapter.
[As an example of the increasingly evident shift beyond this class of
systems in foundational studies see ·Model-Theoretic Logics· edited by
Barwise and Feferman 1985]
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(4) Kodern Mathematics and Effective Classical First-Order
Systems.
The characterization of a formal axiomatic system I have given
encompasses an endless array of available types of formal system. For
example, we may employ second-order logic, various intuitionistic and
constructive systems, free logics, infinitary logics, logics with non-
standard quantifiers, c.>-logics,JIDda1 logics and many-valued logics.
As well as Tarskian semantics and Kripkean semantics there are
infinite-game semantics, topological semantics and we might as well
mention those who propose a substitutional interpretation of
quantifiers. However,
Many logicians would contend that there is no logic beyond first-order
logic, in the sense that when one is forced to make all one's
mathematical (extra-logical> assumptions explicit, these axioms can
always be expressed in first-order logic, and that the informal notion
of prov~ble used in mathematics is made precise by the formal notion
provable in first-order logic. Following a suggestion by Jtlartin
Davis, we refer to this view as Hilbert's Thesis.
The first part of Hilbert's Thesis, that all of Classical Mathematics
is ultimately expressible in first-order logic, is supported by
empirical evidence. It would indeed be revolutionary were someone
able to introduce a new notion which was obviously part of logiC. The
second part of Hilbert's Thesis would seeD to follow from the first-
part and Godel's Completeness Theorem. Thus Hilbert's Thesis is, to
some extent. accepted by many mathematical logicians. [Jon Barwise
"First-Order LogicR in "Handbook of Mathematical LogicR 1977 p.411
Out of context this passage is perhaps slightly misleading in that it
claims that "classical mathematics is ultimately expressible in first-
order logic". What is meant here is that it is expressible in a
system whose underlying logic is classical first-order logic. Given
this modest clarification, we must also underline what is being
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claimed here, namely that each proposition of mathematics 1s first-
order expressible - and,
semantics. This claim,
of course, this brings in the question of
however, is to be distinguished from the
assertion that for each body of mathematics, e.g. arithmetic, there is
a first-order system whose theorems express all and only those
proposi tions of that body of matheJllatics. If the former claim is
unsupportable then we cannot accept first-order formalization as being
sufficient for codification and precisif1cation. The latter claim
clearly incorporates the for_r but it is not so clear that we may
consistently hold the forJlBr whilst denying the latter. Suppose we
confine ourselves to first-order systems and we take the former claim
as justified. Ka.ywe now not collect up all the propositions of a
particular body of mathematics whilst choosing a subcollection
sufficient to generate this collection as our axioms or, indeed, take
them all as axioms? Is this not plaUSible since we are allowing
aursel ves fragments of set theory in the metatheory? Well, this
simply depends on what further constraints we impose on our notion of
formalization.
It is the practically universal practice of contemporary mathematics
to employ (at least ·officially· or ·in public") classical first-order
systems. Thus it is of special interest whether this class of systems
realizes, with respect to a given body of informal mathematics, the
dual desiderata of codification and precisification.
In this connection there is a metamathematical result which needs to
be taken into account, namely Lindstrom's Theorem. This apparently
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demonstrates that first-order logic is characterized by its
•weaknesses' or what is sometimes referred to as its •diseases' .
Lindstrom's Theorem states that first-order logic is the only logic
closed under conjunction, negation, and the existential quantifier
which satisfies the Compactness Theorem and Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem.
Hodges' view is that
It happens that first-order languages are excellent for encoding
finite combinatorial information <e.g. about finite sequences or
syntax), but hopelessly bad at distinguishing one infinite cardinal or
infinite ordering from another infinite cardinal or infinite ordering.
This particular combination _kes first-order model theory very rich
in transfer arguments. For example, the whole of Abraham Robinson's
nonstandard analysis ... is one vaet transfer argument. The model
theorist will not lightly give up a language which is as splendidly
wellk as the Upward and Downward Lowenheht-Skol •• TheoreJ16 ... show
first-order languages to be.
This is the setUng into which Per LindstroJl's theorem came ... He
showed that any language which has as much coding power as first-order
languages, but also the same weaknesses which have just been
mentioned, must actually be a first-order language in the sense that
each of its sentences has exactly the same models as some first-order
sentences. [Hodges 1983 p.8S]
lote that Lindstrom's theorem characterizes first-order logic in
semantic terms, 1.e. Compactness TheoreJl, Lowenheim-Skolem Theorems
and reference to all models of sentences. Thus the theorem appeals to
a significant amount of set theory and we _y only interpret and
appreciate the import of the theorem to the extent of our acquaintance
with and apprehension of this fragment of set theory. Hodges goes on
to conclude that
I think it is fair to say that all of modern _thematics can be
encoded in set theory, but it has to be done locally and not all at
once, and sometimes there is a perceptible loss of meaning in the
encoding.
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One naturally asks how much of the credit for this universality lies
with first-order logic. Might a weaker logic suffice? The answer is
unknown. [Ibid. p.87]
Over and above the widespread emphasis on first-order systems there is
a general focus on those that are referred to by Church as 'logistic
systems' 1. e. roughly those systellS where the metatheory is embedded
in primitive recursive arithmetic. Church characterizes these in
terms of the effectiveness of the following: (1) primitive symbols;
(ii) well-formed foraulas; (iii) axioms; (iv) rules of inference.
Church explains that
The requirements of effectiveness are (of course) not meant in the
sense that a structure which is analogous to a logistic system except
that it fails to satisfy these requirements may not be useful for some
purposes or that it is forbidden to consider such - but only that a
structure of this kind is unsuitable for use or interpretation as a
language. For, however indefinite or imprecisely fixed the common
idea of a language may be, it is at least fundamental to it that a
language shall serve the purpose of communication. And to the extent
that requirements of effectiveness fail, the purpose of communication
is defeated. [1956 p.52]
As illustration he states:
Consider, in particular, the situation which arises if the definition
of well-formedness is non-effective. There is then no certain means
by which, when an alleged expression of the language is uttered
(spoken or written), sayan asserted sentence, the auditor (hearer or
reader) may determine whether it is well-formed, and thus whether any
actual assertion has been made. [Ibid p.52-53]
Church's views on this Datter are widely held and underwrite the
emphaSis on effective systems, though not, of course, the restriction
to those that are classical or indeed to classical first-order
systems. That particular restriction is underwritten by the
considerations in the quotations from Barwise and Hodges. In
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Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy 1973 we find some dissent from Church's
contentions. There it is claimed that
The arguments brought forward in Church ...to the effect that systems,
whose rules of formation and transformation are non-effective, are not
suitable for purposes of communication do not sound too convincing.
Communication may be impaired by this non-effectivenes but it is not
destroyed. Understanding a language is not an all-or-nothing affair.
Our quite efficient use of natural languages shows that a sufficient
degree of understanding can be obtained in spite of the fact that
"meaningfullness·, relative to a natural language is certainly not
effective. [po 286]
Whilst I would acknowledge the truth of the above passage,
particularly in regard to natural language, it is misguided in that
Church is addressing himself to formal languages, i.e. those
constructed from what Parsons refers to as "artificial syntax" [see
Parsons 1974 p.28], and with respect to these kinds of languages
Church's contention is correct. With natural languages, which are in
any case usually in a process of evolution, there is a vast web of
social interactions which enable us to comprehend, to varying degrees,
expressions displaying 'innovative' structure, e.g. modernistic
poetry, the semi-gobbledygook of authority figures, jive talk, or just
plainly bad grammar. But the comprehension of formal languages is, in
general, strictly tied to formal semantics. For example, given the
inductive prescription of Tarski-semantics for first-order languages,
the process of interpretion simply breaks down at the point where we
reach an ill-formed string of symbols. lote, however, that in saying
that the interpretation of a formal language is tied to a formal
semantics is not to deny that the formal semantics is itself embedded
within natural discourse. The 'formality' of formal semantics may be
said to reside rather in a combination of the m8nner of or
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prescription for application, that it is applied to formal languages
and, to a greater or lesser extent. its artificiality. But from this
it does not fOllow that the act of comprehension in the formal or
informal case is itself any different.
Now if the notion of a formula is not effective and hence we are not
always sure whether or not a string of symbols is (with respect to
some semantic theory) asserting a proposition then it is doubtful
whether we may even begin to address the question of codification.
(Whether this is also the case where the notions of proof and
axiomhood are not effective is less clear.) Note that in this
connection we should also bring into relief the distinction between
the judgment of whether or not a given system codifies a body of
informal mathematics and whether or not in fact it does so. These are
complex and delicate issues and I will take some of them up in the
ensuing sections in connection with specific portions of mathematics -
more often than not arithmetic and set theory. This wi11 serve to
clarify their import for codification and in particular the issue of
whether the restriction to effective first-order systems is consistent
with the demands of codification and precisification.
As a postscript I should like to make a further cOmDent on the import
of Lindstrom's Theorem. We have discussed the fact that effective
classical first-order systems predominate in contemporary mathematics.
Lindstrom's theorem emphasises that this logic is, in the given sense,
characterised by Compactness and the LowenheimrSkolem Theorems. This
result underwrites the following argument. First-order logic came to
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be preferred, not because it is the 'right' or 'correct' logic, say,
as opposed to second-order logic, or perhaps intui tionistic logic.
()lost would grant that there are significant or genuine second-order
logical truths yet second-order logic is not generally applied.) It
is preferred very much for pragmatic reasons. Kore specifically, as
is suggested in the above qoutation from Hodges, for the fruitfullness
of its model theory. Undoubtedly the Compactness Theorem and the
Lowenheim-SltolemtheoreDB are the very foundations of contemporary
model theory and thus a significant portion of modern mathematics.
Furthermore, so far as preference of logics is concerned these two
factors appear more important than Completeness.
- 35-
(5) Can We Effectively Formalize and Realize Codification and
Precisification'?
Suppose we take the view that there exist objects to which the
predicate 'positive integer' refers and that the statements of
informal arithmetics are taken to be about these objects. In other
words, the subject matter of informal arithmetic is a realm of
objects, namely positive integers. Further, let us make the
assumption that meaningful propositions with respect to the realm are
definitely true or false. Bow consider a classical first-order system
with a recursive set of axioms that is a putative formalization of
arithmetic. The first-order Peano-Dedekind axioms are an example of
such a system. low so far as codification is concerned this system
falls short. Given Godel's Incompleteness Theorem there are true
sentences about positive integers that are theorems of the formal
system. In other words the formalization has failed to codify the
informal mathematics.
An attempt might be made to part!Hon true arithmetical statements
into those that are, as Paris and Harrington put it, - reasonably
natural theorem[s] of finitary combinatorics· [1977 p.1134] or in
Barwise's terms -strictly mathematical statements about natural
numbers- [Footnote to Paris/Harrington 1977 p.11331 and those that are
merely metamathematical pathologies with respect to arithmetic proper.
Thus, so the argument might run, first-order Peano arithmetic is a
codification of the -natural- part of arithmetic or rather the
arithmetic of number theorists while Godel sentences belong to the
- 36-
other part. Until qUite recently this position had some credibility.
However, this is no longer the case, for as Barwise relates:
Since 1931, the year Godel's Incompleteness Theorems were published,
mathematicians have been looking for a strictly mathematical example
of an incompleteness in first-order Peano arithmetic, one that is
mathematically simple and interesting and does not require the
numerical coding of notions from logic. The first such examples were
found early in 1977,..... [1977 p.11331
In general, in the light of Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, if we have
a body of informal mathematics construed as having as its subject
matter some realm of objects, and we formalize it into an effective
classical first-order system into which recursive arithmetic is
encodable then this system will be incomplete and hence not realize
the codification of the informal mathematics. Two well-known examples
are the following:
(1) First-order Euclidean Geometry construed as the theory of
points, lines, etc. and their relations in real spacej
(11) ZF-set theory construed as having its subject matter the
platonic realm of sets.
Quite often, rather than referring to, say, the platonic realms of
integers, sets, etc., the discussion is couched in terms of standard
models. Standard models are set-theoretic structures and are, so to
speak, the set-theoretic correlates of the realms in question. Some
considerations about language apart, every sentence satisfied by the
standard JlDdel is true of the respective realm and vice versa. The
collection of sentences which are satisfied in the standard model is
known as the 'theory' of the model. We may now characterize the
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failure of codification by stating that there is no recursive set of
axioms whose closure is the theory of the model. Incidentally, I do
not count the presence of non-isomorphic models as a failure of
codification. If the closure of some recursive set of axioms is the
theory of the standard model then we have full codification even if
that system has non-isomorphic models. After all, the sentence 'the
cat sat on the mat' has non-standard readings but that does not mean
that we are warranted in claiming that its familiar use involves a
shortfall of information.
Two responses to the failure of codification present themselves for
consideration which do nat require us to immediately withdraw from
the position that our statements of the informal mathematics are
objectively true or false statements referring to objects of some
given realm. The first is suggested by the following passage from
Parsons 1974
Axiomatization is an especially thoroughgoing and rigorous instance of
a process in the organization of knowledge that might be called
systematization. [po 26]
The first response, then, is that the axiom system codifies and makes
precise the informal mathematics in so far as that informal
mathematics represents a body of knowledge rather than some ideal
complete collection of propositions or facts which, given the
constraints, is in any case uncodifiable. lote here again the
indispensibility of the (F3) component. Looking at the formal sentence
it makes no sense to say we 'know' it, where the 'it' is divorced from
an interpretation. This is even true of putative tautologies, where
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the propositional structure of the sentence rather than its complete
interpretation is important; for we have to interpret the 'logical
symbols' appropriately. The second response is the embracing of the
fictionalist or conceptualist account of mathematics. Now whilst there
is some initial plausibility in these two responses, particularly with
respect to certain disciplines such as arithmetic and geometry for the
forDer and set theory for the latter, in general they cannot be
convincingly maintained given the imposed restraints. (However, the
latter response affords the component of a solution or rather
resolution, for the foundational problems of post-Cohen set theory.
when conjoined to a cri tical analysis of the foundational role of
axiomatic set theory and its development understood as the evolution
of a concept. )
Construing a formal system as codifying and precisifying our knowledge
of a given realm of objects raises the following problems:
(1) This view needs to be underwritten by a plausible account of
mathematical knowledge and it is notoriously difficult to characterize
or determine what consU tutes mathematical knowledge. In so far as
this view involves knowledge of abstract objects it has to counter
forceful arguments, for example as in Benacerraf 1970 invoking the
causal theory of knowledge, to the effect that we cannot have such
knowledge.
(ii) Strictly speaking we are, in general, axiomatizing more than is
'known'. Let us take as an example first-order Peano Arithmetic. We
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may claim to know that the axioms are true of the realm of positive
integers. We might know some of the theorems as self-evidently true,
or let us say, as having the same epistemological status as the
axioms, but are not included in the axioms since they are recognised
as being derivable and we wish to 'streamline' the system. Some
theorems may not be self-evidently true but are known by virtue of
having been confirmed as theorems by actually being derived from the
axioms i.e. we possess a proof. However, the vast majority of
theorems, these constituting an infinite set of arbitrarlly complex
sentences, will not be part of what we know about positive integers,
at least not known in the same sense that the axioms are known. But
this is as it should be since part of the function ofaxiomatization
is to prove hitherto unknown facts or conjectures about positive
integers.
It might be argued that what is required is simply a distinction
between what is known explicitly (e.g. the axioms> and known
implicitly (the majority of theorems). But we have to make some sense
of 'implicit knowledge' - for on the face of it it seems a queer sort
of 'knowledge' that requires proof in order to find out what it is
that one knows!
(111) Suppose we identify the axioms as the codification and ignore
the closure of the theory in this respect. But it is also problematic
whether even the axioms are always to be included in what we know if
they include schems. What is it that we know when we formulate a
system incorporating an infinite axiom schema such as the induction
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axioms of first-order Peano arithmetic? Do we know an infinite number
of propositions which includes information involving arbitrarily
complex predicates or rather the interpretations of these
predicates? In fact, it is more plausible to say here that we know the
second-order form. knowledge which perhaps involves higher-order
notions such as properties. In Kreisel's opinion
A moments reflection shows that the evidence of the first-order schema
derives from the second-order axiom [1967 p.1481
But in this case we have to justify the priority of first-order
systems and also the concentration on predicates rather than
properties since the latter presumably are components of what we know.
In short, this case prompts the question: "Why then are we
axiomatizing within a first-order system?" The question is
particularly embarassing if it is adjoined to an argument that the
shift from the second-order axiom to the corresponding first-order
schema involves a loss of content. For, after all, we are claiming to
be axiomatizing what we kno~ of. say, the positive integers.
(iv) The shift to the view that we are codifying our knowledge of a
particular realm tends to make the informal mathematics difficult to
identify in the sense that. for example. it is now no longer
arithmetic per se we are dealing with but what is known of arithmetic
and how do we decide what we know about positive integers? Moreover,
when we say that a formal system constitutes a formalization of a body
of knowledge does this mean a particular person's, school's,
country's, professional community's knowledge or what? It even begins
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to get somewhat circular if we have this 'knowledge' in virtue of
learning the axioms in a textbook or lecture. But don't many students
learn set theory this way?
We might treat knowledge here in the manner that certain scientific
theories are construed as knowledge, namely: highly confirmed general
statements. There is a certain initial plausibility here in the case
of arithmetic and geometry. (Gauss did go out and measure the interior
angles of a triangle determined by three mountain peaks.) Though
perhaps this strategy might be rendered plausible for arithmetic,
since there is an infinite list in the induction schema and the axioms
are claimed to be highly confirmed then these axioms are not all
directly confirmed individually - they would have to be considered
confirmed en _sse 1.e. we would have to argue the second-order
version is highly confirmed. But is this strategy convincing for set
theory, even though, for example, certain large cardinal axioms have
consequences for natural numbers? What seems to be confirmed in the
case of set theory, if not for that of arithmetic beyond the primitive
recursive, is the consistency of the theory rather than its truth.
Let us look at the proposed strategy a little more carefully. The
assumption is that the system codifies a body of knowledge about a
realm of abstract objects (say positive integers) and the axioms are
highly confirmed propositions. I have already mentioned the general
problem about knowledge of abstract realms (cf. Benaceraff 1970) so
let us turn to 'confirmation' in this context. The straightforward
view here is that we are 'interpreting' the system in the real world
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by, for example, understanding the axioms as informing us on
operations on finite collections of objects. So far we are only at
best confirming consistency. To confirm truth we need an assumption of
'parallelism', i.e. structural similarity, between the abstract realm
and the interpretation. But what warrant would we need for this
assumption? The answer is - knowledge of the abstract realm - which is
the very thing we are trying to confirm! Another point is that if the
system in question is stronger than recursive arithmetic the
interpretation would tend to be about 'ideal' operations and it is
difficult to know how we could claim any significant degree of
confirmation.
Without the doubtful assumption of parallelism, the strategy in
question yields that the system is a theory about the world, 1.e.
yields an essentially empirical approach. This serves to undercut any
active role that might be played by the realm of abstract objects
which constituted our starting point. (As Gillies has pointed out, an
Aristotelian account of the existence of abstract mathematical objects
is compatible with an empiricist view of mathematics. So. for example.
a given set of three apples i.e. the abstract object over and above
its constituents is perceptible. On this basis the theory is
interpreted in the real world (without invoking parallelism). But
apart from any problems there may be about making sense of the use of
'perceptible' on this reading it is still not clear that the 'set'
over and above its constituents is contributing anything as far as
confirmdtion is concerned.)
•
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In the above I considered a response to the apparent failure of
codification of which it was hoped that it did not place us in the
position of withdrawing the presupposition that the statements of the
informal mathematics are objectively true or false. As an alternative
response I consider now the conceptualist or fictional1st account of
mathematics. There are very many varied accounts of this view of
mathematics. Principally, mathematics is construed as human activity
with the emphasis on the imaginative or creative faculty. Consider,
for example, the following view of Lakatos:
Mathematical activity is human activity. Certain aspects of this
activity - as of any activity - can be studied by psychology, others
by history ...But mathematical activity produces mathematics.
Mathematics - this product of human activity - 'alienates itself' from
the human activity which has been producing it. It becomes a living,
growing organism, that acquires a certain autonomy from the activity
which has produced it; it developes its own autonomous laws of growth,
its own dialectic. The genuine creative mathematician is just a
personification, an incarnation of these laws which can only realise
themsel ves in human action. Their incarnation, however, is rarely
perfect. The activity of human mathematicians, as it appears in
history, is only a fumbling realisation of the wonderful dialectic of
mathematical ideas. But any mathematician, if he has talent, spark,
genius, communicates with, feels the sweep of and obeys this dialectic
of ideas. [1976 p.1461
Some accounts of the conceptualist view of mathematics are
straightforwardly fictionalist, e.g. the mythological platonism
described in Chiharl1 1973. There are some, however, which direct the
mathematical imagination via the adjunction of more or less necessary
constraints, for example, by application of Kantian doctrines (as in
Hallett's unpublished "Godel's Philosophy of Xathematics and Kant's
notion of sensible intuition") or a phenomenological analysis (as in
Tragesser's "Phenomenology and Logic" 1977). It is also appropriate to
mention that Cantor, the founder of the mathematical theory of sets,
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also professed a brand of conceptualism. Cantor's conceptualism
emerges in his well-known dictum that the nature of mathematics lies
precisely in its freedom. [See Hallett 1984 on Cantor's "Free
Mathematics· pp. 14-24]
It is true that as a response not requiring immediate withdrawal from
the position that statements of the informal mathematics are
objectively true or false and refer to objects of a given realm,
conceptualism is questionable in that it may be seen to be severely
weakening or at least distorting ontological commitments. Be that as
it may, more direct issue can be taken with the claim of objectivity,
though, in general, less so with Kantian or Phenomenological accounts
than say with mythological platonism. In his account of mythological
platonism Chihara suggests that
...one can hold that mathematicians construct their systems ~s if they
were describing existing objects, as if there are such things as sets
and numbers, and that he [sic] reasons accordingly. Whether such
abstract objects exist, he can say, is irrelevant to the question of
whether the mathematical theories are intelligible. It is enough that
such objects can be conceived ...
By a mythological platonist, I do not have in mind an irrational
person who Simply holds inconsistent beliefs or who is unwilling to
accept the consequences of his own theories. A person studying a
mathematical theory that asserts the existence of abstract entities
need not commdt himself to such entities: he could for example deny
the existence of abstract entities and still reuain consistent by
remaining uncommi ted to the truth of the mathematical theory he is
studying ...[1973 p.62-31
It seems then that a mathematician may, for instance, construct, or
devise, two mutually inconsistent set theories as if each one were
describing a realm of sets and at the same time deny the existence of
either realm or in fact any realm of sets. We can take as an analogy
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two different descriptions of a character an author of fiction may
have in different drafts of a novel (Melville's tale of the "The great
pink-striped whale"?) In other words both realms are on a par in the
sense that they are merely fictions. A fictionalist may 'explore'
these imaginary worlds by elaborating his conception. This
elaboration may either be purely deductive (that is, consists in
drawing consequences from his pesent description) or ampliative,
involving a further taxing of his imagination in producing essentially
new descriptions. Let us call a initial description of such a realm a
description that has not been augmented by the use of proof
procedures.
Suppose we have, for example, two set theories describing two
different reallE of sets. Consider a proposition from the initial
description of one of these realms and suppose its negation occurs in
the initial description of the other. Are we entitled to claim that
we recognise the truth of that mathematical proposition independently
of any proof of that proposition? The question seems ill conceived
since it is more appropriate to talk in terms of whether it is a
correct or accurate description of the given realm. Suppose the
proposi tion and its negation are both correct descriptions of their
respective realms. If we insist here on the question of truth, then
since both realms are on a par, we might be faced with having to deal
with the prospect of concluding that they (the propositions) are both
true. Since we are faced with asserting the truth of a proposition
together with its negation we are entitled to question whether we have
here effectively abandoned the notion of mathematical truth.
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However, Chihara argues that mythological platonism does not entail
the abandonment of mathematical truths but only that we must make the
distinction between 'objectively true' and 'true to a concept'. But in
the present context to say that a proposition is "true to a concept"
is no more than another way of stating that it is a "correct
description". What additional role does the invocation of truth play
here? It seems that the mythological platonist is beginning to reveal
himself as a closet formalist with a bad conscience and over-active
imagination, particularly so if for Chihara "intelligibility· implies
consistency and perhaps not much more. At least, as a general
philosophy, it takes us no further than formalism in that it puts all
consistent formal systems on a par.
Chihara's notion of 'true to a concept' clearly has affinities with
the notion of 'truth in a JlXJdel'in that a proposition true, for
example, in one realm of sets may be false in another. But is
Chihara's mythological platonist no DOre than a model theorist? The
model theorist generally considers different models of his axioms, he
is interested in the different models. Hore specifically, 1n the case
where we have a concept such as group it is the collection of models
and/or overall structural considerations that are to the fore rather
than consideration of the individuals constituting the domain. [These
attitudes are discussed in the following chapter on 'implicit
defini tion' .] Iowa realist doing JlDdel theory may wish to focus on
certain 'standard models' - but unlike the mythological platonist he
is committed to a realm of abstract objects. He certainly does not
hold the 'as if' attitude referred to in the above quotation from
- 47-
Chihara. From Chihara's characterization of mythological platonism
there is no suggestion that there is an interest in the range of
'models' or 'realms' . The mythological platonist describes a
particular realm or perhaps a limited number of realms. (In this weak
sense he could be said to possess a standard model or models.) In the
description of the mythological platonist true and false mean (as for
the realist) true in the 'standard' model except he has more
'standard' models. Put bluntly, the mythological platonist is in
precarious equilibrium between realism and the implicit definition
approach.
But even if we take Chihara's distinction seriously, we can simply go
on to distinguish between two notions of mathematical intuition. The
first reading as before but ·truth· taken in the sense of "objective
truth-. The second variety of mathematical intuition being
characterized as: that mode of cognition through which we may come to
recognize the truth to a concept of a mathematical proposition
independently of any prOOf of that proposition. Whether the second of
these notions is useful for the analysis of the relationship between
formal and informal matheJllaticsremains to be seen. But I judge it
unlikely since there is nothing relevant prior to simply formulating
the description.
Varieties of conceptualism, such as those discussed by Hallett and
Tragesser, as opposed to Chihara' s across the board thesis, tend to
confine themselves to a particular concept (or family of concepts). In
fact, in the given examples, the concept in question is that of 'set'.
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So far as set theory is concerned there are strong reasons for
adopting some form of the conceptualist thesis particularly in the
wake of Cohen's results, though the Kantian or Phenomenological
varieties tend to overstate the case. To begin with conceptualism
provides a straightforward rationalization of independent propositions
such as CH. Briefly, anticipating somewhat, what I have in mind is
that the concept of set is viewed very much as an 'algebraic' concept
together with a structuralist approach to the 'implicit definitian'
account of formalization. (Iote that there is no structuralist thesis
in Chihara' s mythological platonism. ) Koreover, this form of
conceptualism emerges as the best option in the light of the
historical development and treatment of set theory, coupled with its
success vis ~ vis the reduction or formulation of mathematical
concepts and its heuristic strength in the generation of new
mathematical ideas.
Having now discussed two responses to the dramatic failure of
codification evidenced by Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, both, in
their different ways, attempting to preserve the pressuposition of a
realm of objects associated with the various bodies of informal
mathematics, I turn now to a DOre radical departure, but not one
without powerful proponents: Hi!bert and von leumann amongst them.
This is the often misunderstood, and confused, account of formal
systems as implicit definitions.
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(6) Axiom Systems as Implicit Definitions
As Gorsky informs us
When concrete meaningful axiomatic systems were constructed (c.t. the
construction of geometry by Euclid), where the objects under
consideration were regarded as given and to a certain degree analysed
before the construction of the theory, and where explicit definitions
of objects under study were introduced before formulating the axioms,
the latter being interpreted as true propositions describing
correlations between them, the question did not arise in the
methodology of science whether axioms were definitions or not. Axioms
were unconditionally excluded from definitions. [1974 p.40]
However, just before the turn of the century, underpinned by the
development of set theory, and the influence of Hilbert, attitudes
towards axiomatization began a process of radical alteration. This
change is highlighted in what has become known as the Frege-Hilbert
debate.
The main point of disagreement between Frege and Hilbert was over the
nature and purpose of axioms. According to Frege, axioms must be
self-evident truths, thus the terms they use DUst be pre-equipped with
meaning and denotation. Put bluntly, we should know what the
axioJllatizedtheory is a theory of. Milbert on the other hand, took
the view in his work on geometry and the real number system that
axioms are "implicit definitions" of their terms, that is, they serve
to pick out any system of objects that happen to satisfy them, and
that this is all we need or have to say about points or numbers or
whatever. One could be forgiven for thinking that the development of
modern mathematics has completely vindicated Hilbert's view, for this
"structuralist" approach .. has been dominant in twentieth century
mathematics. Certainly structuralism has given mathematical research
enormous freedom, since it appears to encourage the discovery and
investigation of new structures through the modification or
suppression of axioms of a given system. [Hallett: "Review of Michael
Resnick: Frege and the Philosophy of MAthematics"]
The thesis, then, that axiom systems constitute implicit definitions
amounts to this: that a 'natural number' or 'real number' is nothing
more nor less than an element of a model of number theory or real
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number theory respectively. As Hallett puts it "they serve to pick out
any system of objects that happen to satisfy them". There are various
modified versions but this is the 'strong' version professed by
Hilbert about the turn of the century particularly in connection wih
his work on the axiomatization of geometry. To begin with I shall
discuss this strong version. This will serve to bring the central
characteristics of the thesis into bold relief and then I shall turn
to a discussion of an amended form of the thesis which amongst other
things is more in line with Hilbert's general approach and certainly
more viable as a view of formalIzation.
low, in fact, quite a few commentators have tended to shift to a
stronger thesis in the sense that they shade over into outright
formalism. This was so in von leumann's case. As well as von Heumann
quite a few workers in set theory at one time or another adopted the
implici t deUni tion view in some form, or at least professed, or
appeared, to hold it. That Skolem understood Zermelo to have held this
view in the 1908 axiomatization of set theory is evident from Skolem's
first I remark' in his 1922. That many who professed the view later
shifted attitudes either explicl tly or at least, as is usually the
case, in effect, is not surprising given the highly unstable nature of
the position. To demonstrate this characteristic of the thesis I shall
adopt a set theoretical construal of model. Indeed, it is as good as
written into the thesis. As such this is an acknowledgement that a set
theory in some form or other forms a substantial part of the
metatheory.
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It is sometimes claimed that the implicit definition thesis makes no
sense since, for example, we call ZF+CH and ZF+ICH 'set' theories,
but they clearly have no models in common. Furthermore, how is it that
we call ZF, HBG, NF, etc. set theories? Surely there must be a warrant
to enable us to dub these various systems •set' theories and thus
there is a common notion that is not implicitly defined. But this is
not an effective criticism. The term •set·, the thesis holder may
retort, is merely a means of classification that owes its origins in
some cases to a common core of axioms in others to no more than
historical, psychological andlor accidental factors. It no more
militates against the implicit definition thesis than does the fact
that we have various group theories, e.g. abelian groups. non-abelian
groups, etc and it is evident that group theory is no more than an
implicit definition of 'groupies', if you like.
It is to be stressed that under the implicit definition thesis appeal
to a standard model, unless it is picked out by pure convention, is no
longer an option. Except in the case of a convention, the idea of a
standard model is incoherent as an adjunct to the view of axioms as
implicit definitions. There has been a suggestion that, at least for
number theory. the anterior appeal to a standard model may be avoided
if we employ a Lr.h.w language and apply Scott· s theorem that, for
countable model's LW1,w-equivalence and isomorphism coincide. Thus we
may claim a categoric number theory. But this only works if we sneak
in a standard model of number theory into the metatheory. After all,
the language allows countable conjunctions and disjunctions, i.e.
indexed by the sequence of 'natural numbers' of the metatheory. But
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the structure of this index set, and in turn, the resulting class of
isomorphic models, depends an the 'model' of number theory we are
working with in the metatheory. [Cf. Weston 1976 an Kreisel's claims
in his 1967 for a second-order formulation of set theory]
The mention of group theory above brings us to the following
observation. The thesis that an axiom system constitutes an implicit
definition begins to appear quite natural on an algebraic approach to
mathematics. In part, this appearance is historically based. For
example, the pioneers of modern abstract algebra e.g. loether and van
der Yaarden were heavily influenced by the pre-formalist Hilbert even
though they were working in the 20'sand 30's. But apart from
historical considerations it is plainly the case that an algebraic
theory is not the theory of a pertiicul er realm. In the case of
theories such as the first-order theory of groups we have many
familiar structures that satisfy the axioms. These structures, if you
like, are paradigmatic examples of the notion of group. But there is
no question here of a standard model. Ve might 'discover' more about
this concept by applications of the proof theory, or more likely. but
controversially. applying a theory of models. However, we would not
make a 'discovery' in the sense that we would feel obliged to add a
further axiom. Moreover. the existence of propositions independent
of the axioms as such is not problematic. Where with set theory or
arithmetic we might expect, if by some lapse we were not taking the
implicit definition thesis at face value, completeness or
categoricity, it is quite the reverse for algebraic theories. It is
part and parcel of algebraic practice to elaborate a given set of
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axioms. That is - at one time we may be particularly interested in
abelian groups and at another in non-abelian groups.
Let us briefly look at the case of set theory. Here the problems
inherent in the implicit definition thesis are brought into sharp
relief. Suppose we consider the ZF-axioms as an implicit definition.
A universe of sets is no more than a structure satisfying the axioms
and the notion of set is relativized to one of these structures. But
these structures are themselves sets and they cannot be sets in the
sense just given. Are they sets in some absolute sense of sets? If
so, then this is in conflict with the assumption for ZF of the
implicit definition thesis. <Anyway, the thesis was proposed as a
response to the failure of codification and any attempt at codifying
this absolute set theory within an effective system is again bound to
fail short.) Furthermore, the issue of codification aside. if we
employ a system that has set theory incorporated into its semantics we
will not be making set theory any more preCise than our acquaintance
with the notion of set in the semantics. One possibility is that
perhaps we should also view these sets in some relative manner. In
other words, we posit a never-ending hierarchy of universes of
universes, etc. This seems unsatisfactory since it leaves us with the
puzzling question as to what all these objects are. If we construe
them as sitting in some Gantorian Super-Absolute then it seems we are
doomed to begin yet another ascent through the hierarchies .
•
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In the discussion above on the thesis that a formal system constitutes
an implicit definition reference has been made to 'structures',
'notion of a group', 'isomorphism' and 'categorici ty'. But none of
these figure in the characterization of the thesis. Furthermore I have
tended to explicate the thesis in a rather indirect way using
examples; specifically, number theory. group theory and set theory. So
now I shall reconsider directly and in more general terms the thesis
that a formal system constitutes an impl1ci t definition. My purpose
here is first to show that the thesis as it stands is untenable and
then to discuss an associated thesis which explicitly incorporates
reference to 'structure' etc.
The strong implicit definition thesis is that a system of axioms
determine a class of interpretations, namely those that satisfy the
axioms. lote then that an implicit definition is not a definition at
all. The axioms of geometry do not define 'point', 'line' etc.
However, axioms may be converted into a predicate within set theory
which defines a class. For example, the group axioms may be formulated
as a set theoretical predicate which holds of a set only in case it is
a model satisfying the group axioms. But this is all entirely
explicit.
The implicit definition thesis was here introduced as a response to
the failure of codification. So, given a for_l system, a natural
question is, what is the inforJllillltheory of which the system is a
putati ve formalization and does the system codify and precisify the
informal mathematics? To answer this we must first be clear that in
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the case of the implicit definition thesis it cannot be a matter of
whether the system is related to a particular realm in some way. For
example, whether the first order Peano axiom's or ZF exhibit a certain
relation to some realm of natural numbers or sets. According to the
thesis a natural number or set is nothing more than an element in a
model of the respective systems. Second, it 1s straightforwardly the
case that the relevant semantics involved here, i.e. the (F3)
component of the system, 1s a model theory.
The considerations in the paragraph above leads to the conclusion that
if a formal system 1s an implicit definition in the strong sense then
there is no informal theory of which the system is a formalization. So
for example, if a natural number is nothing but an element of a model
of the first order Peano axioms then this dispenses of a realm of
objects whose informal mathematics is putatively codified and
precisified by the formal system. Basically, we have an axiom system
in a given language and its models and nothing preceding it of which
the system is a formalization. In the case of group theory this
position, at least at first sight, is not unappealing since the
interest lies in the DDdels. Th1s is generally true of algebraic
theories.
On the other hand the history of group theory informs us that there
was an informal idea of a group. An informal notion of group to which
we may refer in our judgments whether a formal system is a
formalization of the notion of a group. I have already mentioned the
existence of paradigmatic realizations and in fact it is clear that
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there have been sharp specific heuristics that have contributed to the
formulation of the axioms, for example, the positive integers under
the operation of addition. The informal mathematics is now becoming
identified. For the moment I take it to be the informal notion a
group. However, I am not claiming that there is a prior informal
notion for all algebraic varieties. It is possible for a variety to be
formulated by a random selection of axioms. Furthermore, once a
concept such as 'non-commutati vity' is noted for groups and say the
abelian axiom is added to the basic group axioms then the idea can be
considered generally in connection with other algebraic varieties. It
becomes a familiar concept - and its application a known strategy -
within algebra.
The first proposed mdification to the strong implicit definition
thesis is that whilst axioms do serve to pick out a class of models at
the same time they may be formalizations of informal notions as in the
case of group theory. As such the issues of codification and
precisification are operative. The second modification is to make the
thesis an explicit doctrine on structure. As stated the strong version
makes no direct reference to the notion of structure. Of course, a
model is a 'structure' and the axioms pick out those models with
certain structural features but it has to be made expl1ci t that the
model theory which in Goodman's words "is the study of the semantic
content of mathematical theories" is not essentially concerned with
the 'paints' of a given model. 10 doubt Hilbert and the Hilbert school
of algebraicists supported this view. [See part III, Chapter 3.] Thus
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this modification underpins the references to 'isomorphism' and
'categorici ty'.
I will now refer to this modified view of the status of formal systems
as simply the implicit definition thesis. Now given this thesis where
we have concocted an arbitrary set of axioms the issue of codification
is trivialized. The non-trivial cases are those where we have a prior
informal notion. These are the important cases so far as mathematical
practice is concerned. [Cf. the quotation from Lakatos 1978 in chapter
3 p.-] But here there is no clear cut set of necessary and sufficient
conditions determining codification. If anything it is a matter of
judgement by the _thematical community and varies over time. The
situation is analogous to the adoption by physicists of, for example,
a particular definition of 'mass'. late, however, that an axiom is not
a true or false statement about a particular realm but is more akin to
being a correct assertion about an informal concept. As a
straightforward example, suppose we are conerder Ing the first order
formalization of commutative groups where the (F3) component is a
classical model theory. Then the formal sentence 'TIxTIY<Xfy=yfX), may
be informally understood (as opposed to its interpretation in a given
application of the semantic theory) as prescribing that 'the binary
operation on a group commutes' and thus judged to be part of the
putati ve codification of the informal notion. At this point I shall
make four more remarks on codification and the implicit definition
thesis.
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i) A necessary condition determining codification is that the
paradigmatic structures associated with the informal notion be
included in the collection of models determined by the formal system.
Or rather, that their set model correlates be so included.
it) The development of a mathematical concept is an evolutionary
process including modification of a concept as a response to the
emergence of important open problems. Furthermore, the problem of, and
a given solution to, the formalization of an informal nation itself
may serve to initiate a further stage in the development of the
informal notion. That is, there is a feedback process between informal
notions and formalizations. An important example is the axiomatisation
and formalization of Cantorian set theory which will be discussed in
this connection in part II.
ii1) So far as 'group', 'ring', 'vector space'. 'module' etc.. 1. e.
paradigms of algebraic notions, are concerned, the implicit
definition thesis is a sound viewpoint. But the thesis also covers the
fOI'lllalizationof number theory, geometry and set theory. So ZF, for
example, is considered as a putative formalization of an informal
notion of 'set' picking out a class of structures. Put bluntly. an
algebraic attitude is adopted towards these theories; they are treated
just as the notions of group, ring, etc. On the other hand this is
not to deny that they may have a special foundational importance or
application. Iote, that just as for the strong version, for the
proponent of the implicit definition thesis the incompleteness theorem
does nat signal a failure of codification. (At the same time the
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thesis is not an argument against those who profess a realist attitude
to say natural numbers or sets. If such a realist was willing to give
up Hilbert's thesis then he could claim that the relevant reality was
not completely axiomatizable in an effective first order system. This
1s also a coherent att1 tude for those professing a realist attitude
towards the formalization of the laws of nature. However, in the
mathematical case the problem of how we know what we know is not so
straightforward.)
iv) Although I have introduced the 1mplici t definition thesis as a
response to the failure of codification, historically it was professed
if not for arithmetic (or recursive arithmetic) then for geometry, set
theory and abstract algebraic theories before the proof of the
incompleteness theorem.
In construing classical first order systems as implicit definitions it
becomes especially problematic as to whether we have made the
underlying informal notions semantically precise. Reference to a
standard model is no longer a legitimate option. Rather, we must refer
to a class of structures. Botions such as group and natural number are
reduced to set theoretic notions - a group is realized as a set
theoretic structure and a natural number a set theoretic construction
- and it is problematic whether these set theoretic notions are any
more perspicuous than the original informal notions of group or
natural number or whatever. An historical setting for the above is
provided by Goodman. He informs us that
In the eighteenth century, mathematics was considered a science
distinguished from the other sciences only in being more certain and
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more fundamental. Its special province was the laws governing space
and quantity. In the course of the nineteenth century, this
conception of the nature of mathematics was strongly undermined.
First the non-Euclidean geometries were used to deny existence of a
unique spatial structure for our intuitions to be about. Then
analytic geometry was used to undercut the view that there was an
intuition of space at all apart from our intuition of the numerical
continuum. The end product of this development is the contemporary
mathematician who tells his undergraduate students that by three-
dimensional Euclidean space he means the set of all ordered triples of
real numbers. Obviously, that is not what Euclid meant. Toward the
end of the nineteenth century, even the intuitive conception of
quantity or magnitude was replaced, at least officially, by the purely
conceptual structures introduced by Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor.
Again, a contemporary mathematician is likely to tell his students
that by a real number he means a Dedekind cut. Obviously, that is not
what Euler meant.
One effect of these changes was to produce what might be called a
foundational vacuum - a situation in which mathematicians were without
any sytematic account of the nature of the structures they were
dealing with. Axiomatic set theory rushed in to fill this void. [1979
p.5491
The picture now presented by the implicit definition thesis is that a
formal system identifies a class of models of the axioms and (with the
exceptions referred to above) is a putative formalization of an
informal notion. The semantics is a model theory I.e. a fragment of
set theory. The investigation of the notion associated with the formal
system is facilitated by this set theory. We can ask 'global'
questions such as whether two abelian groups of the same cardinality
of order p (a prime) are isomorphic or consider the Whitehead problem:
"Suppose G is an abelian group with the property that whenever H is an
abelian group extending the group Z, of integers, such that HIZ:.:G,
then H~ZeG (direct sum). Is G necessarily free?" [As stated in Devlin
1979 p.1501 However, the answers to these 'global' questions depend on
the underlying set theory. A given question may be answered
affirmatively, negatively or be independent depending on the
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underlying set theory. The underlying set theory provides construction
principles such as e.g. axiom of replacement and key elements of the
ontology e.g. the existence of a measurable cardinal. For example, if
the underlying
constructibility
set theory incorporates
then the Whitehead question
the principle
is answered in
of
the
affirmative. In this sense the underlying set theory provides an arena
or 'site' for mathematical activity and the realization of
mathematical concepts.
The site delilllits the notion of a group in that a variation in the
underlying set theory in general brings about a variation in the class
of groups and general propositions about groups obtained by
application of the model theory. Furthermore, there is nothing in all
this to suggest that there is anything amiss with the codification of
the informal notion. In effect, the notion of 'group' has been
relativized. Under the implicit definition thesis it is evident that
the situation described above in the case of group theory holds not
only for common algebraic notions but also for arithmetic, the theory
of the continuum, geometry and set theory. In short, mathematical
notions are treated algebraically and this approach accommodates
relativism in a very natural way.
The underlying set theory may itself be formalized and since the
implicit definition thesis applies generally it applies to this formal
system also. A model of this system also constitutes a site of
mathematical activity in that the considerations of the last two
paragraphs may be interpreted as relativized to this model. That is,
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we consider the models as sitting in this 'universe of sets'. More
generally we can construe a site of mathematical activity as a model
of a foundational theory, e.g. 2F, and I shall employ the term in this
general sense. The 'global' questions are not global in any absolute
sense. They refer to 'all' models of a given system where the
quantification is localized to a site. This is in keeping with the
implicit definition thesis which as we have stated does not take
formalization to be a process of codifying truths about some absolute
realm of mathematical objects. In any case, as Mayberry has emphasized
in his 1977 classical first-order logic is constrained in it's ability
to codify any absolute sense of 'all' 1. e. genuine global
quantification.
As indicated in the quotation from Hallett at the beginning of this
chapter the implicit definition thesis is associated with a general
"structuralist- approach. The formal system identifies a 'category' in
a naive sense in that notions such as structure preserving functions
between models and categoricity are emphasised and (in practice) there
is an identification of isomrphic structures. This was natural for
the abstract algebraist but the thesis is in fact applied throughout
mathematics. But these considerations are in anticipation of part III.
There I shall discuss the emergence of category theory out of this
naive context and how wherein category theory concepts were developed
that unify, simplify and generally rationalize the structural
viewpoint. However, as we shall see, this development does not lead to
an eschewal of a set theoretical foundation.
f
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ZF and the axiomatizations and formalizations of set theory which are
its precursors are putative axiomatizations and formalizations of an
informal body of mathematics, roughly speaking, the Cantorian notion
of set. But underlying these formalizations, although generally
centred on the Cantorian notion, we are not faced with a fixed concept
of set but rather with an notion in the process of evolution. It is
clear from a critical history from Cantor to Cohen and post-Cohen
developments that the notion has undergone significant
transformations, particularly important being the shift from Zermelo's
axioms to Skolem's. This last constitutes the subject matter of Part
II.
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(7) Appendix to section (2)
In Brouwer's philosophy, mathematics derives from intuition in so far
as it is based on the Kantian doctrine of Alnner sense" which is the
intuition "by which we are aware of our own states of mind in time."
[Paton 1936 p.99] In so far as it carriee with it an epistemological
component. Kantian "Inner sense" accords with my reading of
mathe_tical intuition. At ti_s Brouwer, appears to confirm this
view. Writing in 1907 he claimed that
The primordial intuition of mathematics and every intellectual
activity 1s the substratum of all observations of change when divested
of all quality. [Ph.D Thesis p.8l
However,
Xathematics is, according to Brouwer, not a theory, a system of rules
and statements, but a certain fundamental part of humansci i vi ty, ...
[Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy 1973 p.220]
At least as far as mathematics is concerned this act!vity primarily
concerns itself with the ontology of mathematics. Inner sense
provides the raw material for this activity. The existence of
mathematical objects derives from iterated operations or
"constructions" in the inner sense and previously constructed objects.
In fact
The fundamental thesis of intuitionism in almost all its variants says
that existence in _the_tics coincides with constructibflity. [Ibid
p. 220.]
The emphasis in Brouwer' 5 philosophy of mathematics is upon
mathematical activity and in particular mathematical existence. What
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then about the status of mathematical propositions? Xay we , via
inner sense, accept the truth of a mathematical proposition
independently of any proof of that proposition? This is apparently an
extremely difficult question. Korner answers in the affirmative. In
fact, according to Korner, for the Brouwerian, this is the case for
all mathematical propositions. He interprets mathematical theorems as
reports on intuitive constructions and claims that
For the intuitionist every true mathematical statement is justified by
a construction which is (1) a self-evident experience and (11) not
external perception. [1960 p.1361
On the other hand, in Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy it is emphasized
that
The construction itself constitutes the proof ... [1973 p.225J
However, the notion of proof here is rather weak since they also state
...one should drop the usual idea as though the demonstration were
intended to convince the reader of the soundness of an argumentation
by basing it, step after step, on recognized principles
[Ibid.p.225]
•
The role of intuition in empiricist accounts of mathematics is not
altogether clear in those versions which include the use of a
principle of induction. That is, either the mathematical principle of
induction or the more usual inductive inference referred to in
discussions of empiricism. Poincare, whose philosophy of mathematics,
according to Chihara, was in many respects empiriCist,
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followed Kant in holding that there are some things we know
through intuition, as for example that mathematical induction is a
valid inference form ... [1973 p.145]
It follows that if the other postUlates of Peano arithmetic, e.g. that
no two positive integers have the same successor, are known
intuitively, then Peano's postUlates are intuitive mathematics
according to my characterization. lote that it is likely that the
majori ty of the consequences of these postulates may be considered
part of the informal theory of arithmetic but not part of intuitive
mathematics. They may be simply too complex or indeed be "surprising"
results. This point also highlights the role of intuitive mathematics
in indicating what are to be taken as axioms. (Consider the axiom of
choice, i.e. Cantor, Ramsey, von Neumann versus Weyl, Borel, Lebesgue,
and the continuum hypothesis in connection to the above.) It may also
be the case that some propositions known intuitively are not added to
the postulates since they are seen to be derivable from them.
However, it might be argued that some of these postulates are "proved"
by inductive procedures (i.e. those commonly discussed in philosophy
of science). The arch-empiricist XiII took induction, in this sense,
to be an inference of syllogistic form in which the major premise is
suppressed. The major premise in question being an assertion of the
uniformity of nature. In this case, if all the postulates are derived
by induction then we have here a candidate for an intuition-free
arithmetic. Kitcher, however, in his recent revival of a
thoroughgoing empiricist philosophy of mathematics takes the view that
Some mathematical statements are asserted on the basis of inductive or
analogical arguments. Such arguments standardly will not fulfill
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either of the functions of proofs, but they may nonetheless be used to
warrant mathematical belief. [1983 p.181]
•
I shall devote the remainder of this section to first drawing
attention to an important distinction and second, in making some
observations about informal mathematics and language. This also
affords us a glance into some attributes regarding the transformation
of informal theories into formal axiomatic systems.
The distinction is that between axiomatization and formalization. So,
for example, as will be made evident, the systems of Peano 1889,
Zermelo 19081'1 and Skolem 1922, though axiomatizations, in
contradistinction to ZFt were not formalizations. Charles Parsons
writes that
Axiomatization is an especially thoroughgoing and rigorous instance of
a process in the organization of knowledge that might be called
systemization. The objective is to organize a body of knowledge (or
of a theory that aspires to be knowledge) in such a way as to clarify
its structure and strengthen its justification as a whole. In
particular, one seeks to single out certain concepts and principles as
"primitive" or "fundamental" and others as "defined" or "derived".
The method ofaxiomatization, first applied to geometry in ancient
times and epitomized by Euclid's Elements, presents a theory by
singling out certain primitive notions and defining others from them,
and singling out certain propositions as axioms and deriving all other
propositions of the theory by deduction.
These notions of definition and deduction are not without ambigui ty.
It is a mark of an informal axiomatic theory that a general background
is used in developing it that is not itselfaxiomatized in the theory
itself. In mdern mathematics this background can include logic,
arithmetic, and even SODS analysis and set theory. [1974 p.27]
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In the above, Parsons states that in axiomatizing we "organize a body
of knowledge". But if, for example, we axiomatize the theory of
abelian groups are we entitled to claim that we have organized a body
of knowledge - especially if we take seriously the contention that the
axioms constitute an implicit definition? (Well, perhaps, in the
sense that we know that much about abelian gr-oups;) Note also that
Parsons is slightly puzzling in the latter part of the quotation in
that the informal axiomatized theory might be logic and this logic is
also the background theory. This point may also hold for set theory.
For Parsons, after axiomatization, or in his words "rigorous
axiomatization", two further steps yield a formalization, first: "all
background theory, incuding logic, and everything given by the meaning
of the prim! t1ves, are to be taken up into the axiomatization";
second: "we replace the language involved by an artificial syntax".
The impression given by Parsons by his use of phrases such as
"singling out primitive notions and defining others from them" and
"replace the language involved" is that informal mathematics, which is
for him a "body of knowledge", is a collection of propositions, where
the term "proposition" is interpreted as a linguistic entity, i.e.
sentence. On that view a formalization involves a change of language
and, moreover, the analysis of the relationship between informal and
formal mathematics essentially involves the study of a particular
relationship between two collections of linguistic entities. One a
collection of propositions the other a collection of sentences of an
artificial language. But is this straightforwardly the case?
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It is an open question whether the "perceptions" of the
epistemological platonist or "conceptions" of the mythological
platonist are in a linguistic mode or in some form more akin to the
sensual, e.g. visual or apprehended in the mind's eye, so to speak.
Is the move from informal to formal mathematics analogous, say, to a
logic student rendering a sequence of sentences of a natural language
into the language of a first-order predicate calculus? Except that
perhaps it might be argued that in the case of mathematics we need to
retain content rather than just logical form. Or might it be, in some
instances, akin to describing a landscape.
The Brouwerian takes an extreme view with respect to the connections
between language and mathematics. The view is that mathematics is
certainly a non-linguistic mental activity. In the Brouwerian
philosophy
the weakness of mathematical language in comparison with mental
construction is stressed, for any language is, says Brouwer, vague and
prone to misunderstanding, even symbolic language (since mathematical
and logical symbols rest on ordinary language for their
interpretation). Hence mathematical language is ambiguous and
defective; mathematical thought, while strict and uniform in itself,
becomes subject to obscurity and error when transferred from one
person to another by means of speaking or writing. Thus it therefore
would be a fundamental mistake to analyse mathematical language
instead of mathematical thought. [Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel, Levy 1973
p. 224)]
Ve might argue that to that activity of which we may impute error and
vagueness we must allow even if only by sheer chance luck the
possibility of correctness and clarity. But for Brouwer language is
essentially vague. This does not necessarily vitiate the analYSis of
the relationship between informal and formal mathematics. However,
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Brouwer's view on the status of formalization does. Beth informs us
that
Brouwer gives a striking description of the successive stages in
the formalisation of mathematics. He enumerates: (i) the construction
of intuitive systems of mathematical entities, <ij) the verbal
parallel of mathematical thinking, that is mathematical language;
(iij) the mathematical analysis of this language; this activity leads
to the discovery of verbal edifices established in accordance with the
principles of logic; <1v) the step of abstracting from the meaning of
the elements which constitute these verbal edifices; the abstract
systems thus obtained are considered to be mathematical systems of the
second order; they are identical with the formal systems studied by
symbolic logic; (v) the introduction of the language of symbolic logic
which accompanies logical constructions; this stage is found in the
works of Peano and Russell; (vi) the mathematical analyet s of the
language of logicians; this stage, initiated by Hi!bert, had been
neglected by Peano and Russell; (vij) the step of abstracting ... etc.
- According to Brouwer, mathematics is only to be found in the first
stage of the process; the second stage is unavoidable from a practical
point of view; the later stages are of a derivative character. [1959
p.4111
Thus, for Brouwer, there is no legitimate formal mathematics as such
and hence there is no relation to analyse between formal and informal
mathematics. The stage (Uj) indicates a relationship between formal
and informal lzmguages but the Brouwerian claim is that this is far
removed from the arena of mathematics. However, in stark contrast to
Brouwer, some philosophers of mathematics working in the general
tradition following on from Brouwer's intuitionism,' in particular
those who take as their starting point that mathematics is grounded in
constructions, conceive mathematical activity and language as
intimately connected. They also take a more positive view of the
relationship between the informal mathematics and its formalization.
For example, Xachover confesses
I strongly believe that all mathematics
starts as schematic constructive activity.
starts from construction,
[1983 p.10]
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It is the schematic nature of the constructions which contributes the
linguistic component. Machover writes
Let us start from a certain type of schematic construction. At this
stage each proposition is a statement asserting the feasibiIity of
such-and-such a construction. A proof of such a proposition consists
in showing how to perform a construction of the kind the proposition
claims to be feasible, and showing that the described construction is
indeed of the required kind. These propositions become at least
partly formalised. (All mathematics becomes at least partly
formalised, if only in a fragment of a natural language. This seems
to be one of the rules of the game; perhaps it has to do with the
schematic nature of the constructions.)
The fact that we are still at a constructive stage means that the
logic which governs our discourse is constructivist logic
(intuitionist logic). Though our mathematics is already formalised -
partly or even completely - it is not meaningless. On the contrary,
formalisation is merely a tool of precision. The postulates which we
use are by no means arbitrary strings of symbols, neither are they
implicit definitions of hypothetical entities. They are postulates in
the old traditional sense self evident truths about the
constructions we are dealing with. Consistency is guaranteed provided
we have managed to capture correctly in our intuition certain basic
facts about these constructions. [Ibid. p.10]
Note that Machover's notion of formalization seems less constrained
than Parson's since formalization does not presuppose an artificial
language. He claims that formalization is merely a tool of precision.
It is clear from the passage quoted above that this is not only
syntactic precision. He also tends to give the impression that there
is a stable underlying concept of construction and that the successive
steps of formalization are to be construed as sharper and sharper
characterizations of this concept. As a matter of fact Brouwer
claimed that there was an absolute concept of construction but, as is
argued by Tait [1983], Brouwer's account of it is inadequate. It has
transpired that the conceptual analysis of 'construction' is proving
to be extremely difficult. The fact that there are so many different
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schools of Constructivist Mathematical Philosophy is partly a
reflection of the elusiveness of the notion of 'construction'. Curry,
in the following passage, indicates a further aspect of its elusive
character. He informs us that
About 1930 Heyting gave a formalization of arithmetic which was
compatible with intuitionism; somewhat later Godel showed that
classical arithmetic could be interpreted in intuitionistic
arithmetic; this gives an intuitionistic proof of the consistency of
classical arithmetic, whereas a strictly finitary proof would
contradict one of Godel's incompleteness theorems. Thus there is,
from the finitary standpoint, a nonconstructive element in the
intuitionistic arithmetic; just where this enters I do not know.
[1963 p.15]
The significance of the aforementioned result, namely that: classical
arithmetic is consistent relative to intuitionistic arithmetic is
again embedded in the issue of the relationship between formal and
informal mathematics. Does it provide evidence of the instability or
incoherence of the notion of 'construction' or have we found a
plausibility argument for the consistency of classical arithmetic?
Consideration of these types of aspects of formal results brings us
back to a central problem which constituted our starting point namely:
the question of the philosophical and foundational significance of
mathematical results.
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PART II: ZERXELO, SKOLEK AID DEFINITE PROPERTIES.
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INTRODUCTION
Cohen's independence results are metamathematical results. That is,
they are theorems about a specific formal system, namely ZF, treated
as a mathematical object. But their foundational and philosophical
significance is to be located within the study of the relationship
between a body of informal mathematics and its putative
formalizations. So the following question arises: "What is the the
informal body of mathematics of which ZF is a putative formalization?"
In the wake of this question are the general considerations discussed
in Part I. Clearly any given answer to the general problems raised in
that discussion will affect attitudes towards the significance of the
independence results.
Ernst Zermelo's paper of 1908 entitled "Investigations in the
foundations of set theory In [1908aJ is generally credited as
presenting the first axiomatization of set theory. His axioms, in one
form or another, may still be said to constitute the core of the
axiomatic approach to set theory. In Part II, after highlighting the
distinction between what I refer to as the logical and mathematical
approaches to set theory, I discuss some of the central features of
the transformation of Zermelo's axiolll3into the formal system ZF.
Specifically Skolem's contribution to this transformation.
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The transformation of Zermelo's axioms into ZF comprises a sequence of
systems featuring addition of axioms e.g. axiom of foundation,
differences in the formulation of particular axioms, differences in
the degree of formalization, changes in the background logic as well
as the underlying heuristic, e.g. influence of the 'iterative' notion
of set. Amongst other things, an examination of this transformation
facili tates a discussion of what is purportedly being formalized by
ZF.
Bow ZF and the axiomatizations and formalizations of set theory which
are its precursors are putative axiomatizations and formalizations of
an informal body of mathematics. In a rather broad sense this informal
body of mathematics may be identified as the Cantorian notion of set.
But underlying these progressive formalizations, although generally
centred on the Cantorian notion, we are not faced with a fixed concept
of set but rather a notion in the process of evolution. It is clear
from a critical account of developments from Cantor to Cohen <and
certain post-Cohen developments e.g. elementary topos theory> that the
notion has undergone significant transmutations. Moreover, the
aforementioned evolution has to a large extent been driven by a
feedback mechanism in the sense that the process of formalization
itself has served to modify the informal notion.
The crucial point in the progress of the formalization of set theory
occurs in the transformation of Zermelo's system following Skolem's
revolutionary paper of 1922. The main body of Skolem's paper consists
of remarks upon eight "points·. Skolem lists these as:
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1. The peculiar fact that, in order to treat of "sets", we must begin
with "domains" that are constituted in a certain way;
2. A definition, much to be desired, that makes Zermelo's notion
"definite propositionH precise;
3. The fact that in every thoroughgoing axiomatization set-theoretic
notions are unavoidably relative;
4. The fact that Zermelo's system of axioms is not sufficient to
provide a foundation for ordinary set theory;
5. The difficulties caused by the nonpredicative stipulations when one
wants to prove the consistency of the axioms;
6. The nonuniqueness of the domain B;
7. The fact that mathematical induction is necessary for the logical
investigation of abstractly given systems of axioms;
8. A remark on the principle of choice. [1922 pp.291-292J
In this paper Skolem proposed the key changes that marked the
transformation of Zermelo's system into 2F, the protagonist in Cohen's
theorems. Moreover, Skolem's criticisms in this paper raise
fundamental philosophical problems for set theory, specifically
problems with respect to its axiomatization and formalization. Most
contemporary papers on the philosophical problems of set theory
relating to its formalization deal with issues that can be directly
traced back to those raised in Skolem's 1922. For example, taking
Skolem's first remark as a starting point, is Mayberry's 1977 whose
criticisms and proposals for an alternati ve axiomatization of set
theory are underpinned by his interpretation of Cantorianism, in
particular Cantor's 'finitism'.
In addition, although the flood of independence results initiated by
Cohen in 1963 brought certain foundational issues into sharp relief,
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it did not create essentially new foundational problems but rather it
dramatically underlined problems that were inherent in the enterprise
of formalizing set theory from the beginning. Moreover, they brought
to centre stage issues which had for the most part been ignored due
largely to the successful and important contribution of set theory to
the development of twentieth century mathematics. That many of these
issues are not new is clearly evidenced by Skolem's paper. For this
reason it offers not only a springboard for a discussion of current
views upon the issues raised by his remarks but also an excellent
focus for an examination of the genesis of ZF. However, in order to
appreciate the points that Skolem was making. it is also necessary to
discuss relevant aspects of Zermelo'S 1908.
It is the topic of 'definite properties' that receives centre stage in
part II. This is for the following reasons:
i) the treatment of definite properties is a central feature of the
formalization of set theory. At the same time, however. it does not
receive sufficient attention in the literature. For example. there has
recently appeared two generally excellent (and large) books on the
history and philosophy of set theory, namely: Moore 1982 and Hallett
1984, both of which discuss the formalization of set theory but have
failed to recognize, or at least make evident, the full importance of
the notion of 'definite property' in this connection.
11) quite a few of the issues raised in Skolem's other remarks are
essentially tied to this topic.
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iii) the treatment of 'definite properties' is intimately related to
independence results in set theory. As Bernays puts it
What the applicability [of Cohen's results] ...depend[sl on is
the...sharper axiomatization by which strict formalization becomes
possible, that is, the Fraenkel-Skolem delimitation of Zermelo's
concept 'definite Eigenschaft' [1967 p.117]
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THE MATHEMATICAL AND LOGICAL APPROACHES TO SET THEORY.
It is important to distinguish two approaches to the theory of sets,
the logical and mathematical, and recognize that Zermelo's system and
the various systems stemming from it, through to ZF, belong to the
latter. The essential characteristic of the 11Jl2the11JlJticalapproach is
its concern with the cantorian theory of transfinite arithmetic.
Cantor, as Hallett informs us,
was the founder of the mathematical theory of the infinite, and so one
might with justice call him the founder of modern mathematics.
Certainly a large part of his achievement was to help make the notion
of set the basic one in mathematics. But in many ways the core of his
work was his theory of transfinite number, especially the concept of
ordinal number ....to understand ~hy the ordinals were so important we
have to go back to some of Cantor's earlier work and the problem of
powers or infinite sizes that it raised.
The problem of powers in its most general form is to find a calculus
of absolute size <power) adequate for describing the sizes of
arbitrary infinite sets. [1984 p.1l
Cantor's theory of transfinite arithmetic was his solution to the
II problem of powers·. This theory _y be characterized, albeit rather
simplistically, as the extension of the natural numbers and the
arithmetical operations upon them, i.e. addition, multiplication and
exponentiation into the transfinite. The constituents of this
extension were the transfinite ordinals. The cardinals were defined in
terms of the ordinals. Cantor considered the fundamental application
of his theory was to be the determination of the power of the
continuum.
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As I stated above. Zermelo's system and its various transformations
through to ZF is Cantorian. Certainly. 2ermelo. Skolem. Fraenkel and
von Neumann professed their systems so to be. Of course, the extent to
which these various systems, in particular 2F. are Cantorian is
problematic and the sense of their Cantorianism requires analysis.
That is, Cantorianism incorporates a transfinite arithmetic, a
philosophy of the infinite and general heuristic principles, e.g. the
priority of the ordinal numbers; and each system needs to be examined
with respect to its incorporation of these particulars. But it is
clear that they are to be included within the mathematical approach.
2ermelo. for instance. states in the introduction to his 1908a that in
this paper his intention is
to show how the entire theory created by Cantor and Dedekind can be
reduced to a few definitions and seven principles, or
axioms, ...[p.200]
2ermelo, in claiming to have reduced Cantor's "entire theory", is
referring to Cantor's transfinite arithmetic. In fact, the greater
part of Zermelo's paper is taken up with developing the 'theory of
equivalence' i.e. fundamental cardinal theory. Thus. having presented
his system and showing that Russell's antinomy is blocked, 2ermelo's
immediate concern is with establishing the adequacy of his system for
the reconstruction of transfinite arithmetic.
Transfini te arithmetic does not feature in the essential concerns of
the logical approach to set theory. Investigating the general theory
of domains which underpins the semantics of logic, e.g. the legitimate
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ranges of quantifiers, or a general theory of the extensions of
properties are paradigms of the logical approach. This approach is to
be found in the work of Boole, Balzano, and the logicists Frege and
Russell. Logicists, not surprisingly, tend to construct unified
integrated systems of logic and sets.
Underpinned by a version of the vicious circle principle, Russell's
theory of types, in contrast to Zermelo's system, was a genuine and
direct response to the logical problem of the incoherence of the
unrestricted axiom of comprehension. Xore generally, after the
antinomies, the logical approach features a concern with a conceptual
analysis of the set concept obviating the antinomies and in Russell
and Poincare's case the requirement that a unified non ad hoc
explanation be given of the known antinomies. That is, an analysis
yielding a principle whose violation is the root cause of both the
logical and semantic paradoxes. Poincare's investigations, which also
led him to formulate a form of the vicious circle principle, were
based on the analysis of a semantic paradox. (In anticipation, I note
that consideration of the semantic paradoxes played a more prominent
role in the formative stages of set theory, particularly within the
mathematical approach, than is generally acknowledged.)
Both the approaches incorporate the thesis that set theory is
sufficient as a foundation for mathematics. For the logiCists this was
a matter of necessity. Those within the mathematical approach tended
towards an instrumentalistic attitude and, in general, were not
inclined towards intensive philosophical analysis. Significantly, this
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instrumentalistic attitude emerges in connection with the formulation
of the notion of definite properties which was basically a matter of
stipulation without, for instance, the benefit of any accompanying
attempt at a philosophical analysis of 'property'.
By way of illustration of foundational attitudes consider the
following two quotations. First, the opening passage of Zermelo's
1908a:
Set theory is that branch of mathematics whose task is to investigate
mathematically the fundamental notions "number", order", and
"function·, taking them in their pristine, simple form, and to develop
thereby the logical foundations of all of arithmetic and analysis;
thus it consU tutes an indispensable component of the science of
mathematics. [p.200]
Second, from Mayberry's 1977
The function of set theory in the foundations of mathematics is a
logical one. It is essentially a theory of definitions and arguments.
It provides the raw materials (L, e. sets, functions, ordered pairs,
etc.) and formal techniques for the definition of mathematical
structures and, through the unpacking of these definitions, the
ultimate principles upon which mathematical argument rests. [p.18]
As indicated in the latter quotation, the reducibility of mathematical
notions to those of set theory constitutes a key component of the
foundational thesis. For the logicists a reductionist programme was a
necessary undertaking. With the possible exception of full category
theory, it is generally acknowledged that the reductionist programme
has been realized. The credit for this extraordinary success is
chiefly due to the Logrc rat s. (One notable exception is the work of
Hausdorff and Kuratowski on reducing 'function', 'relation' and
'ordered pair'.) The reductionist programme, taken on board (to
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various degrees) within the mathematical approach in a largely
instrumentalistic spirit, may thus be said to be parasitic on the work
of the logicists. Kore generally, if the metatheory within which we
are considering some formal system constructed within the mathematical
approach is set theoretic then there is no bar to the metatheory being
based on the work of the logical approach. It is possible that this
metatheory could turn out to be relatively weak. There may, for
instance, be no necessity to incorporate a transfinite arithmetic into
the metatheory. Or there may be large cardinals in the object theory
and not even a replacement principle in the metatheory. Indeed, it is
arguable that nesting the metatheory within the logical approach would
be philosophically sound.
The logical approach, particularly that of the logicists, is close in
spirit to the Leibnizean tradition and to some extent arises directly
out of the Leibnizean programme of developing a characteristica
uni versa 1is. As Dumitriu observes
...the art of the characteristic was essentially connected to the art
of demonstrating, to vocabulary, and thus to the language itself, as
Couturat underlined. Liebniz had to establish a universal language,
or vocabulary, in order to be able to start the algebraical mechanism
of the characteristic. Here is what Couturat stated about this matter
(La Logique de Let tmi z ; p, 79): n In order to set up the alphabet of
human ideas, which had to be the vocabulary basis, all concepts had to
be analysed and reduced to simple elements using definitions. But
that meant taking stock of all human knowledge, and, as the analysis
of concepts is the analysis of truth, it also meant demonstrating all
known truths, reducing them to simple and evident principles ...(1977
Vol. III p.141. See also Couturat 1901]
Constrained to mathematics Leibniz's programme is the blueprint for
Frege's Begriffsschrift. In fact in this connection Frege wrote
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My intention was not to represent an abstract logic in formulas, but
to express a content through written signs in a more precise and clear
way than it is possible to do through words. In fact, what I wanted to
create was not a mere calculus ratiocinator but a lingua characterica
in Leibniz's sense. [1882 pp.1-2. Quoted in van Heijenoort 1967 p.2]
Frege in the passage above is differentiating his approach from
Boole's. Boole tended to concentrate on the algebraic structure of
disciplines such as logic, arithmetic, probabilities and sets and then
highlighting their structural similarities. Xoreover, in applying any
perceived structural similarities, he emphasized the method whereby
one works with a particular algebra (usually arithmetical or perhaps
uninterpreted in the sense that he worked formally with the
operations) then after making the required calculations there is a
choice of interpretations of the result. A typical example occurs in
his 'Laws of Thought' [1854] where on determining the structural
identity between his algebras of logic and the arithmetical algebra of
o and 1 Boole stresses that
Ye may in fact lay aside the logical interpretation of the symbols in
the given equation; convert them into quantitative symbols,
susceptible only of the values 0 and 1; perform upon them as such all
the requisite processes of solution; and finally restore to them their
logical interpretation. [p.701
The contrast between Frege and Boole is an early indicator of the
emergence of an important facet of the mathematical approach: namely
an algebraic treatment of mathematical concepts. [Its significance is
taken up in part III chapter 3.1
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Both approaches were party to the general trend towards formalization
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. For the logical approach
this was part of the Leibnizean influence. As Wedburg observes
When Leibniz dreamed about his characteristica universalis, and when
he sketched his many fragmentary logical calculuses, he seems to have
had in mind the notion of an effective and perhaps also decidable
calculus. (1984 p.276]
The greatest overall influence on the mathematical approach with
respect to formal developments derived from Hilbert. Cantor does not
figure here. Following the founding of modern logic by Boole,
De Morgan and Balzano the theory was developed throughout the century.
Peirce Schroder, Peano and Frege being amongst the principal
contributors. Much of this work was available to Cantor. However, as
Koore informs us
Little concerned with axiomatic systems or with logic in general,
Cantor did not rely on Boole's investigations or those of Boole's
successors. Nor did he conceive of his results within a formal system,
such as the one that Frege pr.oposed in his Begriffsschrift ...
[1980 p. lOll
So in this respect the mathematical approach was not at all Cantorian.
On the other hand the mathematical approach incorporates Cantor's
instrumentalism. I mentioned above that the reductionism, common to
both approaches, was, within the mathematical approach, undertaken in
an instrumentalistic spirit. The set theories of Cantor and Dedekind,
which Zermelo cites as underlying his system, were also developed with
an instrumentalistic attitude in the following sense. The set theories
of Dedekind and Cantor both derived from their work on specific
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mathematic121 pr obl eme. In Cantor's case this was the problem of the
uniqueness of the representation of an arbitrary function by a
trigonometric series. Dedekind's set theory originated from his desire
to give a proof of the Balzano-Weierstrass theorem that had no
recourse to geometric intuition. This was part of his programme to
find, as he put it,
a purely arithmetic and perfectly rigorous foundation for the
principles of infinitesimal analysis. [1872. Translation by Beman 1909
p.2)
The intermingling of strands within the two approaches derives from an
overlapping concern with foundational questions. It must be
emphasized, however, that the drive of these foundational concerns
came from different directions. Cantor and Dedekind were undertaking a
conceptual analysis from within. That is, their overall concern was
motivated by internal problems of mathematics. On the other hand,
Frege and Russell for instance, although both had mathematical
backgrounds, were essentially philosophically motivated. Their aim was
to prove the logicist thesis.
Some tendency for certain strands to interweave is made manifest when
we note that some commentators place Dedekind within the logicist
camp. Gillies, for instance, in comparing Dedekind with Frege states
The main point of similarity with Frege is that Dedekind also espouses
logicism. [1982 p. 50)
Indeed, there are passages in Dedekind' s works underwriting such a
judgement. For example, in his paper 'Was sind und was sollen die
Zahlen?' he writes
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In speaking of arithmetic (algebra, analysis) as part of logic I mean
to imply that I consider the number-concept entirely independent of
the notions or intuitions of space and time, that I consider it an
immediate result from the laws of thought. My answer to the problem
propounded in the title of this paper is, then, briefly this: numbers
are free creations of the human mi nd: they serve as a means of
apprehending more easily and more sharply the difference of things.
It is only through the purely logical process of building up the
science of numbers and by thus acquiring the continuous number-domain
that we are prepared accurately to investigate our notions of spnce
and time by bringing them into relation with this number domain
created in our mind. [1888 pp. 31-32]
But following through, Gillies comments on this passage as follows
Dedekind like Frege rejects the Kantian theory of arithmetic. However
we note at once one difference from Frege. Dedekind has a
psychologistic rather than Platonistic view of logic. He speaks of
"the laws of thought" and of numbers as being "free creations of the
human mind." Another difference between the two emerges later.
Dedekind regards the notion of class, or set, or to use his own
terminology, system, as a logical notion. But Frege denies this. In
his preface to [1893] Grundgesetze dar Art tbmettc Vol. I, Preface
Furth translation p. 4 Frege writes:
"Herr Dedekind, like myself, is of the opinion that the theory of
numbers is a part of logd c: but his work hardly contributes to its
confirmation, because the expressions "systems" and "a thing belongs
to a thing", which he uses, are not usual in logic and are not reduced
to acknowledged logical notions."
For Frege, "concept" and "extension of a concept" are logical notions,
whereas "set", "class", "system" are not. Thus Frege's point of view
leads to higher order logic and type theorYi whereas Dedekind's leads
to axiomatic set theory. [(1982); p. 51)]
I suggest that an analysiS of the interplay of the foundational
consequences of Frege's and Dedekind's points of view, as presented
above, is a prerequisite to an appreciation of the philosophical and
foundational problems of axiomatic set theory. But equally, if not
more, important is a recognition of the distinction between these
views in so far as it is manifested in the mathematical and logical
approaches.
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Now Zermelo was not the first to axiomatize set theory. The systems of
Dedekind, Frege and Russell, for instance, were not preceeded by
Zermelo's. However, Zermelo's system is the axiomatic starting point
of the mathematical approach. That it is generally held to be the
original axiomatization of set theory emphasizes the apparent
predominance of this approach. This apparent predominance is certainly
the case so far as the development of that set theory converging to
ZF is concerned. Undoubtedly ZF (the protagonist of Cohen's results)
is a crucial stage in the evolution of set theory within the
mathematical approach. In discussing general foundational issues
concerning ZF, and in particular the foundational significance of
Cohen's results it is appropriate and important that ZF be viewed in
this context. Finally, in anticipation, my proposal for post-Cohen set
theory in Part III is posited as a natural continuation of this
evolution within the ~the~tical approach. I now turn to its
axiomatic origins.
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ZER¥~LO AND AXIOKATIZATION.
In his introductory note to Zermelo's 1908a van Heijenoort makes some
apparently straightforward and uncontroversial observations on
Zermelo's axiomatization. However, it is worthwhile reconsidering and.
in some instances, questioning them. Van Heijenoort states that
[Zermelo's] paper presents the first axiomatization of set theory.
Cantor's definition of set had hardly more to do with the development
of set theory than Euclid's definition of point with that of geometry.
Dedekind, whom Zermelo considers one of the two creators of set theory
had explicitly stated ...a number of principles about sets <which he
called "systems"), but his attempt had remained fragmentary and had
been somewhat discredited by the nonmathematical way in which he
justified the existence of an infinite set ...In spite of the great
advances that set theory was making, the very notion of set remained
vague. The situation became critical after the appearance of the
Burali-Forti paradox and intolerable after that of the Russell
paradox, the latter involving the bare notions of set and element. One
response to the challenge was Russell's theory of types ...Another.
coming at almost the same time, was Zermelo's axiomatization of set
theory. The two responses are extremely differenti the former is a far
reaching theory of great significance for logic and even ontology,
while the latter is an immediate answer to the pressing needs of the
working mathematician. [1967 p.1991
The main point I comment on here is the generally accepted view that
Zermelo presented an axio~tizatioD of set theory in response to the
appearance of the set theoretical paradoxes and in particular to those
mentioned in the above passage. But I begin with some remarks on some
of the other observations of van Heijenoort's.
Van Heijenoort points out that the responses of Russell and Zermelo to
the paradoxes are "extremely different". The difference he indicates
in this case is consonant with the general distinction I have made
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between the logical and mathematical approaches including the
instrumentalistic tendency of the latter.
In line with the popular view, van Heijenoort informs us that
Zermelo's is the first axiomatization of set theory. Now the sense in
which it is correct to assert that Zermelo's system was the first
axiomatization of set theory and its significance was taken up in the
discussion on the two approaches to set theory. But we may further
pursue its import if we consider it in conjunction with van
Heijenoort's following assertion i.e. ·Cantor's definition of set had
hardly more to do with the development of set theory than Euclid's
definition of point with that of geometry" and that both Cantor and
Dedekind were considered by Zermelo to be the creators of set theory.
To begin with both Cantor and Dedekind provided 'definitions' of
'set'. It is of interest to make a comparison. Dedekind writes
It very frequently happens that different things, ...for some reason
can be considered from a common point of view, can be associated in
the mind, and we say that they form a system. [1888 translated by
Beman 1901 p.45]
Cantor provided several versions. The one from his 1895 reads
By a 'set' we understand every collection to a whole K of definite,
well-differentiated objects m of our intuition or our thought.
[Translation in Hallett 1984 p.331
Now what underlies van Heijenoort's assertion? Put bluntly. it is that
Zermelo's system is posited as an implicit definition of set. [This
point is taken up in Part III, chapter 3] Here Zermelo is displaying
the Hilbertian attitude to axiom systems evident in the 'Grundlagen
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der Geometrie' [ 1899] . Now Euclid's system comprises axioms,
postulates and definitions and as Gorsky puts it
In Euclid's Elements the separate 'primitive' terms of the system are
given explicit definitions. These definitions lie beyond the system
itself...The terms in which the definitions of a number of primit ive
concepts are described do not appear in the formulations of the
relevant primitive propositions <postulates and axioms) or in the
proofs of the theorems, therefore such terms in Euclidean geometry as
'point', 'straight line', 'surface', 'plane' should be regarded as
primitive terms introduced without definitions. In proving the
relevant theorems only those properties of the terms are taken into
account which are described by the corresponding primitive
propositions ...[1974 p.431
Given Hilbert's view of the status of axioms a definition of 'pOint',
for example, added to his axioms for Geometry would make no sense. Van
Heijenoort is tacitly incorporating the Hilbertian view together with
that suggesting that mathematical disciplines are developed by means
of such axiom systems. So Cantor's definiHon of set plays no more
role in the development of set theory (from Zermelo's system) than
does a definition of 'point' in the development of Euclidean geometry
since (Zermelo's) axioms constitute an implicit definition.
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(i) Zermelo and the Logical Paradoxes.
I now turn to the question of Zermelo's purpose in formulating an
axiomatic theory of sets. Why was he motivated to formulate an
axiomatic system? According to van Heijenoort's account Zermelo's
axiomatization was a direct response to the "challenge" of the
paradoxes of Burali-Forti and Russell. Indeed, this is no more than
Zermelo professes in the introduction to his 1908a. He explains that
At present ... the very existence of this discipline [set theory) seems
to be threatened by certain contradictions, or "antinomies", that can
be derived from its principles - principles necessarily governing our
thinking, it seems - and to which no entirely satisfactory solution
has yet been found. In particular, in view of the "Russell antinomy"
...of the set of all sets that do not contain themselves as elements,
it no longer seems admissible today to assign to an arbitrary
logically definable notion a set, or class, as its extension.
Cantor's original deUni tion of a set (1895) as "a collection,
gathered into a whole, of certain well-distinguished objects of our
perception or our thought" therefore certainly requires some
restriction; it has not, however, been successfully replaced by one
that is just as sillple and does not give rise to such reservations.
Under these circumstances there is at this point nothing left for us
to do but to proceed in the opposite direction and, starting from set
theory as it is historically given, to seek out the principles
required for establishing the foundations of this mathematical
discipline. [p.200]
Zermelo's own account of the matter has been accepted and reiterated
more or less universally by commentators. As Koore aptly puts it: "It
has become part of the mathematical and philosophical folklore". But
is Zermelo's account misleading? Does the standard account stand in
need of revision? I maintain that the answer to these questions is in
the affirmative. For Zermelo is ostensibly axiomatizlng the Cantorian
notion of set. But the Cantorian notion of set is not inconsistent. Or
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at least its inconsistency cannot be demonstrated by means of those
principles invoked in the construction of the Burali-Forti or Russell
paradox. However, the belief that Cantor's notion of set does gives
rise to these paradoxes has been widely held. Furthermore, it
continues to be passed on by generally astute contemporary
commentators. For example, we find the following passage in Kitcber's
1983
On several occasions in the past, mathematicians have hailed some
principles as intuitively evident, giving them the status that we give
to the axioms of set theory. It has then turned out that these
principles are false. The most familiar example is that of Frege,
Dedekind, and Cantor, each of whom advanced a universal comprehension
principle, taking any property to determine a set. [p.63.J
It is thus important to clarify the status of the Cantorian notion in
this connection. Hallett does so in his 1984. There he observes that
It is sometimes assumed that Cantor's 'definitions' ... allow virtually
any collection to be a set, and therefore that Cantor's system clearly
gives rise to the famous paradoxes, say those of Burali-Forti or
Russell ...that given the framework of a first order logical calculus,
Cantor's 'definition' translates into the so-called 'comprehension
principle', that is the axiom schema according to which each predicate
yields an axiom tXTIY[YEX~~(y)]. But this view is quite mistaken,
Cantor's 'definitions' only allow as sets those collections which are
whole and this does not at all imply that any collection can be a set.
lothing like the comprehension principle of so-called 'naive set
theory' follows from Cantor's statements. If 'naive set theory' is
characterized as set theory based on the comprehension principle, then
this goes back, not to Cantor, but to Russell (1903) t p.38 See also
Kayberry 1977,1980; Xoore 1978, 1982; Dauben 1979 and even Hilbert
1904.)
As far as set theoretic antinomies are concerned, Cantor was well
aware of the problem they might present. He did not, however,
consider that his theory of sets was thus rendered not viable. In his
philosophy of the infinite Cantor distinguished between two types of
- 94 -
infinite collection. Namely, the transfinite and the absolutely
i nfi ni teo Transfinite collections were 'extendable' or 'bounded'.
They were mathematically viable in that they could be considered as
having a 'number' associated with them, i.e. a cardinality - this
being analogous to the case of finite collections. Absolutely
infinite collections were not extendable and it was the ascription of
cardinality to such a collection, i.e. considering it to be
transfinite, which led to antinomies. Thus, Cantor sometimes made the
distinction between the transfinite and absolutely infinite in terms
of 'consistent' and 'inconsistent' collections. Furthermore
Instead of regarding these absolutely infinite or inconsistent
collections as a source of paradoxes, he treated them as tools with
which to obtain new mathematical results. [Xoore 1980 p.104 N.B. This
method was adopted by Zermelo and has in fact become a standard
technique in the development of set theory particularly after the
incorporation of van leumann's ordinals and definitions by transfinite
induction. For a relatively recent example of its use see Scott 1974]
An important example of this usage was Cantor's demonstration, to be
found in his 1899 letter to Dedekind, of the well-ordering of the
ordinals. Significantly, as Xoore emphasizes
What is intriguing about this demonstration, in terms of the
relationship between logic and set theory, is Cantor's recognition
that his concept of set cannot be identified with the most general
concept of class or collection. [1980 p.1031
So if Cantor's nation of set did not allow the Burali-Forti and
Russell paradoxes and if Zermelo waS axiomatizing the Cantorian notion
it cannot be that the standard view of Zermelo's motivation is
credible. An alternative view has recently been put forward.
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(1i) Xoore's Argument.
In his 1978, 1980, and 1982 Xoore proposes and develops the argument
that
Zermelo was primarily motivated to axiomatize set theory not by the
paradoxes but by the controversy surrounding his proof that every set
can be well-ordered and especially by a desire to secure his axiom of
choice against its numerous critics. (Moore 1980 p.106]
To appreciate this argument it is necessary to look at the important
place of the well-ordering principle within the mathematical approach
to set theory and Zermelo's involvement with its defence.
Cantor's theory facilitates the characterization of a set with an
ordering relation on it as being well-ordered if and only if it is
order-isomorphic to an ordinal. Now we may take the well-ordering
principle as stating that for every set X there exists an ordering
relation R on it and an ordinal a such that X is order-isomorphic to a
relative to R. But why was this principle of such importance to
Cantor?
We mentioned above that Cantor defined the cardinals in terms of the
ordinals. The cardinals were seen as the fundamental measure on all
mathematical objects. That is, the role of the cardinals was to act as
a scale of the powers of transfinite sets just as the natural numbers
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act as a scale of the sizes of the finite sets. In order for the scale
to be viable the following three conditions had to be met:
(1) Completeness, i.e. given a transfinite set its power must be a
'point' on this scale.
(ii) Linear ordering. (In fact the scale was well-ordered.)
(iii> Uniqueness, i.e. the power of a transfinite set is associated
with at most one cardinal.
The construction of a system of arithmetic for the ordinals and
cardinals is the essential task within the mathematical approach and a
scale for powers is a key step towards this end. Given the manner in
which Cantor's theory produced cardinals from ordinals the well-
ordering principle was the crucial premiss in the demonstration that
the aforementioned scale was indeed viable. In fact, we could go
further in that it is arguable that the well-ordering principle lies
at the heart of the classical mathematical approach to the theory of
sets.
Clearly anyone concerned with Cantor's theory <and we have claimed
Zermelo to be such a one) would be interested in the foundational
status of the well-ordering principle. Cantor originally viewed it as
a principle of logic, 1.e. as a law of thought. About 1895, however,
he appeared to have changed his mind about this and at the same
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recognized the need for, and indeed attempted, its demonstration. So
too did Zermelo.
Zermelo's active involvement with the question of the well-ordering
principle appears to have been initiated in 1904 at the Third
International Congress of Xathematicians. The catalyst was Zermelo's
confutation of a demonstration offered by Julius Konig that the
continuum could not be well-ordered. "That 'proof', expressed in the
technical language of Cantorian set theory, stunned the Congress and
especially Cantor." [Keore 1978 p.310]. But by the next day Zermelo
found that a crucial step in Konig's argument was invalid. That is, it
was an application of a result from Bernstein's recently completed
thesis, namely: (aleph,,,)-l-P.....o:: (aleph",).2..h'PhO, which was in fact not
proved in the case where ex is a limit ordinal. Unfortunately for
Konig, this was the very case he relied on in his demonstration.
Following this incident Zer:melo worked on the well-ordering theorem
and within two months had formulated a proof which was published later
that year. This proof made essential use of Zermelo' s 'Axiom of
Choice' and its occurence in the published proof is the first explicit
formulation of this axiom. [See Zermelo 1904]
SUbsequent to the publication of Zermelo's proof there ensued an
intense international debate over its details. Some of the most
prominent mathematicians of the time participated in this debate and
Zermelo certainly was very much taken up in considering the diverse
criticisms levelled against his proof. That these criticisms were
quite diverse, as we shall see below, needs to be stressed. Briefly,
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they included the criticisms of the 'semi-intuitionists' Baire, Borel,
and Lebesgue along (loosely speaking) constructivist lines; Poincare's
objection that Zermelo had employed an impredicative definition;
Peano's objection on logical grounds that the axiom of choice is not
valid in the infinite case if the choices are arbitrary; and the set-
theoretical arguments of the German Cantorians Bernstei nand
Schoenflies.
Koore summarizes his argument as follows:
If the paradoxes were not the main factor motivating Zermelo to invent
his axiomatization, then what was that factor? As we have seen,
between 1904 and 1907 Zermelo's Axiom of Choice and his 1904 proof had
been subjected to numerous extended criticisms by many eminent
mathematicians. Throughout his career, controversy spurred Zermelo to
his greatest efforts, and this was particularly the case for his
axiomatization. Of course, he wanted to place set theory on a firm
axiomatic foundation, which would in turn serve as the basis for all
mathematics. But the evidence shows that by 1904 he regarded the
paradoxes as only an apparent threat.
What ...asthreatened, was the acceptance of his proof that every set
can be well-ordered. How could that proof be secured? Zermelo's answer
was two-fold. First, he replied to his critics at length and gave a
new proof, which nevertheless depended as heavily as the first on his
Axiom of Choice. Second, he created an axiomatization of set theory
and embedded his proof within it. In order to preserve his entire
proof, his axiomatization needed to include his Axiom of Choice, as he
realized very well. Indeed that Axiom - the first part of his
axiomatization to be formulated explicitly - intrigued him because of
its fruitfulness, even outside of his proof. [1978 p.327J
Keore has presented a forceful and richly illustrated argument and has
certainly been convincing in so far as obviating the above-mentioned
folklore. Xoreover, I submit that the propositions, viz:
(*) the well-ordering principle was of central interest to the
development of Cantorian set theorYi
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(*) Zermelo did not perceive the known paradoxes as a serious threat
to the Cantorian notion of set and particularly to the construction of
Cantor's transfinite arithmetic;
(*) Zermelo, after the publication of his 1904, was greatly concerned
with countering its numerous critics and produced his 1908 in
response;
which form the foundation of Koore's argument, are correct. In fact,
only the second of these has been controversial. But Moore's
contention that Zermelo's reply was "two-fold" is problematic. I
suggest that although Xoore is correct in highlighting that Zermelo's
1908 and 1908a were "interrelated in numerous ways" he is incorrect to
conclude that in any strong sense they were "in conception and
motivation. .. a single paper." In other words I shall argue that
Zermelo's 1908a, although in certain respects an extension of his
1908, does not constitute part of Zermelo's riposte to the critics of
his 1904 proof and axiom of choice.
Zermelo's 1908 comprises two parts. The first a new proof of the
well-ordering theorem the second his reply to the objections against
his first proof. Thus we could begin by arguing that Zermelo's 1908a
in so far as it is a counter-argument to his critics is at best a
supplement to an already sufficient response. Sufficient, that is, so
far as Zermelo is concerned. Moreover, in that it does not offer any
qual!tatively different counter-arguments to his critics this sheds
doubt on the contention that Zermelo's motivation in formulating it
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was to answer his critics. The tack I shall pursue runs as follows: if
we look at the nature of the criticisms taken up by Zermelo we shall
see that it is simply not convincing that he constructed his
axiomatization to provide a counter-argument to them.
I have noted that the criticisms were diverse. However, Zermelo
informs us in his summary that
The preceding discussion of the opposition to my 1904 proof can
perhaps be summarized most simply by the following statements. Except
for Poincare, whose critique, based on formal logic - a critique that
would threaten the existence of all of mathematics - has hitherto not
met with any assent Whatsoever, all opponents can be divided into two
classes. Those who have no objection at all to my deductions protest
the use of an unprovable general principle. without reflecting that
such axioms constitute the basis of every mathematical theory and that
precisely the one I adduced is indispensable for the extension of the
science in other respects. too. The other critics, however, who have
been able to convince themselves of this indispensability by a deeper
involvement with set theory. base their objections upon the Burali-
Forti antinomy. which in fact is without significance for my point of
view. since the principles I employed exclude the existence of a set
Q. [1908 p.198. N.B. Q is the collection of all ordinals]
I first consider those criticisms which attack Zermelo's proof by
invoking the spectre of the Burali-Porti paradox. Here the worry is
not that his proof is lacking in rigour but that it is trivial in the
sense that it's premisses are contradictory. Zermelo's answer is that
these objections are misconceived because they presume he treats Q as
a set. He states
I clearly restricted myself to principles and devices that have not
yet by themselves given rise to any antinomy. If some critics
nevertheless deploy this ominous "set Q" against my proof, they must
first project it into that proof artificially. and all arguments drawn
from the inconsistent character of this "set" turn back upon their
authors. [1904 p.1921
-101-
Zermelo's axioms incorporate the premisses of his proof. Now suppose
Zermelo's premisses are suspected of being contradictory on the
grounds that they allow the Burali-Forti argument. Then how does
embedding them in his axioms facilitate a counter-argument? One way
would be to provide a conSistency proof of the axioms. But Zermelo
admits "I have not yet even been able to prove rigorously that my
axioms are consistent". (1908a p.200) Another alternative is to
demonstrate that at least the axioms do not allow the reproduction of
the Burali-Forti argument. But Zermelo offers no such demonstration.
In fact, as Xoore points out that in his 1908a "Zermelo devoted
minimal space to discussing the paradoxes", (1978 p.325] This seems to
indicate that countering this particular attack on his proof was not
the motivation behind Zermelo's axiomatization. Incidentally, if it
was then in this sense it contradicts Koore's contention that the
paradoxes were not Zermelo's primary motivation.
Axiomatization was certainly not a counter-argument to critics of his
axiom of choice. Even in his 1904 Zermelo concedes that "This logical
principle cannot, to be sure, be reduced to a still simpler one ... "
(p.141] In his 1908 he emphatically repeats that "I just cannot prove
this postulate ... and therefore cannot compel anyone to accept it
apodictically." t p. 186] His defence of his axiom of choice is an
appeal to its self-evidence its necessity for many "elementary and
fundamental theorems and problems" of extant mathematics. Furthermore,
he states that
... in order to reject such a fundamental principle, one would have had
to ascertain that in some particular case it did not hold or to derive
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contradictory consequences from it; but none of my opponents has made
any attempt to do this. [1908 p.187J
Thus it seems that there is no case for an axiomatization to answer.
Nevertheless, let us suppose that Zermelo axiomatized to secure his
axiom, not against criticisms that had been in fact been offered, as
strictly speaking, Xoore suggests, but to forstall any of the kind
mentioned in the above passage. Xore specifically, that it did not
lead to contradictions when in the context of Cantorian set theory.
For this to go through he would need a consistency proof. But he
didn't have one! It is possible, however, that he assumed one would be
forthcoming without too much delay. (Iote also that Zermelo, in
precocious mood, asserts -this postulate is logically independent of
the others· [p.187] and so he is ready to countenance counterexamples
but one assumes he would understand them to be pathological relative
to 'classical' mathematics. In any case, an axiomatization of set
incorporating the axiom is not an argument against counterexamples. )
We are now left with Poincare's criticism that Zennelo' s proof is
unacceptable since it employs impredicative definitions. How does an
axiomatization answer this charge? Well, it might provide the means
for formulating a proof not employing such definitions. But this is
extremely doubtful for several reasons. To begin with, there is no
hint or allusion offered by Zermelo of such a proof. Another reason is
Zermelo's general instrumentalistic attitude. He took Poincare's view
to be untenable since if acted upon it would emasculate classical
mathematics. In fact, he thought lithe strict observance of Poincare's
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demand would make every definition, hence all science, impossible."
[1908. p.1911 Thus Zermelo is not motivated to provide a framework for
a proof in accord with Poincare's strictures.
In the light of the above considerations Moore's answer to the
question "what gave rise to Brnst Zermelo's axiomatization of set
theory in 19087- is unconvincing. Coupled with the fact that Zermelo
had comprehensively answered his critics in his 1908 the question of
why Zermelo went on to write the following paper still remains
unsettled. I conclude this chapter with some remarks hopefully
resolving the issue.
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(iii) Resolution: Hilbert and axiomatization.
I have argued that Zermelo was not primarily motivated to axiomatize
set theory because of the paradoxes nor to defend his proof of the
well-ordering principle and his axiom of choice. Whilst there is
probably an element of truth in both these accounts I contend that the
fundamental impulse to axiomatize derived straightforwardly from the
desire, for generlJ.l foundlJ.tionlJ.l conei deret itme, to bring Cantorian
set theory within the fold of those theories to which the axiomatic
method had been applied. In other words, to codify and precisify
Cantorian set theory. Prosaic as this might seem, this was indeed the
case.
Zermelo was working under Hilbert's influence, and Zermelo's
axiomatization was a continuation of the work initiated by Hilbert
after his axiomatization of geometry in his 1899. That is, to treat
the central disciplines of mathematics, e.g. real number theory, as he
had Euclidean geometry. Moore is not unaware of Zermelo's Hilbertian
leanings during this period in his career. In fact, he informs us that
Coming from Berlin, where he had worked in mathematical physics,
Zermelo obtained his HlJ.bilitlJ.tlonsschrift in the same field at
Gottingen during 1899. Under Hilbert's influence, which Zermelo later
described as the most important of his mathematical career, his
interests soon turned to set theory and the foundations of
mathematics. [1980 p.105]
We also find in his 1978
Like Hausdorff and unlike Russell, Zermelo considered set theory as a
part of mathematics, rather than philosophy or logic. But unlike
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Hausdorff, Zermelo regarded an axiomatization of set theory as
essential to its sound future development. [p.324]
and
Of course, he [Zermelo] wanted to place set theory on a firm axiomatic
foundation, which would in turn serve as the basis for all of
mathematics. [p.326]
J(oore is not explicit as to why the locutions "of course" and
"essential· are warranted here; and, after all, they are not warranted
so far as Hausdorff is concerned. But now from these quotations there
clearly emerges the driving force behind Zermelo's axiomatization.
Like Hilbert, he considered axiomatization, per se, to be a key
foundational exercise. So given the general importance of Cantorian
set theory this is powerful enough motivation for Zermelo.
To conclude this section and as a bridge into the next chapter I make
some further remarks arising from the above discussion.
(i) I mentioned above that in certain respects the 1908a paper is an
extension of the 1908. Generally speaking, the earlier paper provides
an aid for interpreting the later one. J(ore specifically, the
principles listed at the beginning of the 1908, in a slightly amended
form, constitute the core of Zermelo's axiomatization. The principles
listed in the 1908 are those used in the proof of the well-ordering
principle and are certainly not an axiomatization of Cantorian set
theory or even an axiomatization as such. But the proof, as Zermelo
puts it, "presupposes no specific theorems of set theory". [1908
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p.183] In other words, these principles or "postulates" are a setting
out of clear, general principles of Cantorian set theory sufficient
for the proof. It is straightforwardly the case that the
identification of such general principles facilitated the
axiomatization in the 1908a.
(11) Koore tells us that Zermelo "created an axiomatization of set
theory and embedded his proof within it.· [1978 p. 326] Now
axiomatization is frequently cited as a means of rigourizing proofs
within a given mathematical discipline. In fact, Koore opens his 1978
by stating
Late nineteenth century Europe witnessed an increasing concern with
mathematical rigor. One prominent form, though not the only one, which
this concern assumed, was the use of the axiomatic method ...[p.3071
Hilbert's axiomatization of geometry rigourized the discipline in the
sense that many hidden assumptions in proofs were made explicit and
gaps in proofs were filled. It is also worth quoting Hilbert in this
connection. In his consideration of foundational problems in
arithmetic, he stated
...we can provide a rigorous and completely satisfying foundation for
the notion of number and in fact by a method that I would call
axiD~tic..,[1904 p.13l]
Now the following question arises: did Zermelo's axiomatization add to
the rigour of Zermelo's proof? Well, in the passage from Hi1bert we
are given a glimpse of the trend leading to the metamathematics that
he was to develop in earnest in response to the Brouwerian criticism
of classical mathematics. In the notion of 'axiomatic', referred to
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here by Hilbert, rigour is achieved by, amongst other things, not only
making the postulates explicit but also making the underlying logic
explicit in pursuence of an effective notion of proof. In other words,
rigour rests on the degree and manner of formalization of which
axiomatization is but one facet. So the answer to the question must be
negative since Zermelo did not go very far in the direction of
formalization over and above providing axioms. In particular, he
provides no expl1cit information on the details of the underlying
logic of his system.
(iii) Although Zermelo's system is by no means a 'formalization' it is
a putative codification and precisif1cation of Cantorian set theory.
It codifies this theory not only in the sense that it provides the
means for the reconstruction of transfinite arithmetic but in that the
axioms themselves are taken "from set theory as it is historically
given". [1908a p.200) I interpret this as implying that they are true
to the Cantorian concept of set.
Some time before Zermelo's work on the well-ordering problem Hi!bert
had publically recognized. not the inconsistency of the Cantorian
notion, but rather the need for its precisification. He writes in his
1904:
G. Cantor sensed the contradictions just mentioned and expressed this
awareness by differentiating between "consistent" and "inconsistent"
sets. But, since in my opinion he does not provide a precise
criterion for this distinction, I must characterize his conception on
this point as one that still leaves latitude for subjective judgment
and therefore affords no objective certainty.
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The most remarkable feature of Zermelo's codification and
precisification of the Cantorian notion of set is his axiom of
separation. The version in his 1908a is, as we shall see,
significantly modified. The reason for this modification has nothing
to do with his defence of the well-ordering theorem. Rather, in his
1908a, it figures extensively in his development of "the theory of
equivalence".
Finally. recall van Heijenoort's contention that "Cantor's definition
of set had hardly more to do with the development of set theory than
Euclid's deUni tion of point with that of geometry. II In one sense
Cantor's definition was very important in connection with the
axiomatic development of set theory. Put bluntly, this is because it
provided the key heuristics guiding Zermelo. In particular with
respect to the formulation of his the axiom of separation. This point
brings us directly to the subject matter of the next chapter.
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ZERMELO AID DEFINITE PROPERTIES.
Given that the key and most innovative feature of Zermelo's system is
his axiom of separation it is not surprising that it was this axiom
which provoked the most intense and sustained criticism. His
formulation of the axiom of separation employed the notion of a
"definite propositional function" - more commonly referred to in the
11terature as "definite property". It was this notion that was the
focus of the criticism directed at Zermelo's axiomatization. Veyl,
Fraenkel, von Neumann and, in particular, Skolem, were the most
notable critics.
But despite the extensive criticism, an important question has, in
general, been either overlooked, ignored or misunderstood. The
question is simply: "What was the motivation behind Zermelo's
invocation of definite properties wi thin a separation principle?" In
this chapter I propose to shed some light on the conceptual origins of
Zermelo's formulation, particularly his use of definite properties.
However, little credit can be taken for supplying the simple answer to
the given question since, as will be seen below, it was clearly
supplied by Zermelo.
The axiom of separation is stated by Zermelo as follows:
Whenever the propositional function P(x) is definite for all elements
of a set X, X possesses a subset X(P) containing as elements precisely
those elements x of m for which P(x) is true. [1908a p.202l
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"Definiteness for propositional functions is defined in terms of
"definiteness· of propositions. The propositional function P (x) is
definite for a class K if for each element ~ of X the proposition P(~)
is definite. The proposition P(~) is definite if
the fundamental relations of the domain, by means of the axioms and
the universally valid laws of logic, determine without arbitrariness
whether it holds or nat. [1908a p.2011
By the "fundamental relations of the domain" Zermelo means simply the
membership structure.
Recall that in the introduction to his 1908a Zermelo states that
Cantor's original definition "requires some restriction" since, in
view of the Russell antinomy, "it no longer seems admissable today to
assign to an arbitrary logically definable notion a set, or class, as
its extension." Zermelo, at this point in his paper, seems to be
interpreting Cantor's prescription as a naive comprehension principle,
i .e. for every 'condition' there exists a set whose members are all
and only those objects satisfying the condition. But this is an
anomaly. We have noted Hallett's observation that "nothing like the
comprehension principle of so-called 'naive set theory' follows from
Cantor's statements." There is no doubt that Zermelo was familiar with
Cantor's philosophy of the infinite and thus aware that Cantor was not
proposing an unrestricted comprehension axiom. At the same time he was
aware, as was Hilbert, that Cantor's ideas needed to be represented in
some more precise manner. In examining the formulation of the axiom of
separation we see that Zermelo is much more in accord with Cantor's
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thinking than the misleading statements in his introduction tend to
suggest.
However, the separation principle may be justifiably construed as a
restricted version of the comprehension principle. Roughly speaking,
instead of a condition collecting together all objects that satisfy
it, it collects together all objects of a given set that satisfy it.
Supplementary axioms such as the power-sets and infinity axioms are
needed to supply the initial sets.
low it is more often than not claimed that it is by means of this
restriction that Zermelo hoped to avert the paradoxes, or in Zermelo's
terms, "the antinomies discovered so far". This claim is mistaken and
indicates a misunderstanding with respect to Zermelo's invocation of
definite properties. But this is not to deny the very important role
in the solution of these paradoxes played by the aforementioned
restriction. The relevant principle underlying Zermelo's approach,
with respect to this restriction, is the 'Limitation of Size
Hypothesis". In Hallett's excellent account of this topic [see Hallett
1984J its general form is stated thus:
All contradictory collections are too big (in some sense of 'bigness'
to be specified), 'contradictory' collection here meaning any
collection such that a contradiction can be derived from assuming it
to be a set. [p.176]
This principle may be traced back to Cantor's philosophy of the
infiniteo Specifically, to his partitioning of infinite collections
into the "transfinite" and the "absolutely infinite". 'Sets' are
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either finite or transfinite and together constitute those collections
which are 'Cantorian finite', i.e. 'increasable' or 'bounded'. [See
Mayberry 1977 and Hallett 1984] The collections that are 'too big'
are identified with those that are "absolutely infinite" and further,
with the contradictory collections, i.e. those giving rise to the
paradoxes. This idea is the heuristic message underlying the first
part of Cantor's definition, viz: "By a 'set' we understand every
collection to a whole ... " [)Iyitalics]
Zermelo's adaption of this principle for the axiom of separation is
that if a given set is not "too big" then a sub-collection separated
off from it certainly cannot itself be "too big". But, as Hallett has
shown in his 1984, there are severe problems with construing Zermelo's
axiomatization as a whole as being underpinned by the limitation of
size hypothesis. The following passage serves as a summary:
Part 2 of the book deals primarily with the influence and status of
the 'limitation of size' idea, an ideal focus for the question of how
far modern set theory is Cantorian set theory, for there is no doubt
both that limitation of size was of great significance in the
development of the axiomatic theory of sets, and that it stems rather
directly from Cantor's metaphysical doctrine of Absolute infinity.
Nevertheless, it is important to be more precise about the role
limitation of size played <and plays) and not to exaggerate its
strength. Part of my purpose is to correct the impression often given
(an impression which stems from Fraenkel> that axiomatic set theory
avoids the standard paradoxes by choosing axioms which do not create
overly large sets, it being assumed that the collection of ordinals,
the Russell 'set' of all self-membered sets and the set-theoretic
universe itself are all 'too big' in some sense... I argue that not
only is it extremely difficult to specify a notion of 'overly large'
which successfully embraces all these collections, but that in any
case no form of this limitation of size argument can justify the
adoption of the impredicative power set axiom. This failure is related
to the inadequacy of various attempts to explain the acceptance of the
usual axioms by their being true in some informally presented,
iterative universe of sets. [1984 pp.xii-xiii]
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Allowing that Zermelo's version of the limi tet ion of size hypothesis
is sound, t ,e. sufficient to avert the paradoxes, then it seems that
he has a warrant for formulating the most general separation axiom he
deems suitable. For example, if he was content to set aside his
reductionist aiDlS, that is, include within his ontology collections
that are not 'abstract sets', he might formulate the following version
of the separation principle: given a set ~, for every condition there
exists a set whose members are all and only those members of a.. that
satisfy the condition. This formulation would allow the employment of
those conditions which give rise to the Burali-Forti and Russell
paradoxes whilst at the same time blocking those paradoxes.
The point is that if mere restriction on size is the means by which
Zermelo undertakes to tackle the paradoxes then there is no need to
invoke definite properties. In fact, Zermelo's invocation of definite
properties becomes qUite unintelligible!
•
So why did Zermelo invoke definite properties? The Simple answer is
that they were employed to avert any se_ntic paradoxes that might
arise 1£ only a general separation principle, such as the one given
above, which we have seen to be underpinned by the limitation of size
hypothesis, was employed. It is surprising that this has been largely
ignored by commentators. For example, Skolem, Fraenkel and von
leumann, who all devote significant space to discussing definite
properties, fail to note that Zermelo invoked the notion of definite
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properties specifically in order to avert the semantic paradoxes. This
is particularly true of recent commentators, e.g. Hallett and G.H.
Koore. Koore often acknowledges the importance of this notion in
connection with the development of axiomatic set theory. [see e.g.
chapter 4.9 1982] and we find in Hallett after some discussion of the
nation the comment
..the confusion over definite properties was undoubtedly a serious
problem for Zermelo's successors. [1984 p.269J
but neither of them mention the reason Zermelo introduced the notion
in the first place. This situation is especially surprising in view of
the fact that Zermelo is quite explicit on this paint. Furthermore its
significance with respect to the Cantorian notion of set and
particularly Cantors definition has not been pursued. In fact it was
an important facet of Zermelo's precisification of the Cantorian
notion!
After stating his axiom of separation Zermelo writes
In the first place, sets may never be independently defined by means
of the axiom but must always be separated as subsets from sets already
given; thus contradictory notions such as "the set of all sets" or
"the set of all ordinal numbers", and with them the "ultrafinite
paradoxes·, ...are excluded. In the second place, moreover, the
defining criterion must always be definite in the sense of our
definition ...with the result that, from our point of view, all
criteria such as "definable by means of a finite number of words",
hence the "Richard antinomy" and the "paradox of finite denotation",
vanish. [1908a p.2021
The simple answer therefore, to the question posed above, is that
Zermelo's invocation of definite properties was aimed at averting the
semantic paradoxes. But this simple answer raises two further
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problems. First, why did Zermelo concern himself with the semantic
paradoxes? Second, how were definite properties supposed to deal with
the semantic paradoxes?
The semantic paradoxes that were to trouble Zermelo began to make
their appearance in 1905 in separate and independent papers by Richard
and Konig. Richard had read that Konig, at the 1904 Heidelberg
conference, had formulated an argument based on the theory of
transfinite ordinal theory showing the well-ordering principle to lead
to contradictions. He had also learned of Zermelo's counterargument
and subsequent proof of the theorem. But in Richard's view, as he puts
it "It it not necessary to go so far as the theory of ordinal numbers
to find such contradictions." Richard devised his paradox with
reference only to the continuum. This strategy was pursued by Konig in
his 1905 and 1906 as part of his continuing effort to show that the
well-ordering principle was invalid.
In his 1905, Konig's argument took the following form: Let us
suppose, in accordance with the well-ordering principle, that the
continuum is well-ordered. Consider the subcollection K consisting of
those real numbers satisfying the condition that they not be finitely
definable. Since! is well-ordered it has a least member. Call it ~.
But a finite prescription, namely: "least member of the collection of
real numbers not finitely definable" uniquely picks out~. Hence we
have both ~eK and not aeJ. Konig took this to be a refutation of the
well-ordering principle.
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But the more fundamental lesson Konig states at the outset of his
paper. It is that
the word "set" is being used indiscriminitely for completely different
notions and that this is the source of the apparent paradoxes of this
young branch of science, that, moreover, set theory itself can no more
dispense with axiomatic assumptions than can any other exact science
and that these assumptions, just as in other disciplines, are subject
to a certain arbitrariness ...[1905 p.144J
So if not Zermelo, then at least Konig took the paradoxes as a spur
towards axiomatization. Incidentally, like Zer:melo, Konig was
basically a conservative with respect to Cantorianism. In his
concluding paragraph he states that his "fragmentary reIDarks"
insofar as they are correct, they only throw a new light on the great
value of what Cantor's genius created, despite their partially
oppositionist character. The opposition is directed only against
certain of cantor's conjectures; the content of the theorems he proved
remains completely intact. I remark, finally, that the distinction
here drawn between "set" and "class" completely resolves the paradoxes
cited ("set of all sets", and so forth). [1905 p.1491
There were some commentators in this period, i.e. 1904-1908, who
denied that the semantic paradoxes were efficacious so far as
providing an argument against the well-ordering principle was
concerned. Whilst Richard and Poincare concentrated on the nature of
the definitions within the construction of these paradoxes Peano
simply denied that they were even relevent to matheIDatics. Peano
claimed that Richard's paradox belonged linguistics and not to
mathematics. Zermelo, however, took them seriously as possible threats
to the well-ordering theorem and indeed considered it necessary to
take active steps to avert them within his axiomatization. These
-117-
steps, as we shall see, are directly in accord with Zermelo's
precisification of the Cantorian notion of set.
The question of how definite properties were supposed to tackle the
semantic paradoxes is made more difficult by the fact that Zermelo
offers no clear explication of his notion of definite property and no
demonstration illustrating the manner in which they avert the semantic
paradoxes. But I contend that the fallowing reconstruction is
essentially correct. To begin with, nate that the nation is
relativized to models. Hence the notion of truth in the ensuing
discussion is roughly akin to the informal idea behind the model
theorists 'truth in a model', i.e. without the trappings of a formal
semantics. Moreover, the notion is further relativized to 'sets' in
the sense of the model in question. In other words, if we assert that
a property is definite then this is always relative to a pair <A,M>
where A is a model, MEA and K is a 'set'.
Now a property P(x) is definite for a set M if for each element ~ of
X, P(a) is exclusively true or false. Thus the property P(x) induces a
partition of K into two disjoint collections. One containing all and
only those elements of K satisfying P(x)j the other those not
satisfying P(x) and we understand to imply that they satisfy not-P(x).
As an example, let K be the set of real numbers and let P(x) be "x is
definable by means of a finite number of words". Let e, be the least
real number not definable by means of a finite number of words. Then
it is straightforward that P(a) is not exclusively true or false. Thus
the property in question is not definite.
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In his 1908 Zermelo states his separation principle as follows:
All elements of a set K that have a property P well-defined for every
single element are the elements of another set, M(P), a "subset" of M.
[1908 p.183]
The account of the axiom of separation in the 1908a paper is a
modified and more detailed version of that in the 1908, although he
seemed to have had a similar idea in mind in both accounts. But why
does he provide a more detailed account in the later paper? I have
argued in the previous chapter that Zermelo considered the 1908 paper
a sufficient reply to the critics of his 1904 proof of the well-
ordering principle and that the axiomatization in the following paper
was not motivated by the need to answer these critics. This also holds
for Richard and Konig with respect to the semantic paradoxes. In the
1908a there is no application of the modified version in connection
with the semantic paradoxes. In fact, Zermelo makes no mention of them
other than in the passage quoted above. In any case, why not provide
the expanded account in the 1908 - they were written at about the same
time?
On reading the second <and longest) part of the 1908a, t .e. the
development of fundamental cardinal theory from the axioms, the reason
Zermelo gives a more detailed account of separation in this later
paper becomes manifest. After giving his account of definite
properties Zermelo states
Thus the question whether I:l.fh or not is always definite, as is the
question whether K~N or not. [p.201]
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In the development of the cardinal theory, Zermelo builds up definite
properties from these basic ones applying the axiom of separation to
construct the fine structure of the theory. This is here the key
application of the separation principle and for which the expanded
account is added for clarificatory purposes.
Zermelo's general idea embodied in the axiom of separation may be
located in the Cantorian notion of set and in particular in the
definition from Cantor's 1895. In that definition we also found the
qualification 'definite'. Fraenkel comments on the qualification
'definite' in Cantor's characterization as follows
[it] expresses that, given a set s, it should be intrinsically
settled for any possible object x whether x is a member of s or not.
Here the addition -intrinsically" stresses that the intention is not
to actual decidability with the present (or with any future) resources
of experience or sciencej a definition which intrinsically settles the
matter, such as the definition of "transcendental" in the case of the
set of all transcendental numbers, is sufficient. To be sure, we thus
essentially use the Aristotelian principle of the excluded middle
which guarantees that for a given object there is no case additional
to those of belonging or not belonging to the set in question.
[1968 p.10J
Thus it follows that the condition "x is not a member of itself" is
not definite in Cantor's sense. Cantor, like Zermelo after him, is
invoking the qualification "definiteness" as an auxiliary to the
limitation of size hypothesis as a means of averting paradoxes. An
important difference is that Cantor's conditions apply globally and
thus a condition is definite or not per sej whilst Zermelo's approach
is strictly speaking local and in principle a condition may be
definite over one class although not so aver some other.
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At the time Cantor was developing his theories the relevant semantical
paradoxes had not yet emerged. Cantor's concern was with the set-
theoretical paradoxes i. e. "u I trafini te paradoxes" such as that of
Burali-Forti's. This indicates a concentration on limitation of size
as a sufficient strategy for averting paradoxes. As we have seen,
Zermelo's local approach reflects the reliance on the limitation of
size hypothesis only so far as the ultrafinite paradoxes are
concerned. The semantic paradoxes were averted by the invocation of
definite propositional functions.
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PROBLEMS INHERENT IN ZERXELO'S ACCOUNT OF DEFINITE PROPERTIES.
After the publication of Zermelo' axiomatization there ensued
considerable criticism, variously motivated, of his account of
definite properties. In the widespread criticism of Zermelo's definite
properties the fact that Zermelo was largely successful in achieving
his instrumentalistic aspirations is often ignored. This should alert
us to the need to reexamine the professed motivation for same of this
criticism. At the same time Zermelo's prescription for definiteness is
certainly problematic and in certain respects flawed. In this chapter
I discuss some of the problematic aspects of this prescription. A
critique of Zermelo's account is rewarding in that it reveals valuable
details of Zermelo's overall approach, highlights the nature of
Skolem's reformulation of Zermelo's notion of definite property and
provides material for an evaluation of that reformulation.
Commentators, including Skolem, criticize Zermelo on the grounds that
his notion is too 'vague' or 'imprecise'. What is not painted aut, and
which is perhaps its principal defect, is the circularity of his
explication. The explication is circular since definiteness occurs in
the statement of the axioms and the axioms determine what is definite.
Or put in another way, which propositional functions are definite
depends an the membership structure. This in turn, depends an the sets
generated by the axiom of separation. But which sets are generated by
this axiom depends on which propositional functions are definite.
There is an indication here that definite properties should be
characterized in some manner independent of the axioms.
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On reading Zermelo's explication of definite property we seem to be in
vertiginous suspension between the syntactic and semantic modes of
interpretation. Zermelo, in characterizing definite propositional
functions makes no explicit statement as to whether they are to be
understood as syntactic entities, properties or otherwise. In all
probabili ty this omission occurred simply because Zermelo did not
perceive the import of the distinction between syntax and semantics.
This failure of logical insight was not peculiar to Zermelo. On the
contrary, it was shared by the majority of those working in the first
quarter of the century. Whilst it is true that Frege had been aware of
the need to strictly differentiate between syntax and semantics his
ideas were not immediately influential on this matter. Moreover,
vagueness with respect to this distinction was apparent not only among
mathematicians such as Zermelo but also among logicians. For example,
Russell, as Quine informs us
used "propositional function" to refer both to attributes and open
sentences or predicates. [1963 p.191
and furthermore
Russell's own exposition simply blurred the distinction between the
abstractive expression (or even the open sentence) and the
propositional function (or attribute or relation) ...[1963 p.245]
Russell, incidentally, with the benefit of some fifty years hindsight,
writes the following of the notion of propositional function employed
in the formulation of his ramified type theory
A propositiona! function is an expression containing a variable and
becoming a proposition as soon as a value is assigned to the variable.
For example, "x is a man" is a propositional function. If, in place of
x, we put Socrates or Plato or anybody else, we get a proposition. We
can replace x by something that is not a man and we still get a
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proposition, though in this case a false one. A propositional function
is nothing but an expression. It does not, by itself, represent
anything. [1959 p. 53]
Zermelo states his separation principle as a single axiom. A feature
of the axiom is quantification over propositional functions. This
higher-order quantification invites an interpretation of definite
proposi tional functions as 'properties' or 'attrlbutes' rather than
syntactic objects. According to Hallett there is some evidence for
this interpretation to be found in Zermelo's later writings. Hallett
writes that
In his [1929], Zermelo attempts to explain his notion of 'definite
property'. He proposes an axiomatization of definite properties, or,
more strictly, an axiomatization of the concept of 'definiteness' for
properties. This approach, he tells us, goes back to his [1908a]; it
is '... the method which I myself had in view, though I did not
expressly say so, and which was applied in the reasoning of the work
mentioned' ([1929], p. 340). 'Definiteness' is now treated as a
predicate under which properties (or relations etc.) fall, and,
importantly, the axioms proposed for definiteness involve
quantification over the properties. The permissibility of
quantification over properties is confirmed in Zermelo (1930]. There
he states what appears to be a second-order version of the axiom of
separation: 'Every propositional function P(x) separates from each set
JI[a subset P(JI[)containing all elements x for which P(x) is true'
([1930)], p.30). [1984 p.268]
Hallett goes on to say that the evidence in the 1908a for the
interpretation in question "is simply not clear". Koreover,
There, separation is not stated in a form which suggests second-order
quantification, and Zermelo largely avoids the term 'property' [p.268]
Whilst I agree with Hallett that Zermelo's 1908a is not clear on this
point, I am less agreeable to Hallett's contention that the form of
the statement of the axiom of separation does not suggest second-order
-124-
logic. The quantification in the axiom is over propositional functions
and thus is manifestly a higher-order logic. What isn't clear is the
nature of these higher-order entities over which he is quantifying.
However, it is the case that insofar as the statement of the
separation principle in the 1908 paper is taken as a guide, then it
serves as a warrant to construe Zermelo's definite propositional
functions as properties.
Two further remarks arising from the above discussion. First, it would
be surprising if Zermelo, at this stage in the development of logic,
did not intend a higher-order system. Both Frege's Begriffsschrift
[1879] and Russell's theory of types [1908] contain a first-order
logic as a subsystem, but this subsystem was not singled out by them
for special purposes. In fact, it is generally held that it was only
in 1915, in a paper of Lowenheim's, that the first-order fragment of
logical systems was focused upon. But even here we must be cautious.
For example, Moore states that Lowenheim
became the first logician to separate first-order logic clearly from
second-order logic, and to acknowledge that first-order logic deserved
to be studied in its own right. [1980 p.100J
But Lowenheim did not single out the first-order part of logic qua
system of logic so much as point out a particular property of
sentences which only displayed quantification over individuals.
Second, we may, of course, interpret the 'P' in his statement of the
axiom as a schematic symbol rather than intended as a variable proper.
After all, in stating the axioms of 2F, for example, such a schematic
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symbol is employed without intending a second-order formalization. But
there is no evidence for this somewhat anachronistic interpretation.
I now turn to the question of construing Zermelo's notion of definite
property as a linguistic entity. Recall that in explicating his notion
Zermelo refers to ua propositional function P(x>, in which the
variable term ranges over all individuals of a class }II, ••• II Now a
variable is a syntactic entity. It may, following Frege, 'indicate a
range' but this informs us as to how we deal with it in our semantic
theory. It is not a semantic entity per se. Now since a variable is
part of the constitution of a propositional function it is not
unreasonable to conclude that a propositional function is itself a
syntactic entity - more specifically, an open formula.
If we interpret definite propositional functions as open formulas then
this naturally leads to an enquiry into the underlying language in
which they are embedded. This is an important question so far as the
foundational viability of Zermelo's axiomatization is concerned
because the axiom of separation is the key tool to be employed to
reconstruct extant mathematical disciplines such as classical
analysis, especially its fine structure and, as is made evident in the
second part of Zermelo's 1908a, transfinite arithmetic. Since those
proposi tional functions which are definite are part of the stock of
propositional functions in general it seems plausible that the extent
of this part may vary with a variation in the extent of the general
collection of propositional functions which itself depends on the
underlying language.
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Before proceeding with the enquiry into the underlying language of
definite propositional functions I first consider a consequence of
Zermelo's characterization of them which apparently presents a
difficulty for their construal as linguistic entities. Let P(x) be a
propositional function and X a class. Recall that according to
Zermelo's prescription <which he presents as relativized to a model>
P(x) is definite if it is definite for all members of X. That is, if
for all members ~ of X, P(~) is definite. Zermelo unequivocally states
that "whether ~€h. or not is always definite". If we are to interpret
propositional functions to be linguistic entities then this implies
that the underlying language includes, for example, an individual
constant for each member of K. However, since the cardinality of M
maybe arbitrarily high it follows that this is also the case for the
cardinality of the underlying language.
This consequence might be taken as militating against the
interpretation of propositional functions as open formulas. But
Zermelo had very liberal views on languages. For example, from
Zermelo's point of view even infinitary languages were not
problematic. Note first, that an espousal of infinitary languages by
Zermelo, viewed in its historical context, cannot be considered a
radical position. In fact the use of infinitely long expressions
within systems of logic was quite common in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century. For example, Peirce, Schroder and Lowenheim
all employed them - the latter even allowing expressions with infinite
strings of quantifiers.
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Having previously pointed out that Hilbert's ideas were a great
influence on Zermelo, at least in the first decade of the century, it
is worthwlle here to quote the following passage concerning Hllbert
and infinitary languages.
At the Third International Congress of Kathematics, held at
Heidelberg, Hilbert analysed the foundations of logic and of the real
numbers. To secure these foundations properly and to circumvent the
set-theoretic paradoxes, he insisted that the laws of logic and some
of those for arithmetic must be developed simultaneously. Above all,
he considered such paradoxes to indicate that traditional logic had
failed to fulfill the rigorous demands that set theory now imposed on
it. In the course of outlining a logical theory for the positive
integers, Hilbert employed both infinite conjunctions ...and
disjunctions. .. Since he did not cite either Peirce or Schroder, it
appears that Hilbert independently formulated this method of defining
quantifiers with a fixed domain ...Two decades later he came to employ
a version of the Axiom of Choice, rather than infinite expressions, in
order to define quantifiers. [Koore 1980 p.99]
In contrast to Hilbert, Zermelo did not come to eschew infinitary
logic. In his replies to Skolem's criticisms of his ax:iomatization
Zermelo argued for a logic incorporating arbitrarily long conjunctions
and disjunctions. These were arbitrarily long in the sense that they
might be indexed by any given ordinal. [See Zermelo 1929, 1930, 1932]
(It might be argued that Zermelo's espousal of infinitary logic was
simply a result of a conflation between syntax and semantics. However,
he did continue to advocate an infinitary logic as late as 1932 by
which time Godel's work, beginning with his completeness theorem for
first-order logic [1930], following an open problem suggested by
Hilbert and Ackermann in their 1928, had done much to clarify ideas
with respect to the distinction between syntax and semantics. Zermelo
was familiar with Gode L'e work and in fact he had discussed it with
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GodeI through an exchange of letters. But there is some suggestion
that Zermelo was not entirely clear on Godel's ideas. Feferman writes:
Godel's work ...drew criticism from various quarters, which was
invariably due to confusions about the necessary distinctions
involved, such as that between the notions of truth and proof. In
fact, the famous set-theorist Ernst Zermelo interpreted these concepts
in such a way as to arrive at a flat contradict ion with Godel' s
results. In correspondence during 1931 Godel took pains to explain his
work to Zermelo, apparently without success. [1986 p.61
This, of course, is not a direct comment on the syntax/semantics
distinction but it does add weight to Hoare's forthright opinion that
in his 1932 Zermelo -did not distinguish clearly enough between his
syntax and semantics.- [1980 p.126])
Given that Zermelo's 1908a was written some ten or more years before
the advent of Hi!bert's full-blown metalllathematicsand that he was
ambiguous with respect to the distinction between syntax and semantics
it is not surprising that he does not make explicit the underlying
language of his definite propositional functions. However, as we shall
see, it is not difficult to give a plausible account of it. Not
difficul t, that is, with the exception of one important syntact ic
category, namely: the logical symbols.
The underlying language of Zermelo's definite propositional functions
excluding the logical component comprises of a single primitive, i.e.
'€' to be read informally as the membership relation. This is directly
in line with Cantor's idea of a set as a purely extensional object,
1.e. a collection completely determined by its members - all other
properties having been 'abstracted' away, so to speak. Thus
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'membership' is the single primitive notion of Cantorian set theory
and Zermelo's axiom system is a theory of membership essentially
requiring just the one binary relation symbol. Supporting the above
assertions about
considerations.
the underlying language are the following
The axioms as stated by Zermelo, with the possible exception of the
axiom of the axiom of separation, refer only to the membership
relation or relations and set theoretical operations compounded from
this relation, e.g. 'subset' and 'intersection'. From this fact we can
conclude that membership is the only primitive non-logical notion
constitutive of definite propositional functions. If not, then we
should expect them to be axiomatized, i. e. there should be further
axioms referring to them. But there are none. Xoreover, Zermelo is
clear that the "fundamental relations over the domain II are of the
form a.€h. Another point is that in the application of his axioms in
part two where the notion of definite property is extenSively employed
it is clear that they are all constructs starting from the
'fundamental relations'. (Incidentally, also from this application, it
is clear that Zermelo presumes that definite propositional functions
are closed under the logical operations of negation, conjunction and
disjunction. In so far the last two are infinitary then we have a
warrant to extend the closure to universal and existential
quantification. A further point worth mentioning here is that
although, strictly speaking, Zermelo gives a local prescription for
definitenessj in practice it is global, i.e. all the definite
propositional functions that he employs are apparently definite
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relative to any class X. This last particular is perhaps is an
indicator that a formulation of definite properties independent of
particular models and classes would be viable.)
•
In Zermelo's prescription for the definiteness of assertions there are
three parameters: the "fundamental relations of the domain" i the
axioms; the "universally valid laws of logic". If the first of these
"determines without arbitrariness" whether a particular assertion
"holds or not" then that assertion is definite. But this determination
is "by means of the axioms and universally valid laws of logic".
Judging from the prescribed role of these last two parameters it is
tempting to conclude that the collection of definite assertions are to
be identified with the closure of the axioms under logical
consequence. Thus, in general, this collection varies in extent
according to which principles count as logical. (Note that from
Zermelo's point of view these these principles could involve notions
such as 'truth' and 'definability' hence the worry over the
introduction of semantic paradoxes.) Another point here is that any
assertion independent of the axioms cannot be definite. However, if we
interpret his prescription in this way the part played by the first
parameter is completely undermined.
Recall that the interpretation offered in chapter 4 above was that an
assertion was definite if it was unambiguously true or false relative
to the given model. The role of the axioms and logic serve to
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circumscri be the models. What I mean by the logic circumscribing the
models is simply that if some principle is accepted as a genuine
logical principle then a structure not satisfying it will not be
considered merely as an interpretation which does not satisfy a
particular axiom but rather not even admissable as an interpretation.
(Of course, in contemporary model theory considerations such as these
are subsumed under the arrangements made to set up the formal
semantics. But Zermelo was working some time before the advent of
formal semantics.) Furthermore, it follows from Zermelo's prescription
that whether a particular assertion is definite in general depends on
whether a particular principle fails to hold. However, if it is
accepted as a logical principle it must hold.
Now the central point I wish to emphasize here is that whether you
interpret the determination of definite assertions "by means of the
axioms and universally valid laws of logic" in either of the ways
suggested in the last two paragraphs definiteness depends on which
principles are accepted as "universally valid laws of logic". Thus the
foundational credentials of his system depends on them since
defini teness is the warrant for the separation operation. However,
Zermelo offers no explicit details as to the underlying logic of his
system. So this omission contributes a further degree of imprecision
to Zermelo's notion of definite property .
•
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I have intimated that a characterization of definiteness such that the
notion is independent of models, classes, the underlying logic or set
of axioms would resolve some of the problems brought about by
Zermelo's prescription. Was such an account offered by Skolem?
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SKOLEM'S REFOR~JLATION OF ZERMELO'S NOTION OF DEFINITE PROPERTY.
<i) Introduction.
Skolem's reformulation of Zermelo's notion of definite property gains
immence significance from the fact that it constituted a key step
leading to the general acceptance by mathematicians and mathematical
logicians over the last half-century, that set theory, upon
formalization, is to be framed as a first-order system. Furthermore,
Skolem's first-orderization of set theory antiCipated the general
movement towards first-orderization of mathematics. This movement,
which gained momentum in the 1930's, underpinned by Gcdel v s
completeness theorem (1930) and Tarski's formal semantics (1936), is
in fact parasitic on the first-orderization of set theory.
But the trend towards first-orderization was not, and is not, left
unchallenged. [For details of the substantial present-day challenge
see e.g. Barwise/Feferman 1985.] Zermelo, in particular, opposed this
trend and took issue with Skolem and von Neumann on this aspect of
their respective reformulations of his system. As Hoore informs us
It was Zermelo, perhaps influenced by Hilbert, who ...argued that
first-order logic should not suffice for mathematics and especially
for set theory. [1982 p.267]
Hilbert's influence in this particular direction is perhaps
surprising. By the 1920's Hilbert had begun to develop his mature
foundational programme, namely: his metamathematics. Loosely speaking,
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this involved framing mathematics within fragments of primitive
arithmetic. [See Giaquinto 1983] So this does not look, at least from
a contemporary perspective, as if Hilbert at that stage would be a
proponent of second-order logic. The central exposition of Hilbert's
metamathematics is to be found in his paper entitled "On The
Infinite"; published in 1925. The chronology is to be noted here, for
:Koore cites as support for his interesting contention the following
quotation dating from 1928:
As soon as the object of investigation becomes the foundation
of...mathematical theories, as soon as we want to determine in what
relation the theory stands to logic and to what extent it can be
obtained from purely logical operations and concepts, then second-
order logic is essential. [Hi!bert and Ackermann 1928 p.86 Koore's
translation. ]
In his 1922 Skolem shows remarkable insight and prescience on matters
regarding the logical and foundational aspects of Zermelo's
axiomatization. Although he suggests a means to render Zermelo's
system more precise at the same time his attitude towards the
foundational viability of axiomatic set theory is essentially
negative. In the concluding remarks of his paper he confesses:
I believe that it was...clear that axiomatization in terms of sets was
not a satisfactory ultimate foundation of mathematics, that
mathematics would, for the most part, not be very much concerned with
it. But in recent times I have seen to my surprise that so many
mathematicians think that these axioms of set theory provide the ideal
foundation for mathematics; therefore it seemed to me that the time
had came to publish a critique. [pp.300-301]
In fact, throughout much of his career, Skolem's attitude towards the
foundational viability of set theory was negative. As Fenstad informs
us
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Skolem... did nat have much confidence in set theory as a foundation
for "real" mathematics, and he was extremely doubtful about the
transfinite powers and non-constructive modes of reasoning of set
theoretical mathematics. His own preferences are better represented by
the important 1923 paper. Here Skolem tries to build up elementary
arithmetic without applying the unrestricted quantifiers "for all" and
"there exists" to the infinite completed totality of natural numbers.
Historically this is perhaps "a first" paper in the theory of
recursive arithmetic. [1967 p.121
In his 1922 Skolem's scepticism is directed against the foundational
adequacy of an axiomatic theory of sets. Later in his career this was
extended to set theory in general. It is important to emphasize the
distinction between the two attitudes. The latter reflects upon the
foundational adequacy of the notion of set whilst the former upon the
axiomatic method. It is a perfectly coherent attitude to take set
theoretical notions as being foundationally adequate, whilst at the
same time maintaining that no axiomatic theory of sets fulfi 11s, or
even in principle may adequately fulfill this foundational role. Given
that set theoretical notions are foundationally adequate then Skolem's
discussion of his first remark may serve to underpin this attitude.
Specifically his contention that
If we adopt Zermelo's axiomatization, we must. strictly speaking, have
a general notion of domains in order to be able to provide a
foundation for set theory. The entire content of this theory is, after
all, as follows: for every domain in which the axioms hold, the
further theorems of set theory also hold. But clearly it it is somehow
circular to reduce the notion of set to a general notion of domain.
[1922 p.292]
Note that the above passage makes it evident that Skolem understood
Zermelo's axiomatization to be an implicit definition. Moreover it
seems that this was Skolem's general view of the status of axiom
systems. In Part lit was discussed how the implicit definition thesis
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goes hand in hand with a relativistic view of mathematical notions.
Now later on his career Skolem, did, in fact, come to adopt an
explicit relativistic view of set theory together with a positive
attitude towards the axiomatic method as a means for its foundation.
In a paper of 1941 he writes
...that axiomatization should lead to relativism is a fact sometimes
considered to be a weak point of the axiomatic method. But without
reason. The analysis of mathematical thought, the fixing of its
fundamental hypotheses and modes of reasoning can only be an advantage
for science. It is not a weakness of a scientific method that it
doesn't yield the impossible. But it appears that most mathematicians
are terrified that the absolute theory of sets should turn out to be
an impossibility. [1941 p.470. Translated in Benacerraf 1985.]
Skolem's relativism, according to Hao Wang, had a tendency to shade
over into formalism. In a paper of 1958, as Hao Wang puts it, Skolem
proposes to present IIa relativist conception of the fundamental
notions of mathematics. It seems to me that this is clearer than the
absolutist and platonist conception which dominates classical
mathematics." A proposition is true if it is formally proved in a
formal system. In simple cases such as recursive arithmetie, the
intuition of induction is sufficient to guide the construction of the
formal system and to assure consistency. "In the other case, one may
accept an opportunist view. )(y point of view is then that one must
use formal systems for the development of mathematical ideas." After
listing diverse formal systems of set theory, Skolem asserts: "I do
not understand why most mathematicians and logicians do not appear to
be satisfied with this notion of sets as defined by a formal system,
but contrariwise speak of the limitations of the axiomatic method. Of
course this notion of set has a relative character, because it depends
on the chosen formal systems. But if this system is chosen suitably,
we can none the less develop mathematics on the basis," [1970 p.40]
Skolem, as is made evident by his fourth remark, subscribed to the
central tenet of the mathematical approach, namely: the generation of
Cantarian transfinite arithmetic is a necessary feature of an
axiomatic theory of sets. As most workers within the mathematical
approach, Skolem displays a strong instrumentalistic streak. He seems
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to have perceived the general enterprise ofaxiomatizing set theory as
undertaken with an instrumentalistic spirit. This emerges, for
instance, in the following passage:
Set theory in its original version led, as we know, to certain
contradictions (antinomies), and no one has yet succeeded in giving a
clarification of them that has won general acceptance. In view of this
threat to set theory, attempts have been made to develop that theory
by means of certain fundamental assumptions, or axioms, in such a way
that the part presumed correct and useful would remain provable while
the contradictions would be avoided. [1922 p.291J
Note also that in this passage Skolem professes the standard view of
the reason for axiomatizing set theory, viz: the antinomies. Are we to
conclude from this that Skolem understood Cantor'5 notion of set to
incorporate the naive comprehension principle? This, as in Zermelo's
case is puzzling. It is unlikely that Skolem is merely taking
Zermelo's statement on this matter in the introduction to his 1908a at
face value. Skolem was certainly familiar with Cantor's transfinite
arithmetic and since he studied in Gottingen in the year 1915-16 he
was likely to be familiar with Cantor's philosophy of the infinite if
not his original writings. On the other hand in his mention of
"clarification" he is most probably referring to the attempts of
Russell and Poincare to analyse the contradictions in terms of the
notion of 'impredicativity'. (Some evidence for this is provided by
Skolem's reference to Russell and Poincare's criticisms of the use of
impredicative definitions in his fifth remark.> So this indicates an
affirmative response to the above question. In that case, since
Cantorian set theory is interpreted as being contradictory, the claim
that Skolem's system is a putative axiomatization of Cantorian set
theory needs to be qualified.
-138-
Incidentally, if Skolem, in the above passage, is intimating that a
successful conceptual analysis or 'clarification' obviates the need
for an axiomatization then he is mistaken. On the contrary, it may
serve as the spur or starting point for one. The formulation of
Russell's theory of types is an illuminating example. As Chihara
points out
Having agreed with Poincare about the source of the paradoxes - the
supposed source being, in each instance, a violation of the
vicious-circle principle - one might think that this would have
satisfied Russell's desire for a solution to the paradoxes. This was
not so: for Russell, the vicious-circle principle was "purely negative
in its scope·; he felt that an adequate solution to the paradoxes must
provide a positive theory which would "exclude" totalities in
accordance with the vicious-circle principle. [1973 p.10]
The theory of types was the "positive· theory developed by Russell. I
turn now to Skolem's precisification of Zermelo's putative
axiomatlzation of Cantorian set theory.
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(ii) Skolem's characterization of definite properties.
Skolem begins his second remark with
A very deficient point in Zermelo is the notion "defini te
proposi tion". Probably no one will find Zermelo' s explanation of it
satisfactory. So far as I know, no one has attempted to give a strict
formulation of this notion; this is very strange, since it can be done
qui te easily and, moreover, in a very natural way that immediately
suggests itself. [1922 p.2921
He then goes on, in order to explain this formulation and "also with a
view to later considerations", to list "the five basic operations of
mathematical logic" as conjunction, disjunction, negation, universal
quantification and existential quantification. After which he proceeds
to reformulate Zermelo's notion of definite propositional functions as
follows:
By a definite proposition we now mean a finite expression constructed
from elementary propositions of the form 4Eb. or s=t: by means of the
five operations mentioned. This is a completely clear notion and one
that is sufficiently comprehensive to permit us to carry out all
ordinary set-theoretic proofs. [p.292-31
At this point Skolem has not specified exp!ici tly whether his new
version of Zermelo's system is intended to be in any way different
from the original except in respect of a new reading of defini te
properties. In particular, there is no such specification in
connection with the underlying logic. It is in the course of making
his third remark that Skolem explicitly completes the transformation
of Zermelo's axiomatization into a first-order system. He observes
that
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Axiom III (axiom of separation) can be replaced by an infinite
sequence of simpler axiom's - which like the rest of Zermelo's axioms,
are first-order propositions in the sense of Lowenheim - containing
the two binary relations e and =. [p.295J
A definite proposition is thus a syntactic entity. Skolem's
formulation identifies definite propositions with first-order formulas
of a language whose only non-logical symbol, with perhaps the
exception of constants, is a binary predicate for the formalization of
the membership relation. Furthermore, if we assume a primitive
recursive language, Skolem's notion is effecti ve. (There has been a
discrepancy in the interpretation of Skolem's characterization. For
example, Hallett writes "Skolem proposed a first-order formulation,
'definite property' thus being replaced by 'predicate of the first-
order language'" (1984 p.2691 In the context of 'separation' Hallett's
interpretation seems intuitively correct and Skolem's usage in the
footnote on p.297 does suggest this interpretation. On the other hand,
from Skolem's discussion of the replacement principle it appears that
a definite property may have at least two variables. The source of the
ambiguity may be traced to the tradition in logic within which Skolem
was working - see the discussion on •Skolem and Completeness' in
chapter 6)
Skolem's notion is clearly independent of any model and class. A
proposition is definite regardless of what holds of "fundamental
relations of the domain" and to which particular set in the domain we
are applying the axiom of separation. In practice. i.e. the actual use
of the axiom of separation by Zermelo in his 1908a. this was also the
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case. But Skolem's characterization forthrightly ensures that
definiteness is not relativized to models. It is also straightforward
that Skolem's notion is independent both of the axioms and underlying
logic of the system. Thus, for example, adding extra axioms to the
system, e.g. the axiom of foundation; or removing existing ones, does
not alter the extension of the class of definite properties.
Trivially, in that Skolem's definite properties are closed under
certain given
independent of
logical connectives
the logic. Rather,
and quantifiers, they
they are independent
are
of
not
the
underlying logic of the system in the non-trivial sense that they are
independent of the rules of inference. But Skolem does not list these
rules explicitly. Like Zermelo, Skolem did not present a formal system
in the Hilbertian sense. It is, however, a much better approximation
to such a system than is Zermelo's. ievertheless, although Skolero is
clear on the fact that he is presenting a first-order system, we are
not directly informed to exactly which first-order system. Just as
Zermelo in his reference to the "universally valid laws of logic"
Skolem writes as if there is some common 'folklore' logic to which we
are to assume he is alluding. There is, however, in his discussion of
Lowenheim's 1915 a hint that he had in mind a variation of the logic
of Schroder's 1895 that excludes nondenumerable conjunction and
disjunction. (See Skolem 1922 p.293]
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(iii) Why did Skolem reformulate Zermelo's axioms as a first-order
system?
In so far as Skolem sets out to provide a "A definition, much to be
desired, that makes Zermelo's notion 'deUni te proposition' precise"
he certainly achieves his purpose. Although given some the criticisms
he makes of axiomatic set theory in his ensuing remarks one begins to
wonder why he deemed the exercise "much to be desired". It is
sometimes overlooked that Zermelo is successful in the sense that he
provides in the second part of his 1908a a forceful demonstration that
his system serves as a foundation for a considerable portion of set
theory in particular and extant mathematics in general. Moreover, this
demonstration employs the notion of definite property formulated in
the first part of the paper. Given Zermelo's apparent success; why did
Skolem need to make the notion any more precise? Was there something
specific in informal set theory or extant mathematics for which
Zer:melo's version of the axiom of separation was inadequate? If so,
Skolem doesn't mention it.
The point of Skolem's third remark is that
... axiomatizing set theory leads to a relativity of set-theoretic
notions, and this relativity is inseparably bound up with every
thoroughgoing axiomatization. (p.296]
Skolem proves a version of what is now known as the Lowenheim-Skolem
theorem. He demonstrates that if an infinite sequence of first-order
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propositions, indexed by the positive integers, are consistent then
those propositions are all satisfied in some countable domain. This
theorem is an extension on the work Skolem had done on Lowenheim's
1915 in his 1920 which is based on his proof of a normal form theorem
for first-order propositions. Skolem's theorem is an example of the
so-called 'first-order diseases' and is forthrightly a result
concerning first-order theories. Now since Skolem's reformulation of
definite property, as he is fully aware, turns Zermelo's
axiomatization into a first-order system, and hence susceptible to
these 'diseases', what reasons did Skolem have, if he is questioning
the viability of an axio11JlJticfoundation for set theory in general.
for concentrating on, or even considering a first-order formulation?
Skolem's professed aim was to render Zermelo's notion precise; and he
indeed formulates an effective notion. Skolem was certainly interested
in effectiveness and considered it an important aspect of mathematical
concepts. This interest is part and parcel of his work on 'decision'
problems in logic and what came to be known as primitive recursive
arithmetic. Ve find, as an example of his thinking in this connection,
the following comment at the close of his eighth remark
...most mathematicians want mathematics to deal, ultimately, with
performable computing operations and not to consist of formal
propositions about objects called this and that. [p.300]
This interest in effectiveness informs us as to why Skolem was
prompted to formulate a syntactic account of definite property. But
Skolem could have, for instance, employed the equally effective notion
'formula of the second-order theory of membership'. In fact, Weyl in
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his 1917 formulated an effective notion of definite property which was
identical to Skolem's with the exception that he did not exclude
higher-order quantification.
Of course. I am here presuming that Skolem's characterization of
definite property is 'formula of the first-order theory of
membership'. This is certainly how it is generally interpreted; and as
such was the blueprint for ZF. But to be precise - in his initial
characterization there is nothing to preclude us reading his
prescription as the unqualified 'formula of the theory of membership.'
It is only in the course of making his third remark that he states
that Zermelo's axiom "can" be stated as a schema comprising first-
order instances and then states "we may then conclude ..." and the
conclusion is that the reformulated axioms have a model with domain
the natural numbers. In the remainder of his paper Skolem apparently
retains this version of set theory but he makes no explicit comment on
the matter.
Now the cynic could argue that Skolem transformed Zermelo's axioms
into a first-order system merely in order to facilitate his
criticisms. which he apparently deems sufficient. of the programme of
providing an axiomatic foundation for set theory. But at the same time
it must be said that it seems unlikely that it was not clear to Skolem
that his criticisms did not apply to axiomatic set theory in general.
Put another way. are there some positive factors which inclined Skolem
to concentrate on the first-order version and as such obviate the view
that Skolem had set up a 'straw man' which in any case was not the
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appropriate target for a general case against the above-mentioned
programme? I claim there are such positive factors.
To bring these positive factors into focus it must be emphasized that
Skolem's criticisms were made with Zermelo's particular axiomatization
and 1908a paper in mind. In other words, although Skolem was aiming to
criticise the idea of an axiomatic foundation for set theory in
general the only visible target was Zermelo's system and his
discussion and application of it in the aforementioned paper. In fact
Skolem says as much in the opening paragraphs of his paper - he writes
Until now, so far as I know, only one ... system of axioms [for set
theory] has found rather general acceptance, namely, that constructed
by Zermelo. Russell and Whitehead, too, constructed a system of logic
that provides a foundation for set theory; if I am not mistaken,
however, mathematicians have taken but little interest in it. In what
follows I therefore concern myself almost exclusively with Zermelo's
axiomatization, ...[p.291]
Indeed, as intimated above, with one notable qualification (discussed
by Skolem in his fourth remark), Zerm.elo's system was an apt target
for Skolem's criticisms in the sense that it appeared to be a
sufficient foundation for Cantorian set theory and extant mathematics
- at least in so far as an instrumentalistic attitude is maintained.
The positive factors, then, which prompted Skolem to concentrate on a
first-order system are to be located in certain features of Zermelo's
1908a.
Zermelo's axiomatization was a higher-order order system and this is
tacitly acknowledged by Skolem when he transforms the axiom of
separation into a schema. But by turning Zermelo's axiomatization into
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a first-order system how can it be that he is attacking Zermelo's
system - the only axiomatic foundation that at the time had "found
general acceptance"?
The answer is that, in a certain sense, Zermelo's 1908a, despite his
stated characterization of definite property and subsequent
formulation of the axiom of separation, is in effect, or pract ics l Lv
speaking, a first-order theory. I mean by this the following:
i) As Skolem notes, all the axioms apart from the axiom of separation
involve only quantification over sets (and perhaps urelements);
i1) Throughout the 190Ba, including the development of cardinality
theory, in the application of the axiom of separation, Zermelo never
uses more than ~rticular instances of the axiom, i.e. never the full
second-order axiom;
iii) In each application, construing 'definite propositional
functions' as syntactic objects - which is a natural construal in the
context - only predicates of the first order theory of membership are
employed. In other words, Zermelo never uses a definite property that
isn't identifiable as falling within those characterized by Skolem.
Thus, if we confine ourselves to analysing Zermelo's constructions and
proofs, Skolem's notion may be 'read off' so to speak. The only
discontinuity, albeit a minor one, in this respect is that Skolem
jumped to a schema including all instances of predicates of the
-147-
first-order theory of membership. It is true that Skolem would have
had to convince himself that his notion were sufficient for further
purposes, i. e. the foundational sufficiency of the residual system.
But, as stated above, Zermelo's system already appeared sufficient,
and he employed what was essentially subsumed in Skolem's system.
InCidentally, we noted Skolem's claim that his notion of defini te
property is "completely clear" and "sufficiently comprehensive to
permit us to carry out all ordinary set-theoretic proofs." The first
part of the claim refers directly to the effectiveness of the notion.
(Skolem's system is a paradigm of precisification.) From the above
discussion it is not unreasonable to conclude that the proofs Skolem
had in mind were those in Zermelo's 1908a.
(It is appropriate to interject here a note on Skolem's axiom of
replacement. The qualification with respect to the suffiCiency of
Zermelo's system referred to above was that the existence of the set
{w, Po, PPw, ... } was not provable in Zermelo's system and hence his
theory was judged deficient in providing full Cantorian transfinite
arithmetic. This was noticed independently by Skolem and Fraenkel. To
remedy this deficiency they introduced an axiom of replacement. Each
of them framed such an axiom in terms of their respective notion of
definite property. Roughly speaking, the idea was that if a definite
property behaves functionally over a set then the image is also a set.
It is true that a more precise formulation of definite property in
turn renders the axiom of replacement more precise and easier to work
with, for instance, in connection with models of the theory. But a
more workable axiom of replacement is rather a welcome spin-off from
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both mens refomulation of Zermelo's notion of definite property rather
than a direct motivation for it. In Fraenkel's case, his reformulation
stemmed from a need for a sharper version of the axiom of replacement
in order to push through his demonstration of the independence of the
axiom of choice. [See Fraenkel 1922])
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iv) I turn now to four further topics arising from the concerns of
this chapter.
(1) Skolem and reduction.
Skolem was considerably influenced by the work and concerns of Peirce,
Schroder and Lowenheim. A common link between these three was the
tradition, which can be traced back to Boole, of an algebraic
treatment of logical operators. Kore specifically, a central influence
on Skolem was Lowenheim's 1915. This paper, as van Heijenoort informs
us
deals with problems connected with the validity, in different domains,
of formulas of the first-order predicate calculus and with various
aspects of the reduction and decision problems. All these topics had
remained alien to the trend that had become dominant in logic, that of
Frege-Peano-Russell. In the following decades, however, these problems
were to come more and more into the foreground, and the paper is now
rightly considered a pioneer in logic. [p.228]
Lowenheim held the view that all of mathematics could be framed within
his 'relative calculus' - a system of higher-order logic incorporating
a Boolean algebra of classes and based on the system of Schroder's
1895 - as was, albeit in modified form, Skolem's logic. In his 1915,
which was very well known to Skolem, Lowenheim states
Every theorem of mathematics ...can be written as a relative equation;
the mathematical theorem then stands or falls according as the
equation is satisfied or not. This transformation of arbitrary
mathematical theorems into the relative equations can be carried out,
I believe, by anyone who knows the work of Vhitehead and Russell.
[p.246]
-150-
This passage occurs in a section entitled II Reduction of the Higher
Calculus of Relatives to the Binary. II Now directly following this
passage he writes
Since, now, according to our theorem the whole relative calculus can
be reduced to the binary relative calculus, it follows that we can
decide whether an arbitrary mathematical proposition is true provided
we can decide whether a binary relative equation is identically
satisfied or not.
Now for those, like Skolem, greatly concerned with foundational
issues, it would of been of considerable interest that the process of
reducing mathematics could be fUrther extended to a first-order
fragment of the relative calculus.
(2) Skolem and Completeness.
It is worth noting that one argument that is standardly proposed
favouring first-order logic, namely its completeness with respect to
an intuitively correct notion of validity, was unavailable to Skolem.
In his proof of Lowenheim's theorem Skolem had provided the essential
mathematical steps for the completeness result but unlike GodeI did
not have a sufficiently clear insight into the distinction between
syntax and semantics to utilize what he had at hand. In particular
Skolem conflated 'satisfiable' and 'consistent'. This is explained by
Wang "by the fact that Skolem is in the tradition of Boole, Schroder,
Lowenheim, and Korselt. Acording to this tradition, unlike that of
Frege and Hilbert, logic is not thought of as a deductive system.
From this point of view, as Professor Bernays has painted out,
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satisfiabil ity is the same as consistency (non-contradiction) ...."
[1970 p.22] Dreben and van Heijenoort have taken up this 1ine of
argument in a recent collection of Godel's papers. They write
For Peirce, Schroder and their followers...quantificational formulas
were indeed often at the centre of their attention, but ...the very
notion of formal system was absent. Thus in his fundamental 1915
Lowenheim deals with quantificational formulas with identity. His
approach, however, is purely model theoretic, that is, semantic. He
has no formal axioms or rules of inference for quantification theory.
His basic notion is that of the truth of a formula for a given
interpretation in a given domain, and with that he handles validity
and satisfiability. Obviously, no question of completeness of a formal
system could arise here either. ( 1986 p.451
Despite Skolem's failure to provide arguments for the priority of a
first-order formulation of set theory and despite his highlighting of
the first-order 'diseases' he was certainly influential in its
establishment as the standard presentation.
The criticisms put forward in his 1922 are not sufficient for Skolem's
case against the application of the axiomatic method to set theory. In
particular, there are two gaps in his argument. First, he needs to
explain why we should go along with his shift to a first-order system.
Secondly, even granting the first, he has to convince us that the
first-order diseases inherent in a first-order axiomatic set theory
militates against its foundational viability. For example, Skolem does
not provide direct arguments as to why a non-categoric theory,
constituting a 'core' theory of sets, is not viable as a foundation.
Indeed, since he tended towards a relativistic view of mathematical
concepts, this richness in the model theory would, presumably, come to
be perceived as a bonus. But as I said, Skolem did not follow through
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on these matters in any detail and resolve what appear as tensions in
his attitude to the foundational viability of axiomatic set theory.
(3) Skolem and the semantic paradoxes.
Zermelo introduced the notion of definite property in order to avert
the semantic paradoxes. Whilst Skolemt s system retains a notion of
defini te property there is no mention in his paper of the semantic
paradoxes. Presumably he did not consider them a threat, Is this
because, like Peano and in contrast to Zermelo, he believed that a
paradox such as Richardt 6 "does not belong to mathematics, but to
linguistics" and consequently could not emerge from within a
mathematical system such as axiomatic set theory? [See Peano 1906J
The topic of semantic paradoxes is rarely addressed in connection with
present day axiomatizations of set theory. This is in large measure
due to the recei ved wisdom that semantic paradoxes do not encroach
into the domain of formal systems. A key influence here is Rameey' s
paper of 1926, where, applying some Wittgensteinian theses, he
determines to demonstrate that simple type theory is sufficient to
carry, with impunity, the logicist programme. How far Ramsey's
arguments are convincing with respect to formalized set theory in
general i6 problematic. But in any case he seems to have been
effective in convincing the majority of workers in mathematical logic
that the semantic paradoxes do not constitute a threat for formal
systems.
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Skolem's paper, however, precedes Ramsey's by four years; so we may
assume that the latter's arguments play no part in Skolem's reasons
for thinking his system was protected from the semantic paradoxes.
Rather than looking at the tack taken by Peano and Ramsey I would
claim that a more plausible account of Skolem's thinking is to be
located in the fact that his definite properties were, in the sense
discussed above, a subclass of Zermelo's definite properties. Put
bluntly, Skolem tackled the semantic paradoxes (and indeed the logical
peredoxee) by the same means as Zermelo. That is, he judged his
'properties', for the purpose of separation, to be 'definite' in the
relevant sense. Since he constrained the extension of his definite
properties to the type that Zermelo was using in practice he did not
require the added prescription that "the fundamental relations of the
domain, by means of the axioms and the universally valid laws of
logic, determine without arbitrariness whether it holds or not." It
was evident, at least to Skolem, that this prescription was satisfied
by this class of definite properties.
But Zermelo Jt'lJS worried that Skolem's general approach would invoke
the semantic paradoxes. In this connection 1t was worth quoting the
following passage from his 1932 which not only provides insight into
his anti-formalism and what I interpret to be his conceptualist
leanings but also illustrates his resistance to adopting the path that
was to take set theory to its present standard form i.e. the system
ZF.
From the assumption that all mathematical concepts and theorems must
be representable by a fixed finite system of signs, one falls
inevitably into 'RichlJrds PlJradox'. Recently this paradox, long after
it seemed dead and buried, found a happy resurrection in Slrolemism,
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the doctrine that every mathematical theory. in particular set theory,
is satisfiable in a countable model. As is well known, from
contradictory premises one may deduce whatever one wishes. Even the
strangest consequences which Skolem and others have drawn from their
basic assumptions, e.g. the 'relativity' of the concepts of power set
and equipollence, have not sufficed to turn them away from a doctrine
which for many has seemed to degenerate into a dogma beyond criticism.
However, a healthy 'metamathematics', a true 'logic of the infinite',
first becomes possible through a fundamental renunciation of the
assumption characterized above, which I term the 'finitistic
prejudice'. In any case the true subject matter of mathematics is
not, as many would have it, 'combination of signs' but conceptually-
ideal relations between the elements of conceptually determined
infinite manifold. Thus our systems of signs is always an incomplete
device, shifting from case to case. It reflects our finite
understanding of the infinite, which we cannot immediately and
intui tively 'survey' or comprehend, though at least we can approach
mastery step by step. In the following an attempt is made to develop
the foundations of a 'mathematical logic' which, free from the
'finitistic prejudice' and from inner contradictions, offers enough
room for the whole of mathematics as it exists at present (and for its
fruitful future development <while abandoning all arbitrary
prohibitions and restrictions.) [Zermelo 1932 p.85. Moore's
translation in his 1980]
As a footnote, it must be said, that, Zermelo was not entirely
misguided (contrary to the Ramsey's view) to worry about the emergence
of semantic paradoxes in formal systems. For example, consider their
exploitation by Godel:
After finishing his doctoral dissertation 1929, Godel set to work to
prove the consistency of analysis, pursuant to Hilbert's program. He
proposed to divide the difficulties of the problem by first reducing
the consistency of analysis to that of number theory. He began by
conSidering the model in which the set variables are interpreted as
ranging over sets definable in arithmetic. He soon realized that he
would need not just the consistency of number theory but also its
truth. This led him to ponder Richard's paradox and the paradox of the
liar, a formal analog of which can be used to infer that truth in
number theory cannot be defined in number theory <cf. Vang 1981, page
654). However, provability in number theory can be defined in number
theory. Therefore, if the provable formulas are all true, there must
be some true but unprovable formulas. Thus GodeI came to find the
results he published in 1931, which shook to its foundations Hilbert's
program for foundations without quite demolishing it. [Kleene 1986
p.127]
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Since semantic notions, albeit in an encoded or implicit mode, can be
located within formal systems; it is premature to dismiss the spectre
of the semantic paradoxes as having been exorcized.
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PART III: THE GENERALIZATION OF SET THEORY.
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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental question under discussion is the philosophical and
foundational significance of Cohen's independence results. Parts I and
I I, though they may be read as self-contained essays provide the
context for an appraisal of the philosophical significance of Cohen's
independence results and a basis for the resolution of foundational
issues brought into high relief by these results. The resolution takes
the form of adopting as a foundation a generalized concept of set,
namely that embodied in 'Local Set Theory' (LST). Underlying LST and
in essence incorporated into it is the tapas theoretic outlook and,
in a sense to be specified, topos theory itself.
In his paper entitled "From Absolute to Local Mathematics" Bell
proposes that we " abandon the unique absolute universe of sets
central to the orthodox set-theoretic account of the foundations of
mathematics, replacing it by a plurality of local mathematical
frameworks- elementary toposes- ... " [1986 p.409-] This is in accord
with the underlying philosophy of topos theory itself. Johnstone
explains that the topos theoretic outlook
., . consists in the rejection of the idea that there is a fixed
universe of "constant" sets within which mathematics can and should be
developed, and the recognition that the notion of "variable structure"
may be more conveniently handled within a universe of conti nuously
variable sets than by the method, traditional since the rise of
abstract set theory, of considering separately a domain of variation
(L, e. a topological space) and a succession of constant structures
attached to the points of this domain. In the words of F.W. Lawvere
[ 1975] , IIEvery notion of constancy is relative, being derived
perceptually or conceptually as a limiting case of variation, and the
undisputed value of such notions in clarifying variation is always
limi ted by that origin. This applies in particular to the notion of
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constant set, and explains why so much of naive set theory carries
over in same farm into the theory of variable sets". It is this
generalization of ideas from constant to variable sets which lies at
the heart of tapas theory; [1977 p.xviiJ
My purpose here is to establish that the generalization of set theory
inherent in this move to local frameworks, more specifically in its
incarnation as LST, is the appropriate progreSSive response to
foundational challenge of post-Cohen mathematics. In addition, my
purpose is to establish that the considerations of parts I and II.
taken in conjunction, direct us to this generalization and that this
generalization is the natural evolutionary step beyond ZF in the
context of the mathematical approach.
ZF is a formalization of an informal body of mathematics and as such
the two desiderata of codification and precisification are realised in
the sense discussed in part I. But this informal mathematics is not
fruitfully construed as being concerned with some realm of abstract
objects or body of knowledge. Rather, the informal mathematics
underlying ZF is the outcome of a complex conceptual development. The
key features of this development constituted the subject matter of
Part I!.
ZF is a product of the mathematical approach to set theory. Understood
as a ~the~tical theory and as the formalization of a concept justice
can be done to the affinities between ZF and the formal axiomat ic
realizations of algebraic concepts; particularly with respect to their
development and treatment. In the recognition that the enterprise of
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formalizing set theory (within the mathematical approach) carried with
it the hallmarks of the development and formalization of an algebraic
concept, involving as it does an emphasis on structure, operations and
models, the nature of the shift from ZF to tapas theory is readily
appreciated. It is a process naturally involved in the development of
algebraic concepts, namely: gener~liz~tion. In this way the nation of
set underlying ZF can be seen to be a particular instance of some
general notion. In their category-theoretic characterization of the
notion of set (more accurately 'model of set theory') i.e. elementary
topos theory, Lawvere and Tierney provided such a generalization.
This generalization assumes its optimum form as LST.
Generalization, in fact, turns out to figure highly in some key parts
of our discussion, e.g. in the section on the generalization of the
classical notion of 'sheaf'. However, that the notion of a tapas is a
generalization of the classical notion of set is, of course, in itself
not an argument in favour of topos theory. There must also be
concomitant foundational advantages. Thus in this connection we may to
some extent agree with Kline, that
Generalization and abstraction undertaken solely because research
papers characterized by them can be written are usually worthless for
application. In fact, most of these papers are devoted to a
reformulation in more general or more abstract terms or in new
terminology of what had previusly existed in more concrete and
specific language. And this reformulation provides no gain in power or
insight to one who would apply the mathematics. The proliferation of
terminology, largely artificial and with no relation to physical
ideas, is certainly not a contribution but rather a hindrance to the
use of mathematics. It is a new language but not a new mathematics.
(1980 p.283]
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Kline overstates the case, however. Even in the most abstract realms
of abstract algebra the adoption of any particular generalization of a
concept is required to carry with it progressive elements; for
example: new theorems, gains in simplicity, insight into existing
concepts and generation of new mathematics or progressive mathematical
programmes. Now, so far as the generalization of set theory in the
topos framework is concerned, these elements are present in abundance.
It is my conviction that this foundational approach will increasingly
gain ground, not only in abstract mathematics but in applications. In
fact it is already being applied to concepts in computation theory and
physics. [See e.g. Manes 1975, Davis 1977, Jozsa 1979] And as for
future applications Bell has expressed his optimism thus
The replacement of absolute by local mathematics results, in my view,
in a considerable gain in flexibility of application of mathematical
ideas, and so offers the possibility of providing an explanation of
their "unreasonable effectiveness" (cf. Wigner 1960). For now, instead
of being obliged to force an intuitively given concept into the
Procrustean bed of absolute mathematics, often distorting its meaning
in the process, we are at 11berty to choose the local mathematics
naturally fitted to express and develop the concept. To the extent
that the given concept embodies aspects of (our experience of) the
objective world, so also will the associated local mathematics; the
"effectiveness" of the latter, i.e. its conformability with the
objective world, therefore loses its "unreasonableness" and instead is
shown to be a product of design." [1986 p.425]
:My claim that the adoption of a topos-theoretic approach is the
appropriate foundational response to Cohen's results is based on both
'external' and 'internal' considerations, which, though intimately
related, are essentially distinct. Both are necessary to the claim.
The external considerations are those drawn from parts I and II. These
concern the formalization of mathematics and in particular set theory;
as well as certain themes drawn from a more historically orientated
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account of the enterprise ofaxiomatizing set theory which play a
crucial role in providing the proper context for appraising the
independence results and a guide for the resolution of foundational
difficulties raised by them. The internal considerations relate to the
development and nature of tapas theory itself and involve an account
of the tapas-theoretic approach. Now tapas theory emerged from and
will be seen to be a natural outcome of the overall evolution and
character of twentieth century mathematics. The essential elements of
this evolution are set theory, its application, formalization, the
emphasis on structure in modern mathematics and category theory. First
impressions notwithstanding these are all in harmony and combine to
generate the foundational power of the tapas theoretic approach. It is
important to emphasize all of these factors and their peculiar
contributions to this evolution.
As well as the sufficiency of the tapas-theoretic approach as a
foundation and indeed its progressiveness as such, a central feature
is the light shed on the independence results when the forcing
technique is analysed in a tapas-theoretic setting. This analysis was
undertaken by Lawvere and Tierney in the years 1969-70 and presented
by Tierney in his 1972 paper entitled "Sheaf Theory and the Continuum
Hypothesis" first presented at the Dalhousie conference on
"Connections between Category Theory and Algebraic Geometry and
Intuitionistic LogiC". As Johnstone informs us:
One of the most striking applications of elementary tapas theory was
to give a categorical proof that the Continuum Hypothesis is
independent of the axioms of set theory. This fact was first proved in
1963 by P.J.Cohen ..jwhilst categorical ideas are implicit in Cohen's
work, the language of elementary tapas theory was required to make the
connection explicit and indeed the desire to do this was one of the
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main driving forces behind the development of elementary tapas theory
by Lawvere and Tierney ...[ (1977) pp.323-324]
Broadly speaking then, what is presented below involves the
interconnections, often quite surprising, among four disciplines: set
theory, category theory, tapas theory and LST. After giving an account
of the relevant aspects of the development of tapas theory and the
tapas theoretic approach I concentrate on the following specific
topics which lie at the heart of the contention that tapas theory is
the appropriate response to the foundational issues following in the
wake of Cohen's independence results. These are: the algebraic view of
set theory; LST and definite properties; the tapas explication of the
forcing technique; and the foundational progress inherent in the tapas
theoretic view. But first of all I discuss the foundational
credentials of category theory, a parent of tapas theory, and whose
foundational features are inherited by its offspring.
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CATEGORY THEORY, FOUNDATIONS,TOPOI AND LST.
(i) LST is set theory.
The proposal, vis a vis foundations, that we adopt the topos theoretic
outlook, specifically in its guise as LST is not to suggest that we
abandon set theory as a foundation. In particular it is not an
indirect means of replacing set theoretical foundations by categorlal
foundations. LST is set theory. Thus my position is consistent with
the view that although the possibility of a theory emerging that
manifestly supersedes set theory as a foundation cannot be ruled out,
and despite problems regarding the shortcomings of set theory in
providing certain key constructions for category theory, so far as a
foundation for practically all present-day mathematics is concerned,
the notion set and concomitant set theoretical constructions are not
as yet superseded. Noting the ·remarkable fact that mathematics can
be based on set theory· Blass comments that
It is not clear to me whether this fact is a mathematical one, a
historical one. or a psychological one (or something else). Does set
theory have some essential structural property that guarantees its
ability to encode other theories? Does set theory serve as a
foundation for merely those theories that have been constructed in the
past, with no expectation that it will serve for future theories? Or
is there something about human brains that prevents them from
producing mathematics that cannot be coded in set theory? My guess is
that the historical view is closest to the truth, but for
psychological reasonSj mathematics codable into set theory was
produced first <and we have not progressed beyond it) because it is
easier for our minds to grasp. I also suspect that we have not yet
come close to grasping the full complexity of what can be coded in set
theory. so non-codable theories will probabably not arise (naturally)
for quite some time.
[A.Blass 1984 p.26J
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But any consideration of these puzzles must take into account that the
notion of set is dynamic and flexible. That is, included in, and
interacting with, the conceptual growth and conceptual evolution of
mathematics (as opposed to, say, the growth of mathematical knowledge,
or more simply: the list of theorems proved) is the notion of set.
This view is becoming increasingly evident in the 1iterature, albeit
sometimes implicitly. For example, after informing us that
The Greek word 'arithmos', which is usually translated misleadingly as
'number', was used to designate a plurality of definite size: a
determinate number of definite distinct objects. [Mayberry 1986 p.431J
Mayberry goes on to claim that
...the [Cantorianl concept of set is a straightforward generalization
of the classical concept of aritbmos. [ibid p.4321
Gray is explicit. He forthrightly states that
On the broadest possible time scale, there have been three great
advances in mathematics: Euclidean geometry, Newtonian and Leibnitzean
calculus, and Cantorian set theory. Each was a culmination of decades
or centuries of fragmentary results and each provided the impetus for
vast new systematizations of knowledge. In each case the original
insights required extensive modifications and improvements (those in
geometry not appearing until the 20th century). As far as set theory
is concerned, what is clear is that we are still in the middle of this
advance and it is too soon to speculate as to its final form.
[1984 pv Ll
But it must be stressed that from the evolutionary view it does not
follow that the concept of set is clear. It is quite consistent with,
for example, Hallett'S contention that the concept of set is
..not an ancient, well understood concept which can easily be taken as
an axiomatic primitive in the knowledge that it can be supported by
extra axiomatic explanation. <. .. this is largely why set theory is
axiomatized, because we do not understand the set concept well)
[Hallett 1984 p.3001
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The essential point is that the enterprise of formalizing and
axiomatizing set theory reflects the growth and development of a
concept. A major factor in this development has been generalization
and LST is a further generalization of the set concept. But having
stated that in espousing LST one is remaining entrenched within set
theoretical foundations I seem to have generated a certain tension.
For I stated that LST incorporates the topos theoretic point of view
and, as explained below, in a certain sense, is tapas theory. However,
topos theory is an outgrowth of category theory. In fact, formally it
can be presented as a finite extension of the first order theory of
categories. (Of course to merely comprehend it as such bel ies its
foundational power just as we do no justice to ZF by simply taking it
as merely another extension of first order logic.) Furthermore, tapas
theory, as such, carries along with it a significant amount of
category theoretic thinking both in terms of heuristics and
techniques.
Have I not then eschewed set theoretical foundations for categorial
foundations? Whilst it is true that it is important for my purposes
that the powerful insights and machinery of category theory are
applicable to topoi, it is their role as set theoretical sites for
mathematical activity, i.e. as 'models' of set theory that is crucial.
Moreover, their formulation by means of LST serves to dispel this
tension. We shall discuss these points later. At present, however, it
is appropriate to discuss some relevent aspects of category theory.
For the growth and development of category theory will playa crucial
role in aur discussion. Amongst ather things, category theory has
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contributed important general foundational concepts and the
interweaving of set-theoretical foundations and the categar1al
viewpoint is a key to addressing the foundational significance of
Cohen's results.
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(i1) Category theory and its foundational importance
(iia) the emergence of category theory and emphasis on structure in
modern mathematics.
The potential foundational importance of category theory derives from
the importance of mathematics as a study of structure or as structure
as the focus of mathematical investigation. From Hypatia, who is
reckoned to be the first woman mathematician in history, through to
Emmy Noether, a student of Hilbert and who in turn tutored
mathematicians ('the Noether boys') such as Artin and van der Waerden,
the history of mathematics displays a continuous concern with what we
may now identify as algebra. In its formative stages algebraists
concerned themselves with methods for solving equations which in turn
gave rise to extension of number systems by the adjunctions of, for
example, 'imaginary' numbers and subsequently varieties of 'complex'
numbers. However, this concern usually played a very minor role in
mathematical activity overall. But in the nineteenth century this
interest grew ever more marked, and moved from the study of particular
systems, e.g. vectors, matrices, quarternions and a variety of
hypernumbers, to more abstract notions. According to Kline
The first abstract structure to be introduced was the group. A great
many of the basic ideas of abstract group theory can be found
implicitly and explicitly at least as far back as 1800. [1972 p.1137]
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Quite early on it began to become apparent that certain systems were a
particular kind of more general system or rather 'species' of system.
For example, as Kramer informs us:
...in 1844, just a year after Hamil ton published the details of his
quaternion algebra, the German geometer Hermann Grassmann (1809-1877)
formulated a far more general concept of algebras of hypercomplex
numbers of all orders ...In fact, Hamilton's quarternions became just
one special algebra among the many Grassmann species. [ 1970 p.79]
Nineteenth century mathematics is replete with such examples. Of
course, the actual history of these developments is quite convoluted.
However, the increasing awareness of the interconnections and
analogies between the increasing number of systems and their
operations led to greater degrees of abstraction as well as a need for
some natural principles of unification and simplification. The
development of modern axiomatics, set theory and category theory each
contri buted to this need. Before making some brief comments on the
role of the first two, note the key general pattern and its connection
with the evolution to category theoretic ideas as presented by Bell in
the the following typically elegant sketch:
category theory... provides a general apparatus for dealing with
mathematical structures and their mutual relations and
transformations. Invented by Bilenberg and MacLane in the 1940'e , it
arose as a branch of algebra by way of topology, but quickly
transcended its origins. Category theory may be said to bear the same
relation to abstract algebra as the latter does to elementary algebra.
For elementary algebra results from the replacement of constant
quantities (1. e. numbers) by variables. keeping the operations on
these quantities fixed. Abstract algebra, in its turn, carries this a
stage further by allowing the operations to vary while ensuring that
the resulting mathematical structures retain a certain prescribed form
(groups, rings, or what have you). Finally ,category allows even the
form of the structures to vary, giving rise to a general theory af
mathematical structure or form. Thus the genesis of category theory is
an instance of the dialectical process of replacing the constant by
the variable, ... [1986 p.409-10J
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It must be stressed, particularly in the present climate of somewhat
philistine attacks on pure mathematics [see, for example, Kline's
1980], that the development and generalization of algebraic concepts
was and is on no reasonable view sterile. In any case, the history of
mathematics is full of examples of concepts that were not immediately
perceived to be instrumental or whose widespread applicability came
very much as a surprise and even continues to astonish by its power.
Perhaps the most dramatic example is the notion of a group.
The idea of a Group is one of the great unifying ideas of mathematics.
It arises in the study of symmetries, both of mathematical and of
scientific objects. Very surprisingly, the examination of these
symmetries leads to deep insights which are not available by direct
inspection: while the notion of a group is very easy to explain, the
applications of this concept do not at all lie on the surface. In
mathematics the concept of a group is fundamental to the fields of
differential geometry topology, number theory and harmonic analysis,
while in science this idea is essential in spectroscopy,
crystalography, and atomic and particle physics. The importance of
abstraction is nowhere lIIOreevident than in the concept of a group.
(J.L.Alperin 'groups and symmetry' 1980 in Mathematics Today ed.
Steen]
In fact Poincare was once inspired to uninhibitedly exclaim that "The
theory of groups is all of mathematics." But we may also consider the
initially more modest example of the 'imaginary' numbers developed to
satisfy the aesthetic requirements of sixteenth century equation
solvers .
...the complex numbers z=x+iy have turned out to be much more than
just a system of numbers. Ordinary functions such as x,'Z, 2"',or ei nx
can be extended to make sense for complex numbers, so that one may
form w=zz or w=2z or w= sinz for z and tf both complex. This discovery
led to a theory of functions of a complex variable, called analytic
functions. This theory starts with the extension of calculus to
complex functions of a complex argument z, .... The resulting theory of
analytic functions of a single complex variable was the great
masterwork of nineteenth century mathematics. Its impact on physics
can be measured by the following sentence which opens a recent
treatise on the physics of fundamental particles: "The great discovery
of theoretical physics in the last decade has been the complex plane."
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One of the major pure mathematical themes of the three past decades
has been the extension (begun by Karl Weierstrass, Henri Poincare, and
Friedrich Hartogs at the end of the nineteenth century> of this theory
to the theory of analytic of several complex variables ....While the
theory of analytic functions of several complex variables has pressed
forward in recent decades, mathematicians and physicists in the past
decade have used such sophisticated results to calculate certain
integrals invented by the physicist Richard Feynman in quantum field
theory. [Browder and JilacLane'The relevance of mathematics' 1980 in
'Mathematics Today' ed. Steen]
The axiomatics of the nineteenth century marks the beginning of the
codification and precisification of the ever increasing number of
algebraic concepts. In the context of nineteenth century algebra
axiomatization is very much the starting point and catalyst of
abstraction. The history of geometry bears witness that in general the
axiomatization of a discipline in itself does not so swiftly bring
about any significant abstraction. But within algebra with its early
toleration of •imaginary' numbers and subsequently the hypercomplex,
and so on, it was reasonably clear that one was <relatively> freely
operating with concepts and the inhibitions and phobias of the early
workers on non-euclidean geometry were not appropriate. With the input
of Hilbert and his school and the advent of set theory the important
shift from axiomatization to formalization got under way and with it
abstract algebra in its contemporary guise. But it is interesting to
note that the axiomatic approach in algebra started surprisingly early
an in the nineteenth century. (This in the period before Hamilton, who
is by many considered the founder of abstract algebra by virtue of the
non-commuti vity of his quaternions.) This approach was developed by
the British algebraic school, which included; Peacock, Farquharson,
Gregory, de Korgan and Boole. [See Kramer 1970 pp.79-80]
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Reid recounts the following tale:
In his docent days Hilbert had attended a lecture in Halle by Hermann
Wiener on the foundations and structure of geometry. In the station in
Berlin on his way back to Konigsberg, under the influence of Wiener's
abstract point of view in dealing with geometric entities, he had
remarked thoughtfully to his companions: "One must be able to say at
all times - instead of potnts, straight lines, and planes - tables,
chairs, and beer mugs." [ 1972 p.57 ]
The story may be apocryphal. But we may find in ita position or
attitude attributable to Hilbert that, in combination with the
development of set theory, came to have an immense influence. This
attitude is very much evident in Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie of
1899. (We have to some extent discussed it in relation to the topic of
implicit definition. It is also important to bear in mind, as we shall
discuss below, that Zermelo was a student of Hilbert at that time
and was heavily influenced by his general viewpoint.) Although Hilbert
was to develop different and certainly elaborated metamathematical
views following Brouwer's attack on classical mathematics, i.e. those
associated with Hilbert's formalistic programme, this early attitude
became widespread and was passed on to, amongst others, the pioneers
of contemporary algebra. But it is important to note that the
influence of the early Hilbert made itself felt throughout general
mathematics. Within algebra this legacy 1s reflected, for example, in
the following passage from the preface of MacLane and Birkhoff
The "modern" approach to algebra rests on the use of axioms for
groups, rings, fields, lattices, and vector spaces as a means to
understanding algebraic manipulations. This modern approach became
generally accepted on the graduate level shortly after the publication
in 1930 and 1931 of Van der Waarden's now classic Noderne Algebra [
Preface to the second edition 1979 of 'Algebra' 1967]
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But left unstated in this passage is the input of set theory for the
provision of domains and constructions on them. That is, in varying
degrees of formality, model theory. (However, note that, as in most
modern texts, they acknowledge set theory in the first chapter.)
Put bluntly, the attitude in question is that 50 far as interpretation
of a given axiomatization is concerned the particular domain of
interpretation or the 'points of the model' is irrelevant. The centre
of attention rests upon structural considerations and in particular
there is no relevant mathematical distinction to be made between
models bearing identical structure. But at the same time the notion of
a universe of sets and universal set theoretical constructions became
an ever more important adjunction to this attitude. [A good idea of
the landmarks of the model theory may be gained from Vaught 1974
'Xodel Theory before 1945' and Chang 1974 'Hodel Theory 1945-1971']
The input of set theory, then, is to provide structures and
constructions and operations on structures. Notions such as
homomorphism and isomorphism central to structural concerns are able
to take on a significant degree of r1gour. Furthermore together with
the idea of a universe of sets emerges a measure of coherence to the
locutions 'all groups', 'all fields', and so on. That is, reference to
'groups' or propositions about them may be construed as reference or
propositions about a particular class of setsj roughly speaking, the
'category' of groups. This move also facilitates the investigation of
global questions: the sort of question generally answered by model
theory rather than the generation of theorems from a collection of
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axioms. This is an important feature for mathematical practice - as
Hodges illustrates in the following passage:
It is often said that in an 'axiomatic theory' such as group theory,
the axioms are 'assumed' and the remaining results are 'deduced from
the axioms'. This is completely wrong. W.R. Scott's textbook Group
Theory [1964] contains 457 pages of facts about groups, and the last
fact which can by any stretch of the imagination be described as being
'deduced from ..[the axioms]' occurs on page 8. [1983 p.72J
Now the global picture of mathematics we have arrived at is of an
increasingly proliferating variety and complex investigation of
mathematical concepts realized as structures as well as the
investigation of their relationships. All this is referred to a
universe of sets for which the 'categories' are not visiblej they are
not themselves mathematical objects in the given arena of mathematical
discourse. Now as it happens, as we shall presently see, the category
theory of KacLane and Eilenberg was not a direct response to the need
for principles lending coherence, unification and simplification to
the situation at hand. However
Like set theory, it provides a general framework for dealing with
mathematical structures, and - again like set theory - it achieves
this by transcending the ~rticularity of structures. But set theory
and category theory go about doing this in entirely different ways.
Set theory strips away structure from the ontology of mathematics
leaving pluralities of structure less individuals open to the
imposition of new structure. Category theory, on the other hand,
transcends particular structure, not by doing away with it, but by
generalising it, that is, by producing an axionwtic general theory of
structure. The success of category theory, and its significance for
foundations is due to the ubiquity of structure in mathematics.
[Bell 1981 p.349J
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(iib) The Development of Category Theory.
In the introduction to their seminal paper 'General Theory of Natural
Equivalences' (1945) Eilenberg and KacLane state that
In a metamathematical sense our theory provides general concepts
applicable to all branches of abstract mathematics, and so contributes
to the current trend toward uniform treatment of different
mathematical disciplines. In particular, it provides opportunities for
the comparison of constructions and of the isomorphisms occuring in
different branches of mathematics; in this way it may occasionally
suggest new results by analogy.
The theory also emphasizes that, whenever new abstract objects are
constructed in a specified way out of given ones, it is advisable to
regard the construction of the corresponding induced mappings on these
new objects as an integral part of their definition. The pursuit of
this program entails a simultaneous consideration of objects and their
mappings (in our terminology, this means the consideration not of
individual objects but of categories). This emphasis on the
specification of the type of mappings employed gives more insight into
the degree of invariance of the various concepts involved. [p.236]
The class of all groups and the homomorphisms between them is a
paradigm of what we may intuitively take to be a 'category'. <I say
'intuitively' because for the moment I want to ignore any foundational
arrangements that have to be made in order to clarify locutions such
as 'the class of all groups', e.g. fixing a universe of sets or
sequence of such.) In general the picture of a category is a species
of structure together with structure preserving functions between
them. Now belying what turns out to be immense conceptual potency the
basic details of axiomatic category theory are surprisingly
straightforward. A category C is a two-sorted system consisting of
what are usually referred to as 'Objects' and 'Arrows'. (I shall use
X,Y,Z, ..to designate objects and f,g,h, ..for arrows.) Each arrow f is
designated a pair of objects 'Domain' and 'Codomain' respectively and
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designated doraCf ) and cod Cf ) . <In category theory it is helpful to
construe an arrow as an ordered triple <f,X,Y>, this will usually be
denoted 'f:!-IY'.) A pair of arrows f,g such that cod cf i=dom cg) are
called 'composable' and to each such pair there corresponds a
'composition' <gOf,X,Z> where X=dom(f) and Z=cod(g). Composition obeys
the associative law, ie hO(gOf)=(h·g)'f. Finally, to each object X of
C is assigned an 'identity' arrow <lx,X,X> which behaves as the unit
of the composition operation, ie. lx'f=f and g·lx=g. The notion of a
category given above is readily formalizable within a first order
language. [See Hatcher 1982.]
Together with the category of groups, algebraic species such as:
rings, modules, topological spaces and their respective morphisms are
categories that readily spring to mind. But the notion allows without
further ado examples such as the 'opposite' categories. Given a
category C we can construct Cop which has the same objects as C and
the same arrows except that their domains and codomains are
interchanged, i.e. if <f,X,Y> is a C-arrow <f,Y,X> is a COP-arrow. The
important point to notice here is that the notion of an arrow is quite
general and need not, unlike the group homomorphisms etc., correspond
to the intuitive or set theoretical notion of a function. Opposite
categories in fact will turn out to be important for the construction
of a fundamental class of topoi. In this connection we might mention
the category constructed from a partially ordered set P. The objects
are the members of P and the arrows are induced from the ordering
relation in the sense that between p,q€p there exists the single arrow
<p,q> (i.e.«p,q>,p,q» iff p~q.
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As well as being interested in certain individual categories we
shall also be interested in investigating relationships between
categories. For example, groups, rings, modules, fields and vector
spaces, have important structural relationships. The fundamental tool
for this investigation is the 'Functor'. This may be construed as a
morphism on categories or a structure preserving function on
categories. I shall denote a functor between categories C,D by F:C~D.
F sends each C-object X to aD-object, F(X)j and each C-arrow f:X~Y to
a D-arrow F(f):F(X)~F(Y) in such a way that composition is preserved,
ie. F(g"f)=F(g)"F(f). Also F(lx)=lF<X:t. Clearly, where F is an
identity function on a category, F is a functor (the identity
functor). A frequently cited class of functors are the 'forgetful'
functors, which as their name suggests 'forgets' or 'jettisons' some
of the structure of its domain. An example of such of a functor is
that from the category of rings to groups which takes a given ring,
(which is a group plus same extra structure) to its underlying group
and is injective on arrows.
Another important class of functors are the 'hom-functors'. Let S be
the category of sets. The objects in this category are sets and the
arrows are functions between them. For a category C, C (X,Y) denotes
the set of C-arrows from X to Y I and we assume it to be a S-object.
Now for a fixed C-object Z the 'covariant ham-functor' C(Z,-) sends a
C-object X to C(Z,X)j and a C-arrow f:X~Y to the function
C(Z,f):C(Z,X)~C(Z,Y)
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which sends an arrow g:Z~X to fOg:Z~Y.
The power of category theory rests on the fact that significant
properties of species of structures and their relationships can be
explicated 'externally'. That is, rather than referring to the
particular members of a given structure we may instead talk in terms
of the morphisms between it and other structures in the category.
(This begins to inform us as to the particular importance of the hom-
functor.) But more importantly I as will be amply exempl if ied, this
external viewpoint facilitates increasing levels of abstraction and
concomitantly deeper insights into the nature of mathematical concepts
and activity. First let us look at a straightforward app l icat t on of
the external method which also is an example of how typical set-
theoretic constructions are characterized <and generalized) in terms
of arrows.
Let X,Y be C-objects. A 'product' of X and Y is a C-object XxY
together with C-arrows Xl:XXY~X, X2:XXY~Ysuch that for every C-object
Z and each pair of arrows f: Z~X, g: Z~Y there is a unique arrow
<f,g>:Z~XxY such that the following diagram commutes
Z
I
I
I
I (fJ~>
I
-v
~--)<_)C.. y----..a..> Y
11"1
[diagram 1]
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This characterization specifies XxY "uniquely up to isomorphism". This
feature of characterizations is typical and simply reflects category
theory's concern with structural features within and between
categories. In the case of S a product is the usual Cartesian
product, where 1tl and 1t2 are the obvious projection functions. But the
category theoretic framework allows the notion of a product to take on
extra dimensions of generality as well as allowing us to make an
overall study of all categories where for any two arbitrary objects a
product exists. But this is nowhere near the end of the story. To
begin with, a product, together with a host of other familiar
constructions, turns out to be a special case of a more general
notion, namely a 'limit'. [See chapter 2.iv.b] A general study of
categories 'closed' under certain limits has proved increaSingly
important in mathematics and logic e.g Cartesian closed categories.
[See MacLane 1971. Lambek and Scott 1986] And then a limit turns aut
to be a special case of an 'universal construction'. This nation is
intimately related to what is considered the most powerful and
important notion to be thus far developed within the category
theoretic framework, namely the 'Adjoint'. But here I am anticipating.
For the moment let us note, as Bell puts it
The generality of category theory has enabled it to play an
increasingly important role in the foundlJtions of mthemtlcs. Its
emergence has had the effect of subtly undermining the prevailing
doctrine that all mathematical concepts are to be referred to a fixed
absolute universe of sets. Category theory, in contrast, suggests that
mathematical concepts and assertions should be regarded as possessing
meaning only in rellJtion to a variety of more or less local
frameworks. ['From Absolute to Local Mathematics' 1986 p.410]
This is consonant with the relativistic reaction to Cohen's
independence results. Bell continues:
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To indicate what I mean, let us follow :MacLane [19711 in considering
the category-theoretic interpretation of the concept "group". From the
set-theoretical point of view, the term "group" signifies a set
(equipped with a couple of operations) satisfying certain elementary
axioms expressed in terms of the elements of the set. Thus the set-
theoretical interpretation of this concept is always referred to the
same framework, the universe of sets. Now consider the category-
theoretic account of the group concept. Here the reference to the
"elements" of the group has been replaced by an arrows only
formulation, thereby enabling the concept to be interpretable not
merely in the universe of <category) of sets, but in essentially any
category. The possibility of varying the framework of interpretation
offered by category theory confers on the group concept a truly
protean generality .. it did not formerly appear to possess. Indeed the
interpretation of the term "group" within the category of topological
spaces is topological group within the category of differentiable
manifolds it is Lie group and within the category of sheaves over a
topologial space it is a sheaf of groups. [ibid pp.410-111
In the above I have given some account of the notions 'category' and
'functor'. However, as Eilenberg and KacLane make abundantly clear and
as is suggested in the title of their pionering work, the essential
mathematical relationship they were concerned with was that of a
'natural equivalence' and then more generally a , natural
transformation'. Categories were required merely to provide domains
and ranges for functors and functors were needed for the definition of
a natural transformation. It is with the emergence of this latter
notion that we may begin to argue for the the claim that category
theory yields some significant foundational insight. Subsequently,
with the isolation of the adjoint the claim is irresistible. To
explicate the notion of natural equivalence I shall follow Ellenberg
and :MacLane , s advice that "The subject matter of this paper is best
explained by an example, such as that of the relation between a vector
space L and its 'dual' or 'conjugate' space T(£)." [1945 pp.231-2] In
fact I shall use this example and follow their account of it.
-180-
Let L be a finite dimensional real vector space. Its dual T ([) is the
vector space of all real valued linear functions t on L. T{L) and L
are isomorphic. But to demonstrate this isomorphism one must
relativize to a definite set of basis vectors for L and the
isomorphism is dependent on the basis chosen in the sense that for a
different basis a different isomorphism will result. Now it is clear
that L and its double dual TT<L) are also isomorphic. However, this
isomorphism (~(L» can be demonstrated independently of any choice of
a basis. Furthermore, this isomorphism is "natural" in that in effect,
simultaneously, for all finite dimensional vector spaces L, L=TT (L)
is exhibited. This situation may be further analysed.
Eilenberg and Kaclane observe that
A discussion of the 'simultaneous' or 'natural' character of the
isomorphism £:TT(L) clearly involves a simultaneous consideration of
all spaces L and all transformations A connecting them; this entails a
simultaneous consideration of the conjugate spaces T(L) and the
induced transformations T<X) connecting themj .." (1945 p.233]
Now an induced transformation from one dual space into another, is
derived by the following means. Let L, and L-2 be finite dimensional
vector spaces and Al a linear transformation between them, i.e.
)11:L,-+L2. Let t2 be an element of T<L;;:). Then we have t2°>",:L1-+R,
which is an element of T(L,). Thus we have a mapping T(>..1):T(Lo,)-+T(L1)
defined by setting (T(>"l)](t2)=t:;;,o>"1.It can also be shown that
identities are preserved and also that
Furthermore, we can iterate this process to double dual spaces. What
we have discussed above may be expressed in terms of a functor r:.:'
whose domain and codomain is the category of finite vector spaces.
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This functor is usually called the iterated dual or conjugate functor
and, in short, for given L and arrow A, T2(L)=TT(L) and T2(A)=TT(A).
The relationship between the family of isomorphisms 0', r"", the
identity functor I, is that for any given arrow A:L,-+L:;:.: the following
diagram commutes
[diagram 2]
It is this commutitivity, expressed equationally as
0'(k)·In)=T2(A)·0'(L,), for arbitrary A, which yields the meaning of
the 'naturality' of 0'. The functors I and rz are said to be 'naturally
equivalent. ' In general then, functors F,G:C-+D are naturally
equivalent if their is a family of D-isomorphisms 0' such that for an
arbitrary C-arrow f:X-+Y the equation O'yOF<f)=G(f)·O'xholds. The notion
of natural equivalence may be extended by weakening the condition on
0', i.e. by allowing the components of 0' to be homomorphisms. In that
case we say that 0' is a natural transformation of F into G. If we
think of F(C) as being the 'picture' of C in D under F, then 0'
naturally transforms F(C) into G(C).
Eilenberg and XacLane originally formulated these nations to solve
problems in homology and cohomology. [see Eilenberg and MacLane
1942.] It was early an recognized that "Same useful maps arising in
geometry are clearly "natural" ones, like the map of vector space L to
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its double dual 12 (L) .. [and].... In1tially, it was easy enough to
leave this notion informal, with the side observation that for finite-
dimensional vector spaces V the usual isomorphism V=V~ was not
natural, because it depended on choices (here, on the choice of
bases).II [KacLane 1976 p.33]. But it became clear to them that
'naturality' was a key notion and that an analysis and rigorous
account was required. Furthermore they were in no doubt doubt as to
the generality of the basic categorial ideas they developed. They
write
The natural isomorphism L-JT2 (L) [(3)] is but one example of many
natural equivalences occurring in mathematics. For instance, the
isomorphism of a locally compact abelian group with its twice iterated
character group, most of the general isomorphisms in group theory and
in the homology theory of complexes and spaces, as well as many
equivalences in set theory [and] in general topology satisfy a
naturality condition resembling (3). [1945 p.235]
•
In characterizing products in a category it was mentioned that
characterization in category theory typically specified objects only
up to isomorphism. From the category theoretic point of view two
isomorphic objects are identical and isomorphic copies of an object
are redundant. Thus all relevant information about a category is
contained in what is referred to as its skeleton which is, roughly
speaking, the category formed from a given category by removing all
members but one of any isomorphism type. Using natural equivalences
the category theoretic outlook just now expressed can be made
-183-
rigorous. Twa categories C, D are said to be 'equivalent', written
C~D, if there exist functors F:C~D, G:D~C such that GOP and FOG are
naturally equivalent to the identity functors Ie and 10 respectively.
Thus the category of finite ordinals and the category of finite sets,
though vastly different so far as the set theoretic obsession of size
is concerned, are equivalent as categories.
[late that there are still some difficulties of the kind addressed by
Freyd in his 1976 paper 'Properties Invariant within Equivalence Types
of Categories'. There he states
All of us know that any "mathematically relevant" property on
categories is invariant within equivalence types of categories.
Furthermore, we all know that any "mathematically relevant" property
on objects and maps is preserved and reflected by equivalence
functors. An obvious problem arises: How can we conveniently
characterise such proprties? The problem is complicated by the fact
that the second mentioned piece of common knowledge, that equivalence
functors preserve and reflect relevant properties on objects and maps,
is just plain wrong. [p.55 lB. A functor F preserves a property P of
an arrow f if F <f> has P whenever f has. It reflects P if f has the
property whenever F(f> has.]
The work of Eilenberg and KacLane was of far-reaching influence, as
is emphatically exemplified in the work of Grothendieck - a central
figure in the development of tapas theory. Another important example
of this influence occurs in the work of Steenrod who would claim that
no paper had influenced his thinking more than "The general theory of
natural equivalences". He explained that although he had been
searching for an axiomatic treatment of homology for years and that he
of course knew that homology acted on maps ...it had never occurred to
him to try to base his axiomatlcs on this fact. [Barr/Wells 1985 p.621
Although Eilenberg and XacLane published their ideas in the early and
mid-forties, in KacLane's words: "These first papers an categories had
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no immediate sequels, because for this period they provided just a
language,· [1981 p.24J Steenrod's work is perhaps a notable exception.
But Grothendieck's 1957 paper 'On some remarks on homological algebra'
was to usher in a new era. "This paper not only summarized ideas of
the previous period by presenting a definitive and 'most general'
formulation of homological algebra but it also initiated the
categorical emphasis of the new period. II [ KacLane 1981 p.25] In this
paper Grothendieck axiomatized the notion of an Abelian category and
went on to prove some important results. (" Thus Grothendieck
demonstrated that categories could be a tool for actually doing
mathematics and from then on the development was rapid. II [Barr and
Wells 1985 p.62J)
Grothendieck's interest in homological algebra was as a source for
methods and constructions with which to advance the theory of
algebraic geometry. In this connection, his 1957 paper displayed an
extremely important particular case of a categorical construction
essentially requiring the notion of a natural transformation.
Grothendieck's construction was that of a category of sheaves over a
fixed topological space and we shall have much to say about this
category in the discussion on the development of topoi.
however, an example of a 'Functor Category'
It was,
Having isolated the notion of a functor between two categories
Eilenberg and KacLane considered categories whose objects are the
functors F: C-iDbetween two given categories C,D. These are denoted U'
where D is referred to as the 'base' category. Their motivation, which
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with hindsight appears staggeringly prosaic, was that a functor
category n •• is useful chiefly in simplifying the statements and proofs
of various facts about functors, .."[1945 p.250] To construct such
categories the appropriate notion of an arrow between functors was
required. But this was already to hand. An arrow in a functor category
is a natural transformation.
A particularly important class of these functor categories, especially
so in connection with the emergence of the concept of a topos, are the
categories of sheaves over a topological space. These are discussed in
Chapter 5.ii.a, but the following serves as a first glance and as an
appropriate example of functor categories. As motivation, consider the
following construction. Let X be a topological space with topology
O(x). Define a set-valued mapping F on O(x) by F(U)={f: f a continuous
real-valued function on U}. For U,Ve-O(x) such that V~U define a map
Fuv:F<UHF(V) by Fuv(f)=ftV (f restricted to V). In categorial terms
we have constructed a functor from O(X) (the category of open sets of
X with arrows corresponding to reverse inclusions) with codomain S.
The category of all such functors G:O(x)~S, i ,e. SCl(.lOI is the
category of presheaves over X.
The particular example of a presheaf given as motivation is in fact
the blueprint for the notion of sheaf. This arises from the following
feature. Let Ue-O(x) and {Ui:i€I} a covering of U indexed by an
arbitrary set 1. Furthermore let {O't:i€I} be such that 0'1€F(Ud. Let
Uk=Um6Un (k,m,nEI), then clearly FUm.L~(O'm)=Fun.Uk(O'n).In other words
the functions O'mand 0' .... agree on the common part of their domains. And
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moreover these I-indexed functions can be 'glued' together in a unique
way to form a real-valued continuous function with domain U. All this
gives rise to the following definitions:
(.) A 'G-compatible family' for a presheaf G relative to an open cover
{Ui:i€D of U is a family {O'l:ieD such that O'i€Ui and
Gurn,uk(<rrn)=Gun,uk(<r,,)for all k,m,nEI where UI':=U",~U""
(f) A presheaf G ls a sheaf if for any G-compatlble family there is a
unique O'E'G(U)such that GU,Ui(O')=O'lfor all lEI.
The categories of the form Shv(X) of all sheaves over X in fact were
the original examples of topoi.
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(iic) Adjoints.
The discovery and explicit formulation of adjoints is due to Kan and
was introduced in his 1958 paper. The use of the term 'adjoint'
derives originally in work on linear differential operators. It was
employed in connection with Hilbert spaces around 1930 where, given a
Hilbert space H and a linear transformation T over H, the adjoint of
T, T*, is the linear operator such that for x,y€H inner products
satisfy the condition <T* (x),y>=<x,T <y». We shall see that the form
of this equality is reflected in the categorial account.
There is practically universal agreement that the notion of an adjoint
is the most important general idea generated from the category
theoretic framework. Witness the following representative quotations
The isolation and explication of the notion of adjointness is perhaps
the most profound contribution that category theory has made to the
history of general mathematical ideas ...[Goldblatt 1979 p.438]
...adjoints occur almost everywhere in many branches of Mathematics ..a
systematic use of all these adjunctions illuminates and clarifies
these subjects [KacLane 1971 p.10S]
Adjoints are everywhere [Barr and Wells 1985 p.511
Bot surprisingly, given a concept of such importance, we can find work
that can be described as 'near misses' to its 'discovery'. Bourbaki,
for instance, was hampered by its initial avoidance of the categorial
framework provided by Eilenberg and MacLane and in a certain sense by
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their concentration on lines of enquiry generated within the French
Mathematical tradition produced what turned out to be a too general
notion. (I say 'in a certain sense' because this tradition was and is
in many respects extremely fertile and unconstrained.) The lesson here
is twofold. First, the general categorial framework is not to be
underestimated or, as has sometimes been the case considered 'general
abstract nonsense', Secondly, a -a good general theory does not search
for the maximum generality, but for the right generali ty.It [MacLane
1971]
As in the case of a natural transformation, an adjoint is a relation
between functors. I can only hope to give here a bare introduction to
this notion. Anyway, from the quotations given above it is clear that
functors so related are ubiquitous in mainstream mathematics. A
particularly rich source of so related functors arises in connection
with the class of forgetful functors. Lawvere, who along with Freyd,
was among the first proponents of the notion, also recognised its
importance with respect to discovering and analysing underlying
unities within logic and foundational subjects in general. [See for
example Lawvere 1963, 1964, 1969a, 1969b ,1970.J We shall see
presently how they may be used to give a categorial account of
quantification. As XacLane observes "The multiplicity of working
examples of adjoint functors is matched by the protean forms of their
definitions ..- [1971a p.233] One method of giving an account of the
notion, following Lambek and Scott 1986, is by treating it as a
generalization of a Galois correspondence.
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Recall that a partially ordered set can be regarded as a category.
Likewise we can so treat a preordered set. A functor between
preordered sets is an order preserving map. Let A and B be preordered
sets and F a functor F:A~B, thus for a,a'€A, if a~a' then F(a)~F(a').
A functor G:B~A is said to be right adjoint to F (and F left adjoint
to G) if given arbitrary a€A and beB then F(aHb iff a(G(b). Notice
that in such categories the hom-sets are either empty or at most
contain one arrow. Trivially then, there is an induced isomorphism
between each pair of hom-sets of the form B(F(a),b) and A(a,G(b».
Furthermore, if B(F(-),-) and A(-,G{-» are treated as set-valued
functors then the isomorphisms, again trivially in this example,
constitute the components of a natural transformation between them.
The above has the merit of constituting a simple example of an adjoint
situation and Lambek and Scott do indeed generalize from the general
idea of a Galois correspondence. The following more complicated
example yields further insight into the induced natural
transformation.
Let VK be the category of all vector spaces over a fixed field K. The
arrows in this category are linear transformations. For a given set X
we can construct the Vtcobject VeX) which is the space of all K-linear
combinations of elements of X, i.e. X is the set of basis vectors for
VeX). This yields a functor V:S~VK taking X to VeX) and for function
h:X~Y, the linear transformation V(h) takes a vector of V{X), which
can be represented by a linear combination of members of X, i.e.
rkixi, to Eki.h(xi), Let U:VK~S be the forgetful functor, i.e. U(W) is
the set of vectors in the space VI and let j:X~U(V(X» be defined by
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j(x)=x. Now for each function f:X~U(W) there is a unique extension to
a linear transformation P:V(XHW such that U(f*')·j=f. Using this fact
we can define an injection from S(X,U(W» into VI«V(X),W) taking f to
P. Now let g: V(X)~Wbe a linear transformation. The restriction of g
to X, i.e. giX is a function f:X~U(V) and it is not difficult to show
that f'*=g. In other words this restriction operation is a bijection
from V...: (V(X) ,V) to S(X,UOr'» whose inverse is the aforementioned
injection.
The above constructions have involved an arbitrary set X and K-vector
space V (or as XacLane puts it "This bijection .. is defined 'in the
same way' for all sets and all vector spaces W." [1971 p. 77]) and from
the discussion of Eilenberg and MacLane , s 1945 paper it is to be
suspected that we have the components of a natural equivalence
':V~dV(X),W):S(X,U(W». This is in fact the case. We may now proceed
to the general characterization of an adjoint situation.
An adjoint situation is a triple <"F,G), Here the functor F:C~D is
said to be the left adjoint of the functor G:~C (the right adjoint of
F). , is a family of maps ,a,b, one for each pair <a,b>, a€C and bED
such that ; ...,I::.:D(F(a),b):C(a,G(b» is 'natural in a and b'. We can
make this naturality explicit as follows:
First, in explicating I natural in a' b is fixed throughout. We then
construct the functor D (F (-) , b) :Cc>""~S, The functor takes an arbitrary
C':;.P-object a to the hom-set D (F (a) , b) ,
fop:a'~a. Then the functor
low consider the COP-arrow
requires an arrow
-191-
D(fOP):D(F(a').b)~D(F(a).b). This is given by letting
D(f",p)[g]=g"F(f), for g:F(a'Hb, where f r a+a ' is the C-arrow inducing
f-=·~·.Next we construct the functor C(-,G(b»:CC:·F'·~S. Here a C""-object
is mapped to C(a, G(b». An arrow feo,.: a' ~a is mapped to the function
C(fcop):C(a' ,G(bHC(a,G(b» by C(fOP)[hJ=h"f, for h:a'~G(b) and f as
above. Now natural in a amounts to the fami ly of functions , ..., b
constituting a natural equivalence between the above defined functors.
This works out in equational terms as, for arbitrary fC"":a'~a,
;, ..,b(g"F(f»=;,,·,b(g)"f. Furthermore the above holds for each b.
We now fix a. The functor D(F(a),-):D~S sends an arbitrary D-object b
to the set D(F(a),b). A D-arrow g:b~b' is mapped to
D(g):D(F(a),bHD(F(a),b') where D(gHhJ=g"h. The functor C(a,G(-):D-IS
sends b to the set C(a,G(b». A D-arrow g:b~b' 1s mapped to
C(a,G(b»~C(a,G(b'» where C(f)[hJ=G{g)"h. Natural in b amounts to the
family ;n,b constituting a natural equivalence between the above
defined functors. Thus the equation ; .. ,b· (g"h)=G{g) ";'''J->(h). Before
finishing this account of the notion of adjointness we give an example
of its use in categorial logic.
The example I shall give demonstrates how quantification may be
treated in a categorial context by the employment of adj oints. This
treatment originated with Lawvere's program of formulating algebraic
logic using categories. Here algebraic theories were certain kinds of
categories. (See Lawvere 1963, 1965a, 1965b, 1969, 1970] The first
step was his observation that substitution corresponds to composition
of arrows. Following from this, substitution may be construed as a
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functor. Then in his 1965b he introduced existential and universal
quantification (strictly speaking 'quantification along an arrow f')
as left and right adjoints of the substitution functor.
Let f: A~B be an arrow in S. The power sets PA and PB understood as
partially ordered sets are categories. The map P: PB~PA defined by
f*(Y)={x:f(x)€Y} for all Y€PB is then easily seen to be a functor. We
define the existential quantification functor along f, i.e. Ef:PA~PB
as follows: EdX)={y:exists x€X.f(x)=y}' Thus E(X)H iff XU*<Y)
and clearly E( is a left adjoint to f* i.e. satisfies the naturality
conditions. We define universal quantification along f by a functor
rr~:PA~PB such that rr,(y)={y:for all x€A(f<x)=y~X€X}. Thus
f*(Y)'X iff Y'rr~(X)and rr~is a right adjoint to f*.
Finally three observations. First for a given functor its left and
right adjoints are unique so far as category theory is concerned. In
ather words any two left or right adjoints are naturally equivalent
<which is isomorphism for functors.) Second, recall that general
constructions within a category (I gave the example of products and it
is heuristically useful to think of general set theoretic
constructions) are all explicable as limits. Usually we are interested
in a certain class of categories because they display a given range of
limits e.g. Cartesian closed categories for the study of the
).-calculus. It turns out that adjoints are associated with important
limit preservation properties. For example a functor with a left
adjoint preserves limits. Furthermore we can usefully define a class
of categories in terms of adjoints. Although we shall nat employ this
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device. this is the case for topoi. [See Lawvere 1972.] Thirdly, we
shall see that the forcing method itself is intimately connected with
an adjoint situation.
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iii) The Emergence of Topos Theory
The elementary theory of toposes was formulated by Lawvere and Tierney
working together at Dalhousie university in the year 1969-70 and
published in Lawvere's 1970 and Tierney's 1972. It is worth noting
that both Lawvere and Tierney were former students of Eilenberg the
co-founder of category theory. Thus they were familiar with the
concepts, methods and theorems of algebraic topology - a discipline
that would figure highly in the development of tapas theory. Lawvere
described their motivation as
...the development on the basis of elementary (first-order) axioms of
"toposes" just good enough to be applicable not only to sheaf theory.
algebraic geometry, global spectrum, etc. as originally envisaged by
Grothendieck, Giraud, Verdier, and Hakim but also Kripke semantics,
abstract proof theory, and the Cohen-Scott method for obtaining
independence results in set theory ... [1972 p.1]
In that this programme was fully realized it reflects the general and
powerful notion of 'set' inherent in their theory. The list given by
Lawvere also reflects the contributing disciplines and their
techniques incorporated into and underlying elementary topos theory.
In his 1976 Lawvere offered the following additional comments on the
genesis of this theory
Around 1963 (the same year in which I completed my doctoral
dissertation under Professsor Eilenberg's direction) five distinct
developments in geometry and logic became known, the subsequent
unification of which has, I believe, forced upon us the serious
consideration of a new concept of set. These were the following:
"Ion-Standard Analysis" (A.Robinson>
"Independence Proofs in Set Theory (P.J.Cohen)
"Semantics for Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus" (S.Kripke)
"Elementary Axioms for the Category of Abstract Sets" (F.W.Lawvere)
"The General Theory of Tapa!" (J.Giraud)
[p.102J
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Lawvere thought of this concept as that of a 'variable set'. [See
chapter 5.ii.c) Kore specifically, as Johnstone puts it
Tapas theory has its origins in two seperate lines of mathematical
development, which remained distinct for nearly ten years. In order to
have a balanced appreciation of the subject, I believe it is necessary
to consider the history of these two lines, and to understand why they
came together when they did. [1977 p.xi]
The twa lines of development referred to here by Johnstone are sheaf
theory which grew out of algebraic topology and Lawvere's categorial
analysis of set theory. But Goldblatt is correct in pointing out that
a full historical perspective requires the teasing out of a third
strand of events ... i.e. logic, especially model theory. We may begin
this account with Cohen's work in 1963 on the independence of the
continuum hypothesis et. al. His forcing technique proved to be the
key to the universe of classical set theory, and led to a wave of
exploration of that territory. But as soon as the method had been
reformulated in the scott-Solovay theory of Boolean-valued models
(1965), the possibility presented itself of replacing "Boolean" by
"Heyting" and thereby generalising the enterprise. Indeed Scott made
this point in his 1967 lecture-notes and then took it up in his papers
(1968, 1970) on the topological interpretation of intuitionistic
analysis. [1979 p.xi]
The interweaving of this third strand we shall investigate in
Chapter 5. Also the input of sheaf theory, bath conceptually and in
terms of techniques, and its interrelationships with the ather twa
strands, for example, in connection with logic and forcing and the
notion of 'variable set', is crucial and will be addressed below
after some more of the basic material is presented. In this section I
shall emphasize the broader background details of the emergence of
tapas theory and then give an account of the theory pi voting on its
role as a generalized set theory.
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iii.a) Grothendieck's work
The account of the development of category theory emerging from the
general evolution of structurally orientated mathematics was taken as
far as the formulation by Kan in 1958 of an adjoint functor. In the
meantime abstract algebra had developed to the point where the
categorical approach had become standard. Thus, for example, group
theorists would focus on the study of 'all' groups and 'all'
group-homomorphisms. (These global considerations bring group
theorists directly in contact with the effects of the underlying
universe of mathematical activity.) In particular "This flair for an
'overall look' appears in algebraic geometry, in model theory, and in
category theory itself, as the subjects developed in this period."
[XacLane 1981 p.24] Grothendieck, working in the field of algebraic
geometry, was perhaps the most influential figure both in the adoption
of general categorial methods and in developing, generalizing and
exploiting the notion of a sheaf. In 1952 Eilenberg and Steenrod had
utilised the categorial framework in giving an axiomatization of the
homology and cohomology of a topological space. This eventually led to
the delineation of the central notion of an 'Abelian' category.
KacLane summarizes the ensuing developments
This idea [Abelian category], though formulated by MacLane in 1950,
was not really effective until it was used by Alexander Grothendieck
in his decisive 1957 paper "On some remarks on homological algebra."
This paper not only summarized ideas of the previous period by
presenting a definitive and "most general· formulation of homological
algebra but it also initiated the categorical emphasis of the new
period. In preparing it, Grothendieck apparently rediscovered the
notion of an abelian category; moreover, he recognised the crucial new
example that of the category of sheaves <modules) over a fixed
topological space.
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From this point, Grothendieck went on to wholly reorganise algebraic
geometry in relentlessly conceptual form in which algebraic geometry
appeared both in its own right and as the most general study of
commutative rings. His influence was exercised through many seminars
on algebraic geometry, for example, the well known SGA-4 (seminaire de
Geometrie Algebraique du Bois Marie 1963/4) - privately circulated at
that time and finally published in three volumes (Artin,Grothendieck,
and Verdier, 1972-73).
Grothendieck's work was a direct sequel to the influence of Bourbaki.
Bourbaki had organised the exposition of mathematics by putting the
right general concepts first. Grothendieck turned ths systematic use
of generality into an explicit tool for research. [1981 p.25]
Put boldly, Grothendieck showed that 'topology was pointless'. In
other words, it is not the points of the space that are important in
the study of the topological properties of a topological space X but
rather the structure of its open sets. For all intents and purposes,
e.g. the cohomology of X, the category of sheaves over X, Sh(X), may
be substituted for X and Sh (X) is defined in terms of the open sets
and coverings of open sets. Koreover these categories were seen to be
of considerable importance in their own right. However, for further
topics in algebraic geometry Grothendieck: formulated a more general
notion of a topology (nGrothendieck topologies") and its sheaves. [See
Chapter 5] Categories of such sheaves were called toposes or
"Grothendieck toposes". In the theorem bearing his name, Giraud, a
member of Grothendieck's seminar, gave necessary and sufficient
conditions characterizing this class of categories. It was Lawvere and
Tierney's modification of Giraud's axioD5 within first order logic
that constituted the axioms for an elementary topos.
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iii.b) Lawvere's work and ....
Let us now turn to Lawvere's categorlal analysis of set theory. Since
his doctoral thesis in 1963 Lawvere's central interest has been the
foundations of mathematics. Kare specifically he has been concerned
with founding mathematics upon categorial notions i.e morphisms and
composition of morphisms. His attitude to the foundations provided by
ZerDelo-Fraenkel set theory may be gleaned from the following passage
When the main contradictions of a thing have been found, the
scientific procedure is to summarize them in slogans which one then
constantly uses as an ideological weapon for the further development
and transformation of the thing. Doing this for "set theory" requires
taking account of the experience that the main pairs of opposing
tendencies in mathematics take the form of adjoint functors, and frees
us of the mathematically irrelevant traces (€) left behind by the
process of accumulating (U) the power set <P) at each stage of a
metaphysical ·construction". (Lawvere 1970 p.329J
This attitude was already evident in the spirit of Lawvere's seminal
paper 'An elementary theory of the category of sets' which he
describes as follows
We adjoin eight first-order axioms to the usual first-order theory of
an abstract Eilenberg-XacLane category to obtain an elementary theory
with the following properties: (a) There is essentially only one
category which satisfies these eight axioms together with the
additional (nonelementary> axiOD of completeness, namely, the category
~ of sets and mappings. Thus our theory distinguishes ~ structurally
from the other complete categories, such as those of topological
spaces, groups, rings, partially ordered sets, etc. (b) The theory
provides a foundation for number theory, analysis, and much of algebra
and topology even though no relation € with the traditional properties
can be defined. Thus we seem to have partially demonstrated that even
in foundations, not Substance but invariant Form is the carrier of the
relevant mathematical information. [Lawvere 1964 p.1506]
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In this passage Lawvere refers to 'completeness' i.e. "complete
categories". This notion, which I shall presently explicate, lies at
the heart of the categorial account of set theory. Roughly speaking,
the basic set operations e.g. cartesian products and intersections,
are generalized within complete categories. This work was subsequently
utilized in the formulation of elementary topos theory and in this
respect contribute to XacLane's comment that "The axioms for a tapas
depend on [an]..understanding of the 'Universal' properties of the
basic constructions of set-theory· [1979 p.1008]. Furthermore, as we
shall see, completeness is also intimately connected to the link
provided by Giraud's axioms between Lawvere's programme, the
formulation of elementary tapas theory and Grothendieck's categories
of sheaves.
One feature of a complete category, then, is that it contains all
products in the sense described above. It was stated that a product is
a particular example of a 'limit'. Now a complete category is a
category displaying all 'limits of diagrams'. These also highlight the
ubiquitaus use of COlDlllutativediagrams and the 'proof' technique of
'diagram chasing'. [See HacLane 1982] Let me explain.
First, the forJDlj1 notion of a diagram for a category C. This is
defined to be a collection of C-objects (the 'vertices') together with
a collection of C-arrows between some of them. Where the diagram is of
reasonable size it can be represented schematically in the usual way
and such representations, of course, gave rise to the present notion
which includes infinite diagrams. Let 6 be a C-diagram with vertices
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{Di: ioO1). A cone aver 6. is a collection of C-arrows {fi: A-+Di:iE I} for
a fixed object A (the vertex of the cone) such that for any arrow
f:D,~D.ithe following commutes
A
ab i.------ooool b.l
[diagram 3]
A limit for 6. <limA) is a cone {f1:A~Di:ieI} such that for any other
cone {gi:B~Di:iEI} there is a unique arrow B~A making
[diagram 4]
commute for each ieI. Usually a limit is identified with its vertex.
The following examples will illustrate how many of the constructions
in the category of sets are realized in terms of limits.
EXAJilPLE1: Let 6 be a diagram consisting of two objects A,B and the
empty collection of arrows. In this case 6. turns out to be the product
of A and B, i.e 1imO=AxB.
EXAXPLE 2: Let 6. be the diagram consisting of objects A,B,C and arrows
f:A~C and g:B-+C. The limit of such a diagram is called the 'pullback'
of arrows f,g for reasons which will become evident. The pullback is
usually schematized as the commutative diagram
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s'
L ,"" A 8
3' 1 l~
A. c.
[diagram 5]
By looking at the pullback in the category of sets S we can get the
idea of the constructions a pullback encapsulates. To begin with the
general form is l..iJI6=«x, y>e- AxB: f <x>=g<y)}. This gives rise to some
interesting particular cases; if C is a singleton, then limA=AxB (up
to isomorphism!); if A'C and f an injection, then l..1.lII6=g-'[f[A]];and
if A,B~C and f,g are inclusion maps, then l1mA=A6B.
EXAMPLE 3: Let 6 be the empty diagram. Then a cone for this diagram is
simply a C-object. Thus ~ is a C-object such that for any other
C-object X there is only one arrow from X to li.1ll/L Such a limit is
called a terminal object and denoted by lc but usually where
unambiguous the subscript is omitted. In S the singleton {0} is
conventionally delegated the role of terminal object; though of course
from the categorial standpoint any singleton will do. It is quite
straightforward to demonstrate that a terminal object in a category is
unique (again up to isolllJrphisJl).We can now perform one of those
dizzy leaps characteristic of category theory. All limits ~re unique
up to isoaorphism! For some meditation on their characterization
reveals them to be terminal objects in the category formed from their
associated collection of cones.
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Recall that the non-elementary axiom in Lawvere's characterization of
the category of sets asserted completeness, that is, the existence of
all 11mits. The examples given above were examples of finite limits,
i.e. limits of finite diagrams. We shall see that in the presence of
certain elementary conditions finite limits are deemed sufficient for
the set theory in a topos. In fact in some circumstances only products
and a terminal object yield all the finite limits. In any case
Lawvere's higher-order axiom is obviated.
We might also at this point mention the connection with the theorem of
Giraud characterizing Grothendieck toposes which led Lawvere and
Tierney to the generalized set theory of elementary toposes. The key
features of Giraud's characterization were couched in terms of
'exactness' properties of a category. (It also happened to be the case
that Tierney had worked on the theory of exact categories.) Now, an
exact category is defined to be a category with all finite limits and
colimits (i.e. its corresponding opposite category has all finite
limits.) Johnstone also remarks that
The starting point ..[of the second line of development of elementary
tapas theory] .. is generally taken to be F.W.Lawvere's pioneering 1964
paper on the elementary theory of the category of sets [1964].
However, I believe that it is necessary to go back a little further,
to the proof of the Lubkin-Freyd-Kitchell embedding theorem for
abelian categories [AC]. It was this theorem which, by showing that
there is an explicit set of elementary axioms which imply all the
(finitary> exactness properties of module categories, paved the way
for a truly autonomous development of category theory as a foundation
for mathematics ...[1977 p.xii]
In the above quotation from Lawvere's 1964 he mentions that his theory
will provide a foundation for, among other things, number theory and
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analysis. For these disciplines classical set theory provides an axiom
of infinity. The set of 'real numbers' can then be constructed by
means of the power set operation on w (or the set designated as the
collection of natural numbers). Lawvere's ingenious categorial
correlate of the axiom of infinity is the postulation of a 'natural
number object'. This is an object Ntogether with arrows s:N-+N, O':l~N
(the category thus require a terminal object) such that for any arrows
h: X-tX, x: 1-1X there is a unique arrow f:]HX making the following
diagram commrce
[diagram 6]
This is an axiom of Lawvere's 1964 system. The notion of a topos is
more general and does not incorporate this axiom. However, it is by
means of its addition to elementary topos theory that Lawvere and
Tierney formulated the continuum hypothesis within the categorial
framework and as a consequence shed considerable light on Cohen's
forcing method. Jote also that this axiom allows further generality to
the notion of a natural number .
. , .the foundations of the arithmetic of natural numbers can be lifted
to any topos with a natural numbers object. The power of the axiomatic
method, and the ability of abstraction to simplify and get at the
heart of things will perhaps be brought home if one reflects that a
"natural number- ... might in fact be anything from a continuous
function between sheaves of sets of germs (local homeomorphisms) to an
equi variant mapping of monoid actions, or a natural transformation
between set-valued functors defined on an arbitrary small category.
[Goldblatt 1979 pp334-5J
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And looking ahead to applications in analysis, Lawvere in his 1970
observed
In any tapas satisfying (w) [presence of natural number object] each
definition of the real numbers yields a definite object, but it is not
yet known what theorems of analysis can be proved about it." [p.334]
Lawvere's paper of 1964 axiomatizing the category of sets laid much of
the groundwork for the formulation, some five years later, of the
elementary theory of a tapas. There it was merged with the sheaf
theory of the Paris school of algebraic geometry. However, on
completing this paper Lawvere was not satisfied with its foundational
viability. In fact the last words of this paper read: "it is the
author's feeling that when one wishes to go substantially beyond what
can be done in the theory presented here, a more satisfactory
foundation will involve a theory of the category of categories."
[p.1510] Lawvere produced such a theory in his 1966 paper entitled
"The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics". For
various reasons this theory too proved unsatisfactory. [See, e.g.
Isbell 1967] But Lawvere had also pursued his interest in the logical
aspects of the category of sets and related categories, and it was
this line of investigation that provided the essential link with
axiomatic sheaf theory and consequently elementary tapas theory.
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iii.c)....and the development of elementary tapas theory.
In their papers introducing elementary tapas theory Lawvere and
Tierney characterized the notion as a category which is; (1*) finitely
completej (2*) Cartesian closed; and has (3:·:)a subobject classifier.
In this section I shall give an account of the development of
elementary topos theory in terms of, and explicating, the postulates
here given. [(1*) has already been addressed on the discussion of the
role of exactness.] Since the original axiomatization there have been
quite a few different equivalent sets of axioms presented in the
11terature. First of all, some have arisen as a result of
simplifications, i.e. as in the case of many important axiomatizations
e.g. the propositional calculus of Principi~ ~thematica, certain
conditions have been found redundant. Second, the particular axioms
used usually reflect the purposes in hand, e.g. whether they are being
used for work within algebraic geometry or foundations. All this
reflects the dual origins and reinforces the scope of the theory. For
"A tapas is, from one point of view, a category with certain
properties characteristic of the category of sets ...From another pOint
of view, a topos is an abstraction of the category of sheaves over a
topological space." [Barr/Wells 1985 p.641. One of the advantages of
these dual roots is a mutually beneficial exchange of concepts,
methods and results between set theory and algebraic geometry. I shall
basically concentrate on the presentation given above and on the
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version that is associated with LST. This latter presentation also
serves to emphasize topos theory qua generalized set theory.
I begin with cartesian-closed categories. I shall understand a
category to be cartesian-closed if it is finitely complete and has
exponentials. Axiom (2") is referring to the addition of
exponentials) Thus a tapas is a cartesian-closed category satisfying
(3*). In set theory, for arbitrary sets X,Y there exists a set XV
which is the set of all functions from Y to X , ie hom(Y,X). Of
course, for any category C and C-objects A, B; hom(A,B) is the
collection of morphisms from A to B, but is, loosely speaking, only an
object of the ambient category C if C is the category of sets.
Exponentials are the categorial correlate, or external
characterization, of this set-theoretic construction I.e. XV
[=hom(Y,X)] for an arbitrary category. Thus we may think of them as
'internal hom-sets'. The external characterization is motivated by two
observations on functions related to sets of the form Xv. First to
each such set there is an associated evaluation function ev: XVxY-IX
defined by ev«f,y»=f(y) for feP, yeY. Second there is a natural
bijection hom(ZxY,X)=hom(Z,XV) induced by the universal property of ev
with respect to members of hom(ZxY,X). lamely, given g:ZxY-IX there is
a unique "g:Z~Xv such that ev("g(z),y>=g(z,y) for all zeZ, yeY.
Furthermore for hehom(Z,XV) it is straightforward that there exists
g€hom(ZxY,X) such that h="g. Thus by analogy we say a category C (with
products) satisfies (2.) if for arbitrary C-objects a,b,c there exists
a C-object b'" and C-arrow ev: b-xa+b such that given C-arrow g:cxa+b
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there is a unique C-arrow 'g:c~b- making the following diagram
cOIlllllute.
[diagram 7]
commute. lote that this condition may readily be presented in terms of
the existence of certain adjoints, roughly, functors (-xa):C~C have
right adjoints . A topos itself may be thought of as a category that
supports certain adjoints. In fact this is perhaps the most categorial
or generalized approach and again underlines the conceptual power of
adjointness.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the formulation of axiom (3+:) I in
the nature of a bridging passage, it is apposite to say a few words
on Lawvere and cartesian closed categories. Lambek and Scott in their
1986 credit the invention of cartesian closed categories to Lawvere in
his 1964. Whereupon soon after in 1966 Eilenberg and Kelly published
an extensive article on the 11ttle more general but closely related
class of categories displaying internal homrsets, namely, 'closed
categories'. Although Lawvere daesn't refer explicitly to cartesian
closed categories or develop the notion as such in his 1964 paper it
is certainly the case that any category satisfying his first two
axioms is cartesian closed. There are certain further connections that
should be mentioned.
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Prior to, and subsequent to, his work on the category of sets Lawvere
had worked an a categorial account of algebraic logic [see Lawvere
which
work categories were employed to represent
itself prefigured important developments,
1963. 1965) . In this
theories, in
including. as we shall describe below, LST itself. Xoreover this work
is important in that it saw the beginnings of Lawvere's investigations
of the internal representation of logical concepts, including
comprehension. Kare specifically, in his 1965 Lawvere had generalized
his categorial account of finite algebraic theories to that of
elementary theories. These required a representation of partially
defined operations and relations. For this purpose an 'object of
truth-values' was added to the category qua theory. The idea of a
category with such an object was to play a vital part in subsequent
developments.
In his 1963 substitution was treated as composition of arrows. This
device in fact was standard in the ~-calculus ('theories of
functionality'). As is made manifest in the work of Lambek and Scott
[1984. 1986) typed ~-calculii may be identified with cartesian closed
categories or as they put it "Both are attempts to describe
axiomatically the process of substitution, so it is not surprising to
find that these two subjects are essentially the same." (1986 p.41]
In his 1965 Lawvere introduced quantifiers in terms of adjoints. Vie
see in this work an early formulation of categories with 'subobject'
correlates. These Lawvere called 'elementary doctrines'. Fallowing on
from these his foundational program progressed with the development of
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'hyperdoctrines' in his 1969a as well as a paper entitled 'Diagonal
arguments and cartesian closed categories' (1969b]. Hyperdoctrines
were explicitly given as a subclass of cartesian closed properties
together with some internal logical characteristics including an
associated power set correlate for each object (he called the objects
'types' and -for each type I there is a cartesian closed category P(X)
of 'attributes of type X'-). Thus, these in certain key respects
anticipated topoi. Xoreover, in his 1970a Lawvere informs us that
The notion of hyperdoctrine was introduced (Adjointness in
Foundations, to appear in Dialectica) in an initial study of systems
of categories connected by specific kinds of adjoints of a kind that
arise in formal logic, proof theory, sheaf theory ..... Since then the
author has noticed that yet another -logical operation", namely that
which assigns to every formula _ its -extension" {x:;(x)} is
characterized by adjointness... The second part of this article is
devoted to a preliminary discussion of this sort of adjoint which we
call tentatively the Comprehension Schema. (p.ll
The above work on the categorial comprehension schema was facilitated
by Lawvere's treatment of a two element set, canonically {0, {0}} or 2.
as an object of truth-values. I,e. {false, true} in S the category of
sets. This usage is reminiscent of Frege's higher-order logic where
truth-values were assumed to be objects and concepts propositional
functions taking these objects as values. In Lawvere's 1964 system an
arrow with codomain 2 was understood to be the characteristic function
of a subset. However, Lawvere's categorial definition of •subset' was
as follows: a is a subset of A iff a is a monomorphism with codomain
A. Subsets, then, were treated as certain kinds of arrows. Another
important external characterization made by Lawvere in this paper was
that of an 'element'. This in fact is given as the first definition of
the paper. An element of A is an arrow with codomain A and domain the
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terminal object 1. One feature of his system that Lawvere paints out
is that not only every arrow with domain 2 is the characteristic
function of some 'subset' but conversely, every 'subset' has a
characteristic function. However, in this system although subsets
could throughout be treated in terms of their characteristic
functions, as MacLane observes "this proved quite difficult to handle"
(1975 p.1231. ADKJngst other things (3*) was to simplify this
procedure.
Fron the mid-sixties progress was made on two fronts. First, in
connection with general exactness properties of categories which was
brought to fruition with Barr's explicit formulation of 'Exact
category' in his paper •Exact categories and categories of sheaves'
(19711. Secondly, on the internalization of logical concepts. In
particular Lawvere and Tierney who had in 1969 embarked on the study
of axiomatic sheaf theory had investigated the results of postulating
the existence of a generalized truth-value object Q within a category.
For it was observed by Lawvere that not only were categories of
sheaves characterized by the exactness properties as discussed above
but also offered interpretations of the logical constructions
generalized from his work on categorial set theory. Kore specifically
he observed that every Grothendieck tapas has a truth value object Q,
and that the notion of Grothendieck topology is closely connected with
endomorphisms of Q [Johnstone 1977 p.xvJ
The upshot was (3*), sometimes referred to as the Q-axiom, which was
the final postulate characterizing elementary tapas theory. Before
proceeding we make two observations on the :merger of categorial set
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theory and axiomatic sheaf theory in respect of the idea of finding an
elementary characterization. First, a general comment by Gray
During the 1960's Lawvere was working on two related questions, the
categorical descriptions of theories and of sets .
...in Lawvere [1964] there 1s an account of the elementary theory of
the category of sets. This obviously suggests looking for the
elementory theory of other categories. Lawvere described categories
themselves (fl, and Schlomiuk described topological spaces [••], but
neither of these descriptions was completely satisfactory. However
Bunge [1966] treats categories of set-valued functors in an
interesting and useful way It seems now, and it seemed then. very
natural to ask for a description of the elementary theory of
categories of sheaves. Giraud's theoremas characterising Grothendieck
topai were known, but they were not elementary, and depended heavily
on set theory.
It was a brilliant inspiration to see that the answers to these two
questions were the salle: an elementary theory [...] was slightly
generalised to a cartesian closed category with a subobject classifier
(= truth value object) thereby giving equally well the appropriate
eleDentary notion of a category of sheaves. [1977 pp.62-63. • 'The
category of categories as a foundation for mathematics' 1966.• f 'An
elementary theory of the category of elementary spaces' 1970. f •• In
the sense of Lawvere 1965]
Secondly. Lawvere and Tierney had studied the model constructions of
Robinson for non-standard analysis and Cohen's for independence
proofs and as Lawvere says ·It was these examples that led Tierney and
De to further generalize the previous theory of topoi in 1969 by
Daking it elementary·. (1976 p.l04] Lawvere judged that within the
fraDework of sheaf constructions the ideas underlying Robinson's and
Cohen's constructions ·can be dealt with in perhaps more natural and
certainly DDre invariant fashion... • [1976 p.104] But there was a
problem. These constructions involved moving from ground models which
were Grothendieck toposes to models of the required elementary
theories of analysis and set theory which turned out not to be
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Grothendieck toposes. Lawvere and Tierney detemined that an elementary
theory of topoi would resolve this tension.
We now turn to the formulation of the Q-axiom. This axiom is, Lawvere
suggests, the categorial correlate of the restricted comprehension
principle of ZF. We will consider this aspect of it in greater depth
in Chapter 4. For the present to give an introductory account of it we
first make some observations with respect to classical set theory.
First, for reasons that will become apparent, we call the function
from 1 into 2 with value 1 'true'. Let X,Y be sets such that X~Y and
f:X~Y the inclusion map. Then there is a unique map Xf:Y~2 such that
the following diagram
"'----~'I
1 fnfg t~~
1 2
[diagram 81
commutes. Furthermore, it is readily seen that the above diagram has
the properties of a pullback. This situation also holds over for
arbitrary sets X,Y where f:X~Y is an injection. In that case, from the
categorial point of view X~ is the characteristic function of X just
as much as it is of f[ Xl. In fact since a basic idea of category
theory is to give external characterizations of concepts interest
focuses on the relevant arrows, true, f, and Xf.
Since in category theory we deal in arrows rather than functions to
general ize the above discussion for arbitrary categories we need a
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correlate for injective functions. This is yielded by the following
characterization of injective functions in terms of their relations to
other functions: a function f is injective iff for any functions g,h
if fOg=foh then g=h: 1. e. 'left-cancellable'. The correlate then is
called a I monic' (from monomorphism) and an arrow is defined to be a
monic iff it is left-cancellable. This definition is conservative with
respect to those categories where arrows correspond to functions. But
clearly not in their corresponding opposite categories. Or, for
example, in a partially ordered set qua category where every arrow is
monic.
A finitely complete category (or equivalently a category with terminal
object and pullbacks) satisfies (3*) if it has an object Q and a map
true: 1...Q such that for each monic m:A...B there is a unique arrow Xr.,: B-+Q
such that the following diagram is a pullback.
(diagram 9]
•
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Using the presence of the subobject classifier the logical operations
can all be formulated internally, i.e. in terms of arrows in the
category. It will be useful to have a brief look at this internal
logic.
In classical set theory the collection of subsets of a given set can
be construed algebraically. In fact it is a Boolean algebra under the
relation of subset inclusion. Furthermore, since subsets may be
identified with their characteristic functions, this collection is
also a Boolean algebra under the appropriate relation and, clearly, is
isomorphic to the algebra of subsets. In this case the object of truth
values is the set 2, L, e. H1J, {0}}, and is itself a Boolean algebra. It
is not difficult to see that the structure of the algebra of truth
values is a crucial factor in determining the behaviour of subsets.
(In fact, as we shall see, Zermelo's appeal to 'definite properties'
is made in order to ensure that classical two-valued logic obtained in
his set theory.) Now, in general, the algebra of truth-values, that
is, the algebraic structure of Q, is a complete Heyting ~lgebr~. And
as in classical set theory the structure of Q and the 'subsets' of a
given object are intimately related. This follows directly from axiom
(3*) .
In general the subsets of an object in a tapas have the structure of a
complete Heyting algebra just as does the structure of Q. A tapas is
called Boolean if the algebra of subsets of each object in the tapas
is Boolean. But this property 1s completely determined by the
structure of Q. A tapas is Boolean iff Q is Boolean. [The intimate
-215-
connection between subsets and the internal logic is made manifest in
generalized set theory. See Chapter 4 on tapas theory and definite
properties. ]
Logical operations such as negation, conjunction, disjunction and
implication are explicable as arrows Q~Q or QxQ~Q. I shall look at the
identification of the arrows carrying negation and conjunction in a
topos. First we have to develop a little more machinery. As well as a
terminal object 1 it is provable that every tapas E contains an
initial object 0, i.e. an object such that given any E-object X there
is a unique E-arrow Ox: O~X. In classical set theory the terminal
object is simply the empty set. llotice also that in the opposite
category constructed from E the initial object is the terminal object
in E. We can now define the companion to true:l~Q, namely: false:l~Q,
We have the arrow 01: O~l which, as is not difficult to show, is a
monic and false is defined to be its characteristic arrow as in the
following diagram. O~
0 ,,>'1
l 1ncA.. l~~
1. ')JL
[diagram 16]
The arrow false:l~Q is itself a monic (as is any arrow with domain 1)
and thus also has a characteristic arrow, which we denote *:Q~Q.
:/~1.-----.p J\
1 ~~ l~
L------->:..f\.,
[diagram 17]
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#:Q~Q is a truth function and in fact is the 'negation' arrow. This is
clear if we consider the classical case where Q=2.
We now turn to conjunction. Since a topos has products, we have in
particular the product QxQ. It follows from the fact that a product is
a limit for a pair of arrows, in particular if each of the pair is
true:1~Q then their is a unique arrow <true,true>:1~QxQ such that the
following diagram commutes
1-
I
I
:<hIu,-ttflL'I
I
"41
AIr-----J\.. 1C. JL ----_=;.
[diagram 18]
We now identify the conjunction arrow &:QxQ~QxQ as the characteristic
arrow of <true.true>:l~QxQ. Again, this is clarified if one considers
the classical case.
lot only does topos theory shed light on issues with regard to what I
have called the mathematical approach to set theory: one of the
interesting aspects of topos theory, and indeed one of its
foundational bonuses, is that it also illuminates issues directly
concerning the logical approach. [Recall that in this approach an
attempt is made to provide a logical analysis of the concept of 'set'
and in the case of the logicists to perform a reduction.] A notable
example of how tapas theory provides insight into the relationship
between logical concepts arises in connection with the axiom of
choice.
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The axiom of choice has been generally regarded as the principle
characteristic of classical mathematics. This axiom can be formulated
within set theory by the proposition that for every surjective
function f:X~Y there is a function g:Y~X such that for all YEY
fOg<y>=y. The correlate of a surjective function in category theory is
an 'epic' arrow, which is an arrow that is right cancellable. The
above form of the axiom of choice is directly translatable within
topos theory as follows: (AC) - 'for each epic f:X~Y there is an arrow
g:Y~X (provably monic) such that fOg=idv. Diaconescu in his 1975
proved the surprising theorem that if a topos satisfies (AC) then it
is Boolean. Regarded as a site of mathematical activity, a Boolean
topos is essentially an arena of classical mathematics .
••
In the above discussion we have mentioned subsets and some of the
machinery for their categorial representation. In set theory perhaps
one of the most mathematically important and controversial axioms is
that which allows the collecting up of all subsets of an arbitrary
set, i.e. the power set axiom. So far this key feature of the category
of sets has not been explicitly addressed in connection with topoi.
However, it was mentioned that the addition of a natural number object
facilitates not only categorial arithmetic but analysis. This latter,
in classical mathematics requires, at least in so far as it is set
theoretically based, a power set operation. Clearly, if tapas theory
is to have any foundational viability with respect to extant
mathematics it must have at least an equally powerful operation to, or
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correlate for, the power set construction. In fact this has already
been included in the topos axioms much in the same way as Lawvere
incorporated the power set axiom in his elementary theory of the
category of sets, namely, via the construction of exponents upon the
object of truth values.
Consider a set X. There is a bijection between subsets of X and
characteristic functions defined over X. Furthermore there exists the
exponential 2X which is the collection of these characteristic
functions. Let P(X) denote the power set of X. Then it is
straightforward that the bijection between subsets of X and their
characteristic functions induces a bijection between P(X) and 2x. Now
let E be a topos and X an E-object. Accordingly then, E contains the
exponent QX. Exponents with base Q are called power-objects (strictly
speaking a pair including the corresponding evaluation arrow 1.e.
(Qx, evx» and these are the categorial correlates of power sets in a
general category.
It turns out that the following (elementary) conditions constitute an
equivalent axiomatization of a topos.
(2") products; (3") subobject classifier;
(I") terminal object;
(4°) power objects. This
axiomatization most closely reflects the presentation of the theory
LST which will be discussed in Chapter 4. As I have stated, tapas
theory is generalized set theory and LST is topos theory in its
optimum form qua generalized set theory. Having given a basic account
of the relevant concepts of category theory and topos theory we are
now in a position to retrace our steps, returning to a discussion of
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ZF and Cohen's independence results, underlining the connections with
the above developments and showing why LST is the next step in the
evolution of set-theory in the context of the mathematical approach.
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THE ALGEBRAIC VIEW OF SET THEORY.
Topos theory is a generalization of the set concept that constitutes
the informal theory formalized by ZF. The process of generalization
is, of course, a fundamental conceptual tool throughout mathematics
(an example of particular interest we describe is the case of the
generalization of 'sheaf over a topology' for arbitrary toposes. See
Chapter 5). Generalization is particularly entrenched in the algebraic
tradition. Now not only is the generalization of set theory into topos
theory indicative of the adoption of an algebraic view of set theory;
to a great extent, this was the case from Zermelo onwards.
In the last chapter we discussed the emergence and development of
category theory from the background of the growth of algebra, set
theory and a general emphasis on structural considerations. We may
also add that the rise of algebra in the second half of the nineteenth
century, e.g. non-commutative algebras, has often been overlooked or
underestimated as a source of the modern foundational studies
initiated around the turn of the century. An essential ingredient in
the pattern of the aforementioned growth has been the steadily
increasing and significant contribution from formalization and set
theory. However, the mathematical approach to set theory, the details
of which were addressed in Part II, based as it was on Zermelo's work,
is itself (and was from its inception) embedded in this growth and
partakes of the treatment accorded therein to a general mathematical
theory.
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Put in another way:
initial and crucial
in Part II I have essentially described the
stages of the successive axiomatizations and
forIDalization of set theory, within the matheIDatical approach, into
its present incarnation i.e. ZF. [Recall that the pivotal pOint
stressed was the first-orderization of set theory by Skolem.] Now the
overall development of set theory is to be interpreted as the
evolution of an algebraic concept such as 'group' or I topological
space'; (acknowledging, of course that set theory has a foundational
role i.e. is applied, and incorporates, as it was specifically
designed to do, a theory of transfinite arithmetic). Furthermore,
Cohen's results emphatically underpin the adoption of a relativistic
account of the set concept.
The shift, then, from ZF set theory to LST i.e. tapas theory is a
natural step in the evolution of the set concept. For, stated bluntly,
the nature of the shift frollJ ZF to topos theory is revealed through
the recogni tion that the enterprise of formalizing set theory within
the mathematical approach bears all the hallmarks of the development
and formalization of an algebraic concept, or concept algebraically
construed. This shift is a process naturally occuring in the
development of algebraic concepts, namely: generalization.
J(ore prosaically perhaps, the shift takes us to a more appropriate
richer class of models or 'sites of IDathematical activity'. Lawvere
and Tierney, the inventors of elementary tapas theory, were very much
concerned with models of set theory as sites of mathematical activity.
This concern was in fact evident throughout the mathematical approach
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starting with Zermelo; and certainly Fraenkel, Skolem and von
leumann's approach focused on these models. In particular they
understood the axioms as providing an implicit definition. This view
which is fundamental within the algebraic approach to mathematical
concepts was emphasized, as we have stated, in Hilbert's early work
and as we shall highlight, greatly influenced Zermelo amongst many
others. We have already mentioned its influence on the founders of
abstract algebra. Von Neumann, who had a foot both in the set
theorists and abstract algebraists camps, was also thus influenced.
Hilbert's pioneering work with models in connection with axiomatics is
stressed by Weyl. Weyl writes;
It is one thing to build up geometry on sure foundations, another to
enquire into the logical structure of the edifice thus erected. If I
am not mistaken, Hilbert is the first who moves freely on this higher
"metageometric· level: systematically he studies the mutual
independence of his axioms and settles the question of independence
from certain limited groups of axioms for some of the most fundamental
geometriC theorems. His method is the construction of models: the
model is shown to disagree with one and to satisfy all other axioms;
hence the one cannot be a consequence of the others. One outstanding
example of this method had been known for a considerable time, the
Cayley-Klein model of non-Euclidean geometry. For Veronese's non-
Archimedean geometry Levi-Civita (shortly before Hilbert) had
constructed a satisfactory arithmetical model. The question of
conSistency is closely related to that of independence. The general
ideas appear to us almost banal today, so thoroughgoing has been their
influence upon our mathematical thinking. Hilbert stated them in clear
and unmistakable language, and embodied them in a work that is like a
crystal: an unbreakable whole with many facets. Its artistic qualities
have undoubtedly contributed to its success as a masterpeice of
science. [1972 p.2651
I do not propose to define algebra or the algebraic approach. To begin
with 'algebra' and the 'algebraic approach' just like 'game' in
Wittgenstein's well known example is a matter of family resemblances
and we would be both mutilating and unduly constraining these notions
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by offering a definition. In fact MacLane in his retiring address as
President of the American Mathematical Society made the fallowing
response to the question "What is Algebra?"
On some occasions I have been tempted to try to define what algebra
is, can, or should be....But no such formal definitions hold valid for
lang, since algebra and its various subfields steadily change under
the influence of ideas and problems coming not just from logic and
geometry, but from analysis, other parts of mathematics, and extra
mathematical sources. The progress of mathematics does indeed depend
on many interlocking, unexpected and multiform developments. [KacLane
1976 p.36]
However, I shall bring out and comment on certain central features of
the development of set theory to both clarify and give substance to
the claim that this development is soundly characterized by the term
'algebraic approach'. Put crudely then, starting with Zermelo, set
theory was developed and treated much the same way as, for example,
the notion of a group. It is the key aspects of this treatment that I
discuss in this chapter. (But before proceeding it should be said that
in the axiom of separation and the question of definite properties, a
notion of special importance for axiomatic set theory, there is
something of a 'residual logic input' perhaps not immediately apparent
in say the power set axiom Or axiom of unions and perhaps not at all
in systems such as the axioms of group theory. This is not surprising
since the axiom of separation partly originates from the
comprehension principle. Furthermore it is not surprising that its
categorial manifestation involves the source of internal logic in a
tapas, namely: the subobject classifier. This topic is taken up in the
following chapter. )
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In laying out the axioms of his set theory Zermelo's idea was that he
was providing an implicit definition of a concept in much the same way
that an algebraist views the formulation of axioms for groups, rings
etc. This is acknowledged in Skolem's first remark where, for example,
he states that
it seems to be clear that, when founded in such an axiomatic way, set
theory cannot remain a privileged logical theory; it is then placed on
the same level as other axiomatic theories. [1922 p.292J
Recall that Zermelo's 1908a paper opens with the declaration
Set theory is that branch of mathematics whose task is to investigate
mathematically the fundamental notions "number", "order", and
"function" ...it constitutes an indispensable component of the science
of mathematics. [p.200]
And note that he begins section §1 - the main body of his 1908a paper
- by stating:
Set theory is concerned with a do~in B of individuals, which we shall
call simply objects, and among which are the sets Lp. 2011
The first quotation establishes unequivocally that his axioms are to
be the axioms of a mathematical theory. In fact his two papers dated
1908 are replete with passages emphasizing this point. For example, in
criticizing Peano for not making the distinction between 'set' and
'class' he claims
as I shall soon show elsewhere [1908aJ, those who champion set theory
as a purely mathematical discipline that is not confined to the basic
notions of traditional logic are certainly in a position to avoid, by
suitably restricting their axioms, all antinomies discovered unti 1
now. [1908 p.189]
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Zermelo's attitude sometimes became nakedly pragmatic. Faced with the
challenge of the Burali-Forti antinomy upon the theory of well-
ordering he does not cling to any fixed notion of set but takes the
position that
....the solution of these difficulties is not to be sought in the
surrender of well-ordering but only in a suitable restriction of the
notion of set. [1908a p.191J
The opening sentence of section §1 is certainly not explicit so far as
the domain B is concerned rather than a parameter it may be a
reference to a fixed domain. But Zermelo worked within Hilbert's
approach to axioms of mathematical concepts and Hilbert's attitude is
straightforwardly revealed in the following comment on the real-number
concept
In the theory of the number-concept the axiomatic method takes the
following form:
Ve think of a system of things; we call these things numbers and
denote them by a, b, c, ... We think of these numbers as standing in
certain mutual relations, the exact and complete description of which
is given by the following axioms ...[Hilbert 1900 pp.257-8 translation
in Hallett 1984)
Responding to the above Hallett states
This was certainly Zermelo's position towards sets in his [1908bJ:
sets are just things in a domain, he says, about which the seven
axioms he gives holds ...lt is curious that this position is close to
Cantor's description of what happens when a new concept is introduced
into mathematics. ,[1984 303-4)
Furthermore HUbert's profound influence on Zermelo at this time is
readily appreciated from the description below given by Zermelo. who,
it must be remembered, up till his arrival in Gottingen had worked in
mathematical physics
-226-
Thirty years ago, when I was a Privatdozent at Gottingen, I came under
the influence of D. Hilbert, to wham I am surely the mast indebted for
my mathematical development. As a result I began to do research an the
foundations of mathematics, especially on the fundamental problems of
Cantorian set theory, whose true significance I learned to appreciate
through the fruitful collaboration of the mathematicians at Gottingen.
[p.l of an unpublished report from Zermelo' s Nachlass. Translation
from Koore 1982 p.89. Incidentally Koore's interpretation takes the
strong form "Under Hilbert's influence, which Zermelo later described
as the most important of his mathematical career ....p.105 ]
Ve might also add that in his work of the late twenties Zermelo
explicitly referred to a multiplicity of domains for his axioms. There
was no question there, for him, of a fixed domain.
However, whilst holding with the above, it would be an error to claim
that his view that axioms are to be understood as an implicit
definition constituted a component of a fully worked out philosophical
theory on his part (certainly not in 1908). Bar for that matter was
this fully thought through at that stage by Hilbert. Hilbert's
significant philosophical work i.e. the 'Ketamathematics' followed in
the wake of the intuitionist's attacks on classical mathematics. It
was more the case that the view marked a tendency and attitude towards
the process ofaxiomatization. However it was a tendency amongst
succesive set theorists that was to be evident from that time onwards,
through the work of von Neumann, up to the post-Cohen work of Lawvere
and Tierney. <We have already noted this viewpoint in connection with
the development of algebra - in particular the school of abstract
algebra originating in GotUngen. Nate also Lawvere's comment 'the
essential role of theories is to describe their models' [1975 p.4])
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With this attitude towards the axioms of set theory, just as in the
case of group, the focus is upon models of the axioms. In group theory
we are interested in the model (up to isomorphism) not in its elements
('groupies' 7). Likewise 'universe of sets' takes centre stage rather
than 'set'. Furthermore there is no relevant distinction to be made
between isomorphic models. The 'points' cease to matter and the scene
1s set for a categorial account.
The above tendency within the mathematical approach is confirmed by
von leumann in his 1925. Russell, Konig, Veyl and Brouwer are grouped
together as 'radical' with respect to their proposals vis a vis
foundations, whilst
The other group, Zermelo, Fraenkel and Schoenflies, has eschewed so
radical a revision. The methods of logic are not cr iticized to any
extent, but are retained; only (the no doubt useless) naive notion of
set is prohibited. To replace this notion the axiomatic method is
employed; that is, one formulates a number of postulates in which , to
be sure, the word ·set· occurs but without any meaning. Here (in the
spirit of the axiomatic method) one understands by "set" nothing but
an object of which one knows no more and wants to know no more than
what follows about it from the postUlates. [p.3951
(Upon reading some of the works of the set theorists mentioned above
it is certainly the case that one may find passages either implicitly
or explicitly seemingly at variance with the algebraic view of set
theory. For example, in Zermelo's writings, strong 'realist' leanings
are identifiable and von Neumann influenced by the later Hilbert veers
towards that brand of formalism. However, it is still the case that at
least their treatment of the theory accords with the algebraic view.
Kore recently where the professed metaphysical views clashed directly
as in Godel's platonistic philosophy the axioms were basically handled
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in the same manner as the axioms for groups. Furthermore, while
waiting for an intuition informing us as to whether a particular
proposition holds in the 'real' universe of sets in the meantime it is
still incumbent on a realist to offer a response to Cohen's results.
Or put another way, the arguments for tapas theory may be applied with
respect to 'sites of mathemematical activity' within some 'real'
higher universe)
For the remainder of this section I want to mention three further
details underlining the algebraic view and treatment of axiomatic set
theory. First, briefly, an insight of Hallett's in his 1984
concerning Zermelo's reductionism and the emphasis on structure. He
remarks in a footnote that
It is interesting to note that the positions of Bourbaki and other
modern structuralists are strikingly reminiscent of the Zermelo-
Hessenberg-Fraenkel position. For example, one might consider category
theory as concerned not so much with objects but rather with
isouorphisms and classes of isouorphisms. [p.249)
The position that prompts this remark is Zermelo's brand of
reductionism, more specifically, the treatment of the reduction of
numbers to sets. The now familiar approach is that of von Neumann
where, for example, the natural numbers are identified with fin!te
ordinals. On the other hand
The basic idea of the Zermelo (and Hessenberg) treatment of number is
somewhat similar to that of Frege. As with Frege and Cantor the
relations of equinumerosity and isomorphism between sets are taken to
be fundamental. The idea is then, as far as possible I to reduce
statements involving numerical terms to statements involving only
equinumerosity and isomorphism ...(Hallett 1964 p.245J
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The second detail concerns the treatment of the 'E' relation as a
'tree structure'. In Part II we discussed the manner in which Skolem
transformed Zermelo's set theory into a first-order theory essentially
by taking definite properties to be first-order formulas in a language
whose only non-logical symbol was a binary predicate for the
'membership' relation. Thus, in mere abstract terms, Skolem may
reasonably be construed as having formulated the first-order theory of
'E'. With the postulation of well-foundedness this theory may, quite
naturally, be interpreted in terms of 'tree-structure', albeit a
rather complicated one. In fact, there has been a continuing theme of
working on set theory directly in terms of tree-structure. As early
examples we may cite Skolem himself and also Kirimanoff both in
connection with well-founded sets. Kirimanoff [1917] was interested in
'ordinary' sets which he described as having finite 'membership
chains' .
Perhaps more interestingly, Skolem described what we would now denote
as an 'inner model' B' of set theory within "a do11lltinB" [my italics]
composed of those sets with finite 'E-sequences'. Then starting with a
model composed of such sets each of which terminates at the null-set
he shows how to form an extended domain by adjoining a new element.
[Note the analogy with forcing - see Appendix] This is all facilitated
by the observation that "with every set Jl we can associate a
corresponding €-tree ..II [1922 p. 298J His new model is then bui1t up
from augmented trees. It should be stressed that neither Skolem nor
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lHrimanoff suggested that sets were well-founded or not. They were
simply investigating different models of the axioms.
I have used the above examples to underline an algebraic attitude on
the part of certain set theorists. However. in general. the use of the
tree-structure analysis has not proved particularly important for
mainstream set theory. But it does figure in two important
developments. First. It has been adapted within descriptive set
theory. which chiefly concerns itself with the application of set
theoretic methods to the analysis of the continuum. In this
discipline. although the notion of a 'tree' is widely employed it is
significantly altered. It is defined as a partially-ordered set <T. ~I >
such that for any xsT the set {y€T:y€x} is well-ordered by {r. The
first sytematic studies of such trees appears in Kurepa 1935 in
connection with his work on the Souslin Hypothesis and manifestly
diverges from its use in analysing the membership relation. This is
not the case with respect to the second development.
This second development is the establishment of a programme begun more
or less immediately after the formulation of tapas theory. Given topos
theory as a generalized set theory it is natural to ask how we may add
to it in order to approximate (categorially) classical set theory. In
a sense this may be seen as a continuation of Lawvere's 1964 programme
ofaxiomatizing the category of sets. Two of the tasks undertaken .for
example. might be to give categorial accounts of the axioms of
extensional! ty and well-foundedness. JiIore specifieally. the
programmes' aim. as described by Johnstone
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is to prove that (elementary) tapas theory, with the addition of
certain "set-like" axioms, is logiclJlly equ i val eni: to a certain "weak"
version of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. [1977 p.303]
The approximating system referred to by Johnstone is Z" whose
characteristic feature is that it allows only formulas with bounded
quantification to figure in the separation schema. This programme was
initiated independently by Kitchell and Cole in their respective
papers of 1972. Referring to these, Osius informs us
..the construction of the model of set theory is based on a set-
theoretical idea which goes back to Specker..[1957]...namely that the
membership relation on a set can be characterised by a 'tree' having
certain properties. [1974 p.80]
However Osius was not satisfied with their use of trees. He continues
with
Since the concept of a tree does not seem to be a "natural" concept in
topos theory (although definable there), one might say with due
reference to the pioneer work of Cole and Kitchell that their
construction of the model appears as a translation of set-theoretical
ideas into the language of tapas theory, which is not very
'categorical' in a more general sense. [p.80]
Osius claims his own formulation offers "a simpler and more general
method to define models of set theory within tapas theory". [1974
p.80] One aspect of his method deserves comment here. His method of
characterizing the membership relation involves the shift from a
'local' condition to a 'global'. This is is a common feature of tapas
theory particularly in its guise as a category of sheaves and
generally in the application of sheaf-theoretic methods e.g. forCing
in a categorial setting. [See Chapter 5] To finish. in the following
quotation, Hatcher neatly summarises Osius' strategy
-232-
The basic observation .... is that, though the membership relation is
defined globally on the whole universe of sets, any two sets x and y
can be considered as elements of an englobing set z, reducing the
question of the membership between x and y to that of determining the
membership among elements of z. Thus, the global membership question
can, in any given instance, be reduced to a -local" membership
question concerning elements of a fixed set z.
In particular, if z is transitive, then x and y will also be subsets
of z. But any set z is contained as a subset of a transitive set,
namely its transitive closure t. Ve can therefore "imitate" the
membership relation of 20 if we can give a categorical definition of
membership between two mnoDDrphislIIS with transitive codomain
(representing two given elements of a transitive set). [1982 p.299J.
For the third detail the focus of attention shifts to the application
of set theory. Cantorian set theory grew out of Cantor's work in
analysis, specifically problems concerning the representation of
functions by trigonometric series; and subsequently point set theory.
From its inception, set theory has been applied 1n the study of the
continuum and analysis in general. But from early on in this century
it has been increasingly applied to problems in the fast growing area
of algebra. In fact, as we discussed above, set theory 1s inextricably
bound up with this growth. In the ensuing. the point is that we also
observe that this growth produced a feedback effect on the application
of set theory.
low we have stated that the characteristic feature of the mathematical
approach to set theory is its concern with transfinite number theory.
Any axiomatization of set theory within this approach must generate
such an arithmetic. However. to underline the algebraic view of set
theory in its application we point out that there was a marked shift
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from the use of ordinal arguments or proofs making explicit use of
transfinite arithmetic to maximal arguments. The application of
maximal arguments is a standard algebraic technique, for example, the
use of Zorn's lemma is ubiquitous.
Hausdorff, a pioneer in the application of set theory, is credited to
have given the first explicit formulation of a maximal principle in
his 1909. However with the development of abstract algebra in the
twenties and thirties the use of maximal principles comes into
prominence and begins to overshadow heuristics involving ordinal
arguments e.g. those based on the well-ordering principle. In fact
such principles were seen as essential to the progress of abstract
algebra. Perhaps the most famous of these principles is Zorn's Lemma
formulated by Zorn in 1935 The use of this principle finally
established the supremacy of maximal arguments over ordinal arguments.
The basic reason for the switch seems to be a matter of pragmat ism.
That is, the form of a maximal principle e.g. Zorns Lemma is more
directly applicable and suggestive in an algebraic context than
ordinal arguments. Furthermore they have the heuristic advantage that
they tend to be applicable in a more uniform manner. This is brought
out in the following passage on Kuratowski's use of maximal principles
in his development of Dedekind's chain theory:
As noted by Kuratowski [1922] the theory of transftni te numbers had
found numerous applications in different branches of analysis and of
topology, although the actual theorems established scarcely contained
any reference to these numbers. Koreover, a number of mathematicians
had succeeded in eliminating transfinite numbers from their theories
by means of special, ad hoc, devices. Kuratowski therefore proposed a
simple, general and uniform method which could be applied in all these
applications without any reference to transfinite theory ...."
[Temple, G. '100 Years of Mathematics' 1981 p.40]
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And discussing the impact of Zorns LemmaMoore adds
Why, then, did maximal principles not attain prominence at an earlier
date? Since the deductive strength of such principles was no greater,
and no less, than that of the Axiom [of Choice], their use as a
substi tute for the Well-Ordering Theorem was largely a matter of
convenience. Steinitz had applied this theorem liberally in algebra,
but by the 1930's some of his successors considered it, together with
transfinite ordinals, to be a transcendental device and not properly a
part of algebra. Hence there arose in algebra a perceived need to
replace both ordinals and the Well-Ordering Theorem by a more
algebraic device. Yet since maximal principles had been formulated
previously only as peripheral theorems in set theory, algebraists
ignorant of them until Zorn i1lustrated how useful they could be."
[1982 p.226-7]
In conclusion it should be noted that initially, and for some time
after, these maximal principles were applied as lemmas or alternatives
to the we1l-ordering theorem. They were not at first construed as
instances of the we1l-ordering theorem applied in a different but
equi valent form. The logical relations amongst these principles were
not investigated. This situation only began to change after Zorn IS
work. However, although after formulating his principle Zorn claimed
that it was equivalent to the axiom of choice he did not provide a
proof. This was done by TeichmUller [1939J and independently by Tukey
[ 1940J .
-235-
TOPOS THEORY, LST AID DEFINITE PROPERTIES.
(i) Definite properties and topos theory.
The notion of 'definite property' has been a central, essential, and
continuous theme in set theoretical thinking since Cantor's original
explications of the concept of set. The enterprise ofaxlomatizing
and formalizing set theory beginning with Zermelo, through the work of
those such as Weyl, Skolem, Praeukel, von leumann and right up to the
present day essentially involves the explication of definite property.
I have discussed deUni te properties at so_ length in Part II, in
particular, focusing on Skolem's formulation and it is evident, I
hope, from that discussion just how crucial this notion has been for
the development of the set concept wi thin the mathematical approach.
Unfortunately its importance has often been overlooked Dr at least
understated by commentators on set theory, especially with respect to
its connection with Cantorianis •.
Usually built into the axio. of separation, as such this notion may
justifiably be said to constitute the 'overlap' between the
mathematical and logical character or content of set theory.
Furthermore, as is made clear below, the notion is intimately related
to the character of the 1nterllal logic of set theory. In fact the
formulation of the axiom of separation by Zer..lo is often referred to
as his version of the co~rehen8ion principle. Its role was to
facili tate the 'fine work' of reconstructing mathematics within set
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theory - capitalizing on the results in this field already achieved by
the logicists, e.g. in Russell's 'Principles of Mathematics' (1903).
In topes theory the Q-axiom facilitates the provision of an analogue
to the Separation Axiom seen as a restricted comprehension principle
in the following way. First let us consider the situation in the
category of sets as follows. Let 1 be a set and 1 a definite property.
Then the separation axio. yields the subset of X {x:xel & 1} which we
denote as Xtt. Let I: 1-+2 be the characteristic function of Xto and
{x:;}:1..-+1 the inclusion _po For any YfI, yeX.. iff 1 <y)=l and the
the following diagra. is a pullback
[diagraa 9]
Let I:A-+Q be a generalized characteristic function i.e. an arrow with
codoain Q. (Lawvere calls the. 'propositional functions' - see his
1972 p.3). There then exists a monic (the topes correlate of
inclusion) {x:I):Att-+Asuch that the following diagra. i. a pullback
~~ .. ~ \----- ...A
l~r .mai-----+J\...
[diagram 10]
low the following 'membership' relation Is defined between elements of
an object and monics with that object as codomain. Recall that for an
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object A, we defined an 'element' of A to be an arrow with domain 1
and codoaaf n Ai. e. ~: l...A Let m:B-tA be an arbitrary monic with
codomain A. We define K to be a member of JI if there exists an element
of B i.e. ~:1-tB such that the following diagram commutes.
i
1\B ~ ..,,,
[diagram 11]
Thus &=m·~. The rationale for this deUni tion becomes clear if we
think of JI as an inclusion in the category of sets. low consider the
following diagram which is an extension of the pullback square given
above.
1.
---___,;._--=:::::. "
I~
------!\.
[diagram 12]
low suppose x£{x:_> i.e. x={x:_)·~. Since from any object there exists
a unique arrow with codomain 1 it follows that 11=lA·J. By assumption
follows that _·&=true. On the other hand if we postulate that _ox=true
by the universal property of pullbacks x£{x:,>. We have then
x£ {x:,> iff r&=true
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And, as the notation is designed to suggest, this is the
internalization of the restricted comprehension axiom.
It is important to note (particularly in connection in what we have to
say about the interpretation of LST) that there is a duality between
arrows of the form X:A~Q and monics with codomain A. For monic m:B~A
there is (according to the Q-axiom) a unique arrow with codomain Q for
which it is the pullback. Conversely given X:A~Q there is, in a sense,
a unique 'subset' of A associated with X;A...Q. If we represent that
'subset' by a monic, say, m:B~Q then X:A~Q classifies m;B~A. From the
category theoretic point of view the subset is unique since it is
determined up to isomorphism. But since the emphasis here is on
arrows, specifically monics, the notion of a 'subobject' is developed.
For an object A a subobject of A is an equivalence class of manics.
Two manics m:B...A, n:C~A are equivalent in case there is an arrow i:B~C
such that m·i=n. The collection of subobjects for an object A is
denoted Sub(A). Moreover the function carrying objects to subobjects
is a set-valued functor. We thus obtain for a topos the following
Datural isomorphism
Sub(-)~Hom(-Q) (,)
Incidentally, Lawvere is quite forthright about the meaning of the
Q-axiom. He states that
The characterizing property of the set Q,...the truth values of a
topos E, is that there is a distinguished eternal truth value
true:l~Q, the inverse image {XI_> of which along _:X...Q is of course a
subset of X for which
x€{XI;) iff ;·x=true-r, for any x:T~X,
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but which moreover is such that any subset of any X is of the form for
a unique;. [Lawvere 1976 p.121. I.B. here x:T~X is to be construed as
a 'generalized element' or 'element of X varying along T' as opposed
to a 'constant element' i.e. x:1~X. The arrow truer is the composite
true'IdT:T~QJ
In the above account of the topos analogue of the separation axiom the
role of definite properties has been played by Lawvere's
'proposi tional functions' Given an object A and a propositional
function on A there is a 'subset' of A induced by that propositional
function. I have phrased it deliberately in Lawvere's terminology in
order to bring out the resemblence to Zermelo's approach and this
resemblence will become more evident as we proceed.
low the topic of definite properties brings us directly to the
question of the relationships between the notions of properties,
formulas, and subsets. These relationships have been 'uneasy' at best.
The topos-theoretic approach, in its incarnation as LST, being a
generalization of set theory is no exception with respect to its
concern with deUni te properties and, as we shall see, within this
framework they emerge in a particularly interesting guise, especially
in respect of the aforementioned 'uneasy relationship'. Kore
specifically, in the formulation of LST they are an appropriate
refinement of Skolem's reformulation of Zermelo's account of definite
property and constitute a natural endpoint in that they resolve
certain issues relating the relationship between subsets, power sets
and formulas engendered by Skolem's version. In this connection a
significant role is played by the natural isomorphism (I).
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But having acknowledged its logical connections it must be emphasized
that the notion of a definite property is nevertheless a manifestation
of the mathematical approach to set theory. To begin with there was
here no claim that in any respect it was the notion of 'property' per
se that was being explicated. lor was there any concern to any
significant degree with a general analysis of properties or
mathematical properties. Set theory is sometimes described as the
'theory of extensions of arbitrary properties'. But, if anything, this
construal relates to the concerns of the logical approach not the
mathematical. The different accounts of definite property by Zermelo,
Skolem etc. did not spring from philosophical analyses of property as
such. Xoreover, the various reformulations of Zermelo's notion,
variously motivated, are more in the way of being stipulations. Each
stipulation underpinning the set theorists particular concerns. (Of
course, the essential constraint on these formulations was that they
allow the axiom of separation to perform its original quasi-
constructive role.>
As a restricted comprehension Zermelo's axiom of separation generated
sufficient sets for the quasi-construction of extant mathematics. The
point of adding the constraint of 'definiteness' upon the range of his
second order quantifiers was the avoidance of the semantic paradoxes.
As discussed in part II, although it is commonly held that the notion
of definite property originates in the early work of Zermelo in fact
Zermelo was adopting a Cantorian idea. If we look at its Cantorian
precursor it is arguable that Zermelo built it into his axiom in order
to regulate the logic of the relation between putative subsets of a
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given set and the members of the set - just as the logic of Q
determines the logic of subobjects -except, perhaps, that Zermelo
couched his discussion in terms of 'propositional functions'. But at
the same time, as we have noted, he was ambiguous with respect to the
syntactic versus semantic interpretation. Anyway, we observed that in
the 1895 paper Cantor offers the following characterization
By an "aggregate" we are to understand any collection into a whole M
of definite and separate objects m of our intuition or our thought.
(1985 p.85 of Jourdain's 1915 translation]
It is worthwhile quoting again Fraenkel' s comments on the
qualification 'definite' 1n Cantor's characterization. He writes
(itl ...expresses that, given a set 6, it should be intrinsically
settled for any possible object x whether x is a member of s or not.
Here the addition -intrinsically· stresses that the intention is not
to actual decidability with the present (or with any futUre) resources
of experience or science; a definition which intrinsically settles the
matter, such as the definition of -transcendental" in the case of the
set of all transcendental numbers, is sufficient. To be sure, we thus
essentially use the Aristotelian principle of the excluded middle
which guarantees that for a given object there is no case additional
to those of belonging Or not belonging to the set in question.
(A.Fraenkel, 1968 "Abstract Set Theory" p.10]
So, for example, the 'collection of natural numbers definable in less
than nineteen words' is not a Cantorian ·aggregate". That is, if we
accept Fraenkel's interpretation. But Zermelo in his adoption of this
notion for his axiom of separation (built in to bar the semantic
paradoxes) had this idea in mind. Given a X-definite "propositional
function" P(x) (recall that for Zermelo definiteness is always
relative to some set X) and an object a of X then either P(a) holds or
not and paraphrasing Fraenkel there is no case additional to holding
or not holding. In terms of characteristic functions: P<x) is X-
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defini te iff there is a function X:X-i2 such that for a€X X (a)=l iff
P(a) holds and x(a)=O iff P{a) doesn't hold. Note also that a
classical characteristic function defined over a given set X generates
an "aggregate- in Cantor's sense i.e. X-l[l]. It is definite by design
or construction, so to speak. This comment also carries over to
Lawvere's propositional functions which are generalized characteristic
functions.
X-l[l] is also a subset of X according to the underlying heuristic of
Zeruelo's Separation axiom, Dauely: limitation of size. From an
extensional point of view X-l [1] can be thought of as a def!n! te
property over X or perhaps even X:X...2 lillybe taken as such. This
latter, of course, is a 'propositional function' in Lawvere's sense
understood in the category of sets and is generalized for an arbitrary
topas. Or it might be understood that X-1[1] implies the existence of
a deUni te property of which it is the extension. Zermelo's second
order formulation of the separation axiom (espeCially given his
equivocation between a seDllntic and syntactic reading of deUni te
property> might suggest this reading of Zermelo. In that case (#) Is
the topos correlate. But since Zermelo was not forthcoming as to his
philosophy of properties any conjectures on the above must be regarded
as tentative.
ZF set theory adopts Skolem's first-order version of the axiom of
separation and in particular his notion of definite property. Skolem's
characterization is unequivocal definite properties are to be
understood as forDlllas of the first-order language whose only non-
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logical symbol (with the possible exception of individual constants)
is 'E' . However, a 'gap' is opened up between definite properties
in the sense that they are no longer relativized to sets. The notion
is no longer local. But if we read (or stipulate) Lawvere's
propositional functions as the appropriate correlate of definite
properties for a topos then definite properties are, just as in
Zermelo's case, localized.
Skolem's statement that his notion of definite property is "completely
clear and one that is sufficiently comprehensive to permit us to carry
out all ordinary set theoretic proofs" emphasizes the foundational
pragmatics of the mathematical approach. But in following Skolem ZF
has lnheri ted the following problematic feature, namely: that the
relationship between deUni te properties and the subsets of a given
set is left in a somewhat unsatisfactory state. Intuitively, the power
set of a given set comprises all the subcollections of that set. But
how is the constitution of this power set related to definite
properties? For a given definite property and set there is a
subcollection of that set correlated with the definite property.
However, the relationship of an arbitrary subset or member of the
power set of a given set to definite properties is unclear. I am not
claiming that this cannot be said of Zermelo's approach. The problem
here is that Zermelo is unforthcoming as to the status of
propositional functions. Perhaps the issue was only obscured by his
second order formulation. What is certain is that there was no general
analysis of 'properties' and their relationship to sets wi thin the
mathematical approach. For toposes the relationship between definite
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properties and subsets, that is, the relationship between what we take
the appropriate correlates of these, begins to be clarified by (#).
Now whilst LST is conservative in that it essentially retains the ZF
(i.e. Skolem's) version of definite properties in the sense that
definite properties are taken to be formulas, one of its progressive
features is that it goes some way in resolving what amounts to a
dichotomy between definite properties and subsets. Moreover, LST goes
further in the direction of 'reducing gaps' (e.g. between arb!trary
members of a power set and definite properties or, more generally,
between theories and models) in the sense that it does justice to the
dictum 'the theory is the model'. Or in the words of Lambek and Scott
"A tapas then does not contain, but actually coincides with !ts
internal language". [1986 p.246]
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(ii) Internal languages and LST.
It is in the formulation of LST that topos theory is fully realized as
a generalization of set theory. LST arose through the discovery and
work on the internal languages yielded naturally by a topos. These
languages are generally held to have been discovered independently by
Xitchell, Benabou and Joyal. The first formal account of such a
language was given by Xitchell in his 1972.
According to Johnstone we may trace the motivation for their
development to the categorial analysis of Cohen'S forcing method. He
states that
In view of the Lawvere-Tierney proof of the independence of the
continuum hypothesis ..it became a matter of importance to determine
the precise relationship between elementary topos theory and axiomatic
set theory. The answer was found independently by J.C.Cole ..[19731 and
G.Osius [1974] .. [1977 p.xv]
The work of Kitchell, Cole and Osius was a continuation of Lawvere's
programme of characterizing the category of sets. Cole and Osius
worked towards an extension of elementary topos theory approximating
ZP, by providing, for example, categorial correlates for the axioms of
foundation and replacement. Kitchell, more generally, characterizes
the category of sets arising from Boolean-valued models of set-theory.
One of the best known results of this programme is the logical
equivalence between the theory of well-pOinted topoi (i.e. tapa! whose
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skeleton contains at least two objects and if two arrows f:A~B, g:A~B
are such that for every element x:1~A f·x=g·x then f=g) is logically
equivalent to Zoo According to Hatcher the theory of well-'pointed
topoi has identified the 'core' of set theory. However, although these
results are interesting in so far as they constitute an investigation
into the set theoretic structure that may be 'lifted' from the
category of sets into tapas it is the more general notion of a tapas
in its incarnation as LST that is of greater interest. For it is the
'generalized' set concept that proves the most fruitful.
But this 'lifting' did suggest that some of the reasoning and
heuristics of topos theory in category theoretic terms might be
replaced by the more familiar arguments along set-theoretical lines.
This was the use to which the internal languages were put. As Osius
puts it
This set
languages)
theory ...
immediately
construction
wrestle with
1975 p.297)
theoretical method of investigations Li ,e. internal
in tapas theory has the advantage, that - once the set
has been developed to a certain extent - it allows to
proceed from a heuristical set theoretical idea or
to the corresponding result in topos without having to
lots of diagrams <getting bigger and bigger)." (Osius
Hatcher presents the position as follows
Use of the internal languages ..for toposes ..can replace appeal to
principles of functor theory in establishing complicated properties of
toposes. Workers in the field of tapas theory differ considerably as
to their preference for the linguistic approach or the functorial
approach to studying toposes. On the one hand, the linguistic approach
allows one to reason in a set-like language about toposes and thus to
transfer certai n thought patterns from set theory to tapas theory.
There is, however, the drawback that the linguistic approach does not
give us much feeling for what is going on since the connection between
the reasoning in the formal language and the toposes themselves is
made via ..[aJ.. fairly complicated interpretation function ...Thus one
finds oneself constantly asking "Now what does this re~lly mean?n On
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the other hand, the functorial and diagrammatic approach to topos
theory has the advantage of allowing one to handle the toposes
directly and to "see" schematically through the use of commutative
diagrams and functors exactly why and how certain principles work. The
heart of set-theoretical reasoning is the abstraction principle by
which one simply thinks up the property one needs, writes it down, and
and then declares that there is a mathemati,cal object (set) which
satisfies the property. With the diagrammatic-functional approach, one
must supply the link between concepts and objects since morphisms and
functors must be explicitly defined. Functorial reasoning is therefore
more explicit or •constructive" and contains more information than
does set-theoretical reasoning, but one must pay the price of the
extra effort necessary to obtain this extra information.
(1982 pp. 310-11J
It must be stressed, however, that the shift to working with internal
languages is not a prescription for eschewing categorial methods in
foundations generally or tapas theory in particular. The foundational
insights and machinery of category theory are still essential. This is
because, among other things, it is necessary to analyse and control
the mathematical changes brought about by the movement from one 'site
of mathematical activity' to another and this is where functors,
adjoints play an essential part. Or, as in LST, we might find versions
of the language and theory based giving us a better feeling "for what
is going on". In short, in adopting LST (or tapas theory in general)
we retain the set concept as the foundational base, but at the same
time it is not a matter of choosing between set theoretical and
categorial heuristics and methods but rather developing both in
parallel and making the most of what is certainly a very progressive
interaction for foundations.
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At this point we turn to a description of LST and its properties. The
account given here is that of the theory formulated by John Bell in
his forthcoming (197-J. And, as Bell emphasizes, in the consideration
of LST we will be "furnishing the precise sense in which toposes are
to be regarded as generalizations of the category of sets" .
•
To begin with let us briefly recap on the general structure of a
tapas. A topos is a category and thus is composed of two basic
collections: objects and arrows. The initial heuristic of LST is to
construe objects as 'types'. The category exhibits the following
additional features: a terminal object 1; finite products of arbitrary
objects; an object of truth-values Q and 'truth' arrow true:l~Q acting
together as a subobject classifier; power objects i.e. for each object
A an exponential QA. As we have observed the internal logic of a topos
is governed by the algebra of truth-values i.e. elements of Q. In
general its structure, as it has turned out, 1s of a complete Heyting
algebra and thus the general internal logic 1s intuitionistic. This
then is the basic raw material for the internal language which we
shall refer to as the 'local language'. After this language is
constructed the local set theory 1.e. the system LST is formulated
within it. As in classical set theory the system is built around the
primitives '{:}','€' and '=' (respectively: abstraction. membership
and equali ty>
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A local language L essentially consists of two collections of symbols:
type symbols and terms. (Where each term is associated with a given
type.) These collections are defined recursively from an initially
specified stock of symbols which are as follows:
(51) 1. Q (the unity type symbol and truth-value type symbol
respectively. )
(52) A,B,C ... (a collection (possibly empty) of ground type symbols.
(53) XA, yA,ZA. .... (a collection of variables associated with each
type. )
(54) # (this will denote the term of type 1)
(S5) f.g,h (a collection (possibly empty) of function symbols)
The type symbols of L are defined to be as follows:
(TS1) 1. Q
(T52) A. B,C, ..
(T53) if Al, ... An are type symbols then so is Al x...xAn. (n~1)
(T54) if A is a type symbol, so is PA.
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To each function symbol we assign a signature of the form A~B, where
A,B are type symbols. low the ter1llS of L and their associated types
are defined to be as follows:
(Tl) II
(T2) the variables XA,YA,ZA, .. for each type A.
(T3) if f is a function symbol of signature A~B and T is a term of
type A, then f(T) is a term of type B.
(T4) if T1, ••• Tn are terms of types Al, ... An, then <T1 ••• Tn> 15 a term
of type A,x" .An (n~2)
(T5) if T is a term of type Alx ... xAn (n~2) then (T)t
term of type Ai.
(T6) if ~ is a term of type Q, XA of type A then {XA:~) is a term of
(UUn) 1s a
type PA.
(T7) if ~,T are terms of the same type, then ~=T is a term of type Q.
(T8) if ~,T are terms of types A,PA respectively, then ~£T is a term
of type Q.
(Terms of type Q are called formulas. And note that each formula ex
gi ves rise to an abstract {XA:a}. For convenience we write variables
of type Q as W,wl, .. etc and the syntactic variables over formulas as
~,J3,'t .. etc. Where the context allows typical ambiguity is employed.
Also substitution, freedom and bondage are handled in the standard
manner. )
-251-
We have not so far, as is usual for example in classical first-order
systems explicitly provided 'logical' symbols. However it is not ton
difficult to appreciate that the above language has its genesis in the
internal picture of a tapas and we have also noted how the logic is
also generated internally. Thus it is not too surprising that L
already contains the machinery to express logical operations. In fact
these are defined as follows:
(w not occuring free in a or 6)
(was in L8)
A property of the systems of local set theory is that these logical
operations as just defined obey the rules of intuitionistic logic. We
now present the basic axioms of a local set theory. The system is
given as a sequent calculus.
(L1> a+l)3for a=)3
(L1) true for 11='
(L3) a&)3 for (a.j3>=<true,true>
(L4) a-!j3for (a&j3)+la
(L5) TTxa for (x: true}
(L6) flJlse for TTw.w
(L7) -a for a-!flJlse
(L8) avj3 for TTw(«a-!w)&(j3-!w)Hw]
(L9) Ixa for TTw(TTx(a-!w)-!w]
Tautology a:a
: xl=II
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Equality
x=y, cx(z/x):a(z/x) (with x,y free for z in a)
Prodycts
X=«X1 ••• Xn»
Comprehension : X€ (x: a} f4a
Finally the following are the inference rules
Thinning I": a
Ji,r:a
f:a a,f:j3
(any variable free in a 1s free in r or ~
r:~
SUbstitytion r:a
(~ free for x in f,a:)
r (xlT) :a (xlT)
Extensionality r XfO'f4XfT
(x not free in r,O',~)
r:O"=T
Equivalence a,r:~ ~,f:a
r:af4~
The notion of proof is the standard one for a sequent calculus. If the
sequent r: a is deri vable from a set of sequenta S we wri te r I -l"CX. If
rl-a, i.e. rl-~a we say r:a is II valid sequent.
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A Local Set Theory in L is defined to be a collection S of sequents
which is closed under derivability. Given a set S of sequents using
the prescription (f:a)€S. iff fl-sa we generate the local set theory
S. for which S are said to be a set of axioms for S.. (Not to be
confused with the basic axioms.) The local set theory in L generated
by the empty set of axioms is called 'pure' local set theory and
denoted by L. The local language with no ground types or function
symbols is called the 'pure' local language and is denoted by L,•. The
pure local set theory in 10 is denoted by Lo.
•
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The first important property of an LST S is that it determines a
category of generalized sets C(S) i.e. C(S) is a tapas. CS) is
constructed from the syntax of S. In fact, the heuristic for deriving
C(S) from S closely resembles the manner in which given a classical
set theory we may derive a tapas. (On the semantic level sets become
objects and functions arrows. Thus when considering the theory qua
syntactic object we look for their term correlates. The process is
very much like Henkin's construction of the canonical model for a
first order theory.) To make this clearer let us first look at some of
the implicit set theory inherent in a local language.
Consider formulas of the form T~V where T is of some type A. Then the
type of 0' is PA. Only terms associated with a power type 'have
eleJll9nts' . {XA: XA£O'} is also of type PA. Accardi ng to the
comprehension axiom we have Whence by
extensionality we may infer that {XA:XA~O'}=O'. In other words, not only
is it the case that only terms associated with power types have
members they are also determined by their members in the sense just
described. Clearly. if we are looking for 'set-like' terms within our
local language terms associated with power types are the natural
candidates. Thus, we make the following definition. The 'set-like'
terms of a local language L are the terms associated with power types.
A closed set-like term will be called an 'L-set' (or 'set' where the
relevant language is clear).
Having identified the sets within S we can emphasize their set
theoretical nature by demnstrating that they in effect form a set
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theory within S in the sense that they satisfy further fami! iar
properties. First of all we show some examples of how we may define
the usual operations and relations on them. In the ensuing we denote
sets by upper case letters A,B,C, .., and to simplify matters we use
the following abbreviations:
TIx€A.a for nx(x€A~a)
Ex€A.a for Ex(xeA&a)
E!xEA.a for E!x(x€A&a)
{x€A:a} for {x:xeA&a}
We make the following definitions:
A~B for TIxEA.x£B
AloB for {X:xeA&x€B)
UA or A for {XA: true)
"A or " for {xA:false}
PA for (u: ua}
loC for {x:TIyEC.XEY)
h) for {X:X=T} (x not free in T)
{~,~} for {X:X=~VX=T} (x not free in ~,T)
h:a} for {Z:EX1 ....Ex.,«Z=T)&a)} <z not free in T)
AxB for {<x,y>:x€A & yeB}
AS for {z:z'BxA & nxeBE!yeA«x,Y>Ez}
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Now we can now prove the following:
1- A=B ~ rrx(x€A~x€B) (Axiom of extensionality)
1- MA
1- (A~B & B~A) ~ A=B
1- (A~B & B~C) ~ A~C
1- (C(A~B» ~ «OA) & (C~B»
1- ((AUB)(C) 1+ «A(C) & (B(C» (Axiom of binary unions)
1- XA€UA
1- -(XA€0A) (Axiom of the empty set)
1- A€PB ft A~B (Axiom of power sets)
1- (A~~C) ft (ITz€C(A(z»
1- (C~A) ft rrz€C(z~A)
1- x€ {y} ft x=y
I - ex ~ T€ {T ; ex}
Conjoined with the comprehension axiom the propositions above
constitute the the essentials or 'core axioms' of the local set theory
in L. Why is this set theory 'local'? John Bell explains
The set theory is local because some of the set-theoretic operations,
e.g. intersection and union, may only be performed on sets of the same
type, i.e. H locally". Moreover, variables are constrained to range
over given types - locally - in contrast with the situation in
classical set theory where they are permitted to range globally over a
putative universe of discourse. [Chapter 3 p.28 forthcoming 197-. In
connection with the requirement of restricting global quantification
in a theory of sets see the discussion in Mayberry 1977. Notice also
that we have in this set theory a 'universal' UA set for each type A.l
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According to the heuristic we are are working with sets will
constitute the objects of the category to be constructed and functions
(wbich in set theory are, of course, particular kinds of sets) are the
arrows. Thus we choose those ~sets which are functions. That is those
sets F such that l-sFeBA. The topos C(S) is then essentially
constructed from S-sets and S-functions. I say 'essentially' because
we have to make two amendments following from the following
considerations. First of all the 'sets' are syntactic objects and
thus, as we have understood them, they are intensional. Thus we w111
in general have many S-sets which according to the theory are the same
set i.e. A,B such that l-sA=B. But whilst it is harmless that they are
different qua terms they obviously cannot be different qu~ sets
(objects) if they are extensionally identical. Hence the objects of
the category are taken to be equivalence classes of S-sets under the
relation =s defined by A=sB iff l-eA=B.
Second, as was observed in the account of category theory, arrows are
assigned a specific domain and coda_in. This is in contrast to a
function in set theory whose codomain is non-specific. That was the
reason that arrows are understood as ordered triples. For the same
reason we define an S-arrow to be a triple of S-sets <A,F,B> where
l-sFeBA. Having made these provisions it can be shown that this
collection of objects and arrows forD a category C(S). Horeover, just
as in the case of set theory C(S) satisfies the axioms of elementary
topos theory. Such a topos is called a Linguistic tapas. [Strictly
speaking the term denotes the topos generated from S-sets via the
canonical construction of Bell 197- ]
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Toposes may be used as the basis of a semantics for local languages.
Let E be a tapas. An interpretation I of L in E is simply an
assignment of types to objects i.e. I(A)=AI satisfying:
(A,x...A,...)I = (A,)IX ...x(A....)I
(PAh = P (AI)
11 = 1
QI = Q
Together with an assignment to each function symbol f with signature
A~B of an arrow fI:AI~BI.
The next step is to provide an extension of I to all terms. The basic
idea is that these terms are interpreted as arrows using the following
prescription. Let T be a term of type B and x, ...x r-t distinct variables
of types A, ....A....including all the variables of T. Then an
interpretion of T relative to the sequence x, ...x" is an arrow
! T! : (Ax) 1x ..... X (AI)n~B
The specific arrow for each term T is then defined recursively. We
forego the details, but for example I II ralattve to a sequence x, ...x,
is the unique arrow (Alhx ... (AI) ....~1. Jote that if T is a closed term
of a type B then IT! relative to the empty sequence is an arrow with
domain 1 thus ITI is an element of B1• In the case T is a set {y:a} of
type PC then I {y:a}1 is an eleuent of PCl which in turn corresponds to
a subobject of Cl. But what of definite properties, say formulas with
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one free variable ? Let a be such a formula with free variable xc.
Then lal relative to C is an arrow CI~Q a 'propositional function'.
And this classifies! {xc:a}!.
We next turn to the question of truth and validity of a formula in our
local language relative to a given topos and interpretation. Let a be
a sentence i.e. a closed term of type Q. The interpretation of a is an
arrow lal:l~Q. Under what conditions do we want to say that a 1s true
in the topos 1. e. I=c ? Recall that in our deflnl tlon of logical terms
the truth value 'true' was defined by the formula #=#. Suppose we take
a to be this formula. Then it computes as the arrow true:l~Q. Clearly
we want #=# to hold. Construed as an element of Q, which is a complete
Heyting algebra, it is the Dax1mal truth value. For example, if Q 1s
the collection of open sets of a topological space then the maximal
truth value is the whole space. So if lal computes as 1#=#1, being 'as
true as possible', then at least I=a should be the case. Furthermore,
following the general pattern of intuitionistic semantics <and since
it is shown that LST yields the theorems of intuitionist logic) the
definition of validity should give a as true iff it takes the maximal
truth value in the topos. That is, we should end up with I=a iff tal
is the arrow true.
We also require that the axioms, given as sequents are valid. So for
example, since a:a is an axiom then our definition of validity should
yield al=a. Furthermore, since it is truth value that counts we should
be able to replace an occurrence of a by any ~ where lal=I~I. That is,
if lal=I~1 and 1¥1=lol, then if we have al=~ we should also have ¥I=o.
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Since thinning is a rule of inference validity should be maintained if
we add sentences to the left hand side of the sequent. For any
sentence a, lat:1~Q uniquely determines a subobject of 1. If we
compute la&~1:1~Q then this is, the infimum of {lal,ll3l} in the
algebra of subobjects of 1. So, if we have al=~ we should also have
a&'¥' =B: Putting all this together, if Ial(I~I in the algebra of
subobjects of 1 then al=~ should hold. The above considerations supply
a partial heuristic for the following definition of validity.
First, if r is a finite set of formulas {a" •.. an,} we write: Irl for
the characteristic arrow of inf{la,I, ...lan,l} if m;tO or true:l ...Q if
m=O. r:~ is said to be valid valid, written rl=I3, if Irl~II3I,
<relative to the sequence of free variables of {r,~}. Indeed, for a
sentence a it turns out that I=e iff 'at=true. Relative to this
semantics it can be proved that the axioms and rules of inference of a
local language are valid under any interpretation in any tapas. In
fact, we can obtain both the soundness of LST and its completeness
with respect to this semantics.
The next property establishes that LST and tapas theory are two
aspects of the same concept of set. We have seen that from a local set
theory S we can construct a tapas, the canonical construction yields a
'linguistic topos' C(S). Xoreover, this tapas is a model for the local
set theory. low given a tapas E we can construct a local language L(E)
from its objects and arrows. With the exception of the terminal object
and object of truth values which are taken as 1 and IIrespectively the
objects of E make up the ground type symbols. The product types and
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power types are defined recursively in the obvious way starting from
the products and power objects of ground types. The arrows constitute
the function symbols which as usual are triples <f, A,B> for arrow
f:A-iB. Given L(E) we can induce the 'natural interpretation' by
interpreting a ground type symbol and function symbol as the objects
and arrows from which they are derived.
The local set theory Th(E) is defined as the theory in L (E) whose
axioms are all sequents f:a such that under the natural interpretation
fl=a holds in E. Since LST is sound it follows that
Since Th(E> is a local set theory we can construct the linguistic
tapas C(Th(E». What is the relationship between this linguistic tapas
and the tapas E we started with? They are the same tapas! Formally, we
can prove the 'Equivalence Theorem':
EI!!C(Th(E»
And from the point of view of category theory they are identical.
low starting with a local set theory S we may construct the following
progression:
S -t C (S) -t Th <C(S» -iC (Th(C(S)» -t •••
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By the equivalence theorem we have
Furthermore, for any term of type Q in the language of the theory S we
have
Thus the toposes constructed in this progression are stable in the
sense that from the point of view of category theory they are
identical. And the succession of theories are conservative with
respect to provability.
Finally, a remark on the relationship between definite properties and
subobjects. We know that a formula (definite property) of L <E) 1s
interpreted as an arrow with codomain Q, ie. as a 'propositional
function' and hence is uniquely associated with some subobject in E.
But we can go further in our account of the relationship in question.
Given an arbitrary subobject in E its characteristic function
generates a formula in L(E> with which the original subobject 1s
uniquely associated.
•
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We have observed the set theory inherent within a LST. By appeal to
the equivalence theorem. a tapas. construed as a site for mathematical
activity is seen to embody the set theoretical constructions of LST.
In short. the foundations of the mathematical activity within a tapas
is set theoretical. This last particular underwrites my contention
that the shift from ZF to tapas theoretic foundations is not a shift
away from set theory. LST is set theory.
But at the same time we have made use of the category theoretic
viewpoint. For example. the 'equivalence' of the equivalence theorem
is equivalence of categories. Here there is no tension between set
theory and category theory. Both have their appropriate role. In fact,
the foundational importance and input of category theory was discussed
in Chapter 2 against the background of the increasing emphasis on
structure in the evolution of modern mathematics. But as stated, these
structures are set theoretical realizations. The job of category
theory is to generate the general concepts and heuristics for dealing
with structures and their relations. This does not militate against
the view that mathematics takes place within a set theoretical
universe.
Since mathematics 1s based within these sites it is a vital
foundational task to analyse the relationships between sites and the
process of moving from one to another. The best clue we have in this
connection is Cohen's forcing technique. One of the insights that
categorial concepts afford us is as to the nature of this process.
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This surely constitutes foundational progress. It is to the topic af
the topos explication of forcing to which we now turn.
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THE TOPOS EXPLICATION OF FORCING.
(i) Forcing orland the continuum hypothesis.
In 1963 Cohen obtained a proof of the independence of the continuum
hypothesis from ZF set theory. However, the essential foundational
significance of Cohen's result does not emerge from the fact that this
particular independence result is proved or in fact that any
particular independence result is proved. The foundational impact of
Cohen's result arises out of the forcing technique. Broadly speaking.
Cohen's method yields a uniform method of constructing new models of
set theory (with certain given desired properties) from a ground
model. [For a general overview of the method see Appendix]. The
classical universe of sets or models provide 'sites' within which
mathematical activity takes place. The application of Cohen's method
across the spectrum of mathematical disciplines and the proliferation
of independence results has not only forcefully underlined that, as
Reyes puts it" ..that by ,embedding' mathemat ical objects in the
universe V of sets, these objects inherit the features of the
surrounding universe .." [Reyes 1981 p.2361 but also the immense
richness or variation in this inheritance.
Thus a fundamental foundational task is the analysis and control of
this inheritance. Clearly, as matters stand at present, the key here
is an understanding of forcing. This is achieved by the explication of
forcing in the tapas-theoretic framework. Moreover, this analYSis
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shows that in fact the appropriate sites of mathematical activity. and
which are implicit i.e. present but inviSible, in the forcing method
of Cohen are not the classical set theoretic universes. This
explication is the main subject of the chapter. But before proceeding
with this I want to make a few additional remarks on some of the
statements in the paragraph above.
To begin with - on the importance of the particular result that the
continuum hypothesis is independent of ZF. This importance certainly
does not derive from the fact that it is an example of a shortfall, as
such, in the axioms of set theory. Godel's incompleteness results 1n
1931, over thirty years previous, informed us that a theory such as ZF
not only was incomplete but was not strong enough to prove its own
consistency. <LowenheiDrSkolem had also brought out limitations of
first-order systems. These limitative results were sufficient for
Skolem to occasionally adopt a relativist position.)
However, Cantor had devised his set theory or rather theory of
transfinite arithmetic as a 'measure' of mathematical objects and
undeniably the continuum has been perhaps the most important object of
mathematical investigations - so at least this object must be measured
by the theory. Certainly Cantor worked on the problem of the continuum
hypothesis throughout his career and Bilbert cited it at the top of
his list of the twenty three most important mathematical problems for
the new century. So historically it was placed at centre stage of
matters set theoretical and consequently the proof of its independence
accrued much attention.
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The situation engendered by the proof of its independence may to some
extent be likened to the Paris-Harrington result in connection with
formalized arithmetic. It was known that Peano Arithmetic is
incomplete but it may
arithmetical statements
be thought that we
into those that are
may partition true
"reasonably natural
theorems] of finitary combinatorics" [Paris/Harrington 1977] or
"strictly mathematical statements about natural numbers" [ibid] and
those that are metamathematical pathologies with respect to arithmetic
proper with the idea that Godel's result doesn't apply to the former.
But the work of Paris-Harrington has demonstrated that this programme
is not viable.
low by analogy, I'llthough the incompleteness of ZF and all the other
shortcomings of ZF by virtue of it being a first order system were
accepted, as long as 'no reasonably natural or strictly mathematical
statements about sets' are independent then we need not have any
foundational qualms. The notion of 'reasonably natural' or 'strictly
mathematical' is, if not for arithmetic then certainly for set theory,
obscure. However, the feeling is that at least it should be read to
include the continuum hypothesis.
But at the same time the following pointe should be made that point
away from the view that the foundational impact resides in the proof
of the independence of the continuum hypothesis. Or if you like,
perhaps this particular proof is foundationally important but having
taken the fact of its independence on board it turns out that it is
the message of the forcing technique itself that is of greater
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moment. In any case, first, it had already been thought that the
continuum hypothesis would prove to be independent. For example,
Skolem in a prophetic footnote to in his 1922 wrote
Since Zermelo's axioms do not uniquely determine the domain a, it is
very improbable that all cardinality problems are decidable by means
of these axioms. For example, it is quite probable that what is called
the continuum problem, namely, the question whether 2.. 1 .. ,.", ,.) is
greater than or equal to aleph(!) I is not solvable at all on this
basis; nothing need be decided about it. The situation may be exactly
the same as in the following case: an unspecified commutative field is
given, and we ask whether it contains an element x such that x~=2.
This is just not determined, since the domain is not unique.
[p.299. Incidentally, note the comparison of set theory with an
algebraic theory. I believe this underlines the algebraic view of the
those set theorists within the mathematical approach, Also note that
the domain is not fixed i,e. B is a parameter.]
More recently, Gode I writing in his 1947, is of the opinion that the
continuum hypothesis could not be proven from the axioms of ZF. He
gives two reasons. First "the fact that there are two quite
differently defined classes of objects both of which satisfy all
axioms of set theory" t p. 478] 1. e. the constructible sets and the
other "of the sets in the sense of arbitrary multitudes". The
continuum hypothesis predicts the result of counting the subsets of w,
but the notion of set yielded by the axioms is not clear enough to
inform us as to which sets are to be counted. Second, he paints to
facts "not known in Cantor's time" which constitute "highly
implausi ble consequences of the continuum hypothesis". Thus having
given a proof of the consistency of the hypothesis with ZF he doubts
that it is other than independent.
As a topt c internal to set theory the continuum hypothesis has had,
and with a certain justification, a high profile. And as we have
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stated the continuum itself is a structure of prime mathematical
importance. But the fact is that the continuum hypothesis has had very
little effect if any throughout the greater part of mathematics.
(On a practical note we might add that not only has there been a flood
of independence results in group theory, topology, etc but many open
problems in these various disciplines that have taxed the time and
ingenuity of researchers have been proved to be independent i.e.
insoluble in the appropriate sense. Conversely a given independence
result saves any researcher embarking upon a fruitless
enterprise. Hence it is arguable that any insight into the nature of
forcing, at least in this connection, constitutes foundational
progress. )
In his forward to Bell's 1977 Scott writes that
Cohen's achievement lies in being able to expand models <countable,
standard models> by adding new sets in a very economical fashion: they
more or less have only the properties they are forced to have ...I knew
almost all the set-theoreticians of the day, and I think I can say
that no one could have guessed that the proof would have gone in just
this way ....And moreover his method was very flexible in introducing
lots and lots of models - indeed, too many models. [p.xiii]
We have already mentioned that an analysis of Cohen'S forcing method
brings to light the implicit presence of sites of mathematical
activity. These come to light as intermediaries between Cohen's ground
models and their adjuncts. The nature of these will be made clear in
the discussion on Lawvere's notion of 'variable set' below. Thus
Cohen'S forcing not only yields a key to the passage between one site
and another but also indicates the presence of a more extended and
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richer source of sites. That is, the classical sites are embedded and
form part of a denser array of sites. In short, we are not seeing the
whole picture. It is here that the explication of forcing in the tapas
theoretic setting sheds its light. Forcing turns out to be a special
case of a natural operation on toposes and furthermore there is a
significant increase in our understanding and management of the
relations between the sitee of mathematical activity as well as the
means of smoothly moving between them. This understand1ng and insight
is not at all evident from the entrenched classical point of view.
This last consideration reinforces the brand of relativism inherent in
the shift to LST. Xostowski's variety, for example, although it stems
from Cohen's independence results yields no further insight int~ their
significance beyond the adoption of a bare relativist standpoint.
In tbe remainder of this chapter the above will be made more concrete
by a presentation of the tapas theoretic explication of forcing. This
is presented in three sections: (ii. a) Grothendieck's generalization
of the classical notion of Sheafj (ii.b) Lawvere and Tierney's
generalization of the notion of sheaf to an an arbitrary tapas; <ii.c)
Forcing and Lawvere's notion of 'variable set .
•
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(ii.a) Grothendieck's generalization of the classical notion of Sheaf.
The key to the tapas theoretic account of forcing is to be found in
the concept of a she~f. The overall program here is to generalize the
classical notion of a sheaf over a topological space. Recall that a
sheaf is an object in the functor category in Sl:J(X', where O(X) is the
set of open sets of the topological space X construed as a category
with arrows corresponding to reverse inclusions. The generalization
carried out by Grothendieck involves replacing the category O(X) by an
arbitrary small category C. This essentially requires formulating the
appropriate analogues of "presheaf" and "covering family". Now I have
stated that generalization is an important and frequently used
conceptual tool of mathematics and in particular algebra. The
generalization of 'sheaf' is a particularly interesting example. As
will become apparent, the methodology employed is that of analysing
the classical case, DlCre specifically finding appropriate equivalent
characterizations of the classical notions, or at least key
characteristics, which Day be DlCre naturally carried over into the
general setting. Before embarking on a DlCredetailed exposition let us
first sketch in some of the historical background and motivation of
the work of Grothendieck and others on this program.
The history of sheaf theory may be said to have its starting paint in
Oflag XVII, a prisoner-of-war camp. It was there that Leray delivered
a course of lectures which formed the subject matter of his 1945
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paper. This paper is generally held to have inaugurated sheaf theory.
But as Gray puts it
Sheaf theory, not really being a subject, cannot properly be said to
have a history. Rather, it is an octopus spreading itself throughout
everyone else's history. Of course, "everyone" is an exaggeration
since sheaf theory is a part of geometry; namely, that part concerned
with the passage from local to global properties. [1979 p.1l
This transition from the local to the global turns out to be the key
to the connection between the Cohen's forcing method and sheaf theory.
Loosely speaking, Cohen's forcing conditions carry bits of local
information, for example, about a 'new' subset of the natural numbers,
which can be 'glued' together to form that subset in an adjunction of
the ground model. [See Appendix].
In the 1950's sheaf theory was developed by Cartan, WeiI, Serre,
Godement, Grothendieck and others. It rapidly became a tool in
disciplines such as algebraic topology, complex analysis, analytic
geometry, differential geometry, the theory of differential equations
and, most significantly in connection with our present concerns
algebraic geometry. The central figures in this last discipline were
Grothendieck and other members of his "Semlnaire de Geometrie
Algebrique du Bois Karie" which included Artin, Giraud, and Verdier.
According to Gray one of the central problems addressed by
Grothendieck's school was the Weil conjectures. [See Gray 1979 p.39J
These conjectures are the generalization of the well-known Riemann
hypothesis for mod-p number systems. (These were eventually proved by
Deligne in 1974.) An essential notion developed in this field was that
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of a 'scheme' This development , as Gray states, was due "essentially
to Grothendieck who, after abortive attempts by Chevalley and others,
found the right generalization of varieties - that of schemes."
Johnstone now takes up the story
However .....it was soon discovered that the topological notion of
sheaf was not entirely adequate, in that the only topology available
on an abstract algebraic variety or scheme, the Zariski topology, did
not have "enough open sets" to provide a good geometric notion of
localization. A. Grothendieck observed that to replace "Zariski
open inclusion" by "etale morphism" was a step in the right direction;
but unfortunately the schemes which are etale over a given 9cheme do
not in general form a partially ordered set. It was thus necessary to
invent the notion of "Grothendieck topology" on an arbitrary category,
and the generalized notion of sheaf for such a topology, in order to
provide a framework for the development of etale cohomology. [1977 p.
xiiJ
As we have seen the more general notion that was developed was that of
a Grothendieck topos which, facilitated by Giraud's characterization
in terms of exactness properties, led to the Lawvere-Tierney theory of
elementary topoi. We now turn to some of the details. As Bell pOints
out:
...it is clear from the definition that the notion of a sheaf on a
topological space depends only on the lattice of open subsets of the
space, and in no way on its "points". This suggests the possibility of
extending this notion to categories more general than lattices of open
sets. We shall see not only that this possibility can be realized for
an arbitrary small category C, but that the resulting theory is an
important and illuminating generalization of the classical case.
[1982 p.326J
In generalizing the notion of a sheaf in a category of the form SIl<X.
to one where we replace O(X) by C 1. e. to formulate the notion of a
sheaf over a small category C, we need a more general notion of a
topology and, as stated above, in particular we need the appropriate
general notions of a "presheaf" and "covering family". That is: a
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Grothendieck topology on a category is a generalization of the concept
of all open covers of all open sets in a topological space. Then a
sheaf is the appropriate class of presheaves over this topology. The
generalization of ·presheaf" is more or less immediate. That is, we
again take a presheaf to be an object in the functor category S~(·,·~·,
- the c~tegory of presheaves on C. F is a subpresheaf of G if for all
C-objects X F(X)~G(X) and for C-arrow f:X~Y F(f)=G(f)tF(Y).
A class of presheaves known as the "representable presheaves" are of
special importance in facilitating the extended notion of covering
family. Let X be a C-object. Then a representable presheaf 1s a
functor hx where hx(Y)=hom(Y,X) and for C-arrow f:Y-iZ we obtain the
function hx(f):hx(Z)~hx(Y) defined by hx(f)[gl=gOf for g€h~(Z).
On analysing the classical notion of a covering family it was found
that their properties could be expressed in terms of sieves. Let
U€O(X) a sieve on U is a family R of subsets of U satisfying: i)
R~O(X) i 11) if W€O(X) and W~V€R then We-R. The following observation
allows us to analyse covering families in terms of sieves. Let Q~O(X)
be a family of subsets of U. Q generates the sieve O'={V€O(X):V~UQ).
Clearly. 0 covers U iff 0' does. Let J(U) be the set of a "covering
sieves" R on U. where U€O(X). For a sieve R. V~U. we define V'R={W:WER
and W~V}. i.e the restriction of R to V.
Grothendieck took the following conditions to be "cberscter tet t c of
the notion of covering sieve for sheaf theoretic purposes because, as
we shall see, they generalize easily to an arbitrary small category C
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in such a way as to enable the notion of sheaf to be naturally carried
over to C." The conditions are; <i) the 'maximal' sieve is a coveri ng
sieve; (i1> the restriction of a covering sieve to a smaller open set
is a covering sieve; <iii) if the restriction of a sieve 8 to each
member of a covering sieve R is a covering sieve, then 8 is a covering
sieve. Kore formally:
(C1) {VeO(X):V~U}eJ(U)
(C2) if ReJ(U) and VeO(X), then V*RE'!(V).
(C3) if ReJ(U) and 8 is a sieve on U such that for each VeR we have
V*SeJ(V), then SeJ<U),
At this point, then, the task in hand is to form for an arbitrary
C-object U, the notion of a sieve on U. For the collection of open
sets O(X) on a topological space X a sieve is defined in terms of
inclusions. But for O(X) construed as a category O(X)-arrows
correspond to inclusion. 80 we may by analogy with O(X)-arrows define
a sieve for C-arrows, as follows: for C-object U, a sieve on U is a
family R of C-arrows with codomain U, such that if (a: V...U)eR, then
gi ven any (13: W~V), (ao~: Y~U)eR. From this notion of sieve for an
arbitrary category C, employing C-arrows in like manner to 0(X)-arrow5
(i.e. inclusions), the notion of a covering sieve in C is realized by
directly translating the conditions (C1)-(C3). Kore specifically, via
the formulation of a 'Grothendieck topology'. This is defined as a
set-valued function J with domain all C-objects. J assigns to ea·-h
C-object U a family J (U) of sieves on U, called J-covering sieves,
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such that the following (direct translations of (C1)-(C3» are
satisfied:
(G1) for any U, {cx:codomain(cx)=U}€J(U)
(G2) if ReJ(U) and f:V~U is any arrow, then the sieve
f*R= {cx:W~V: f'cx€R}eJ (V)
(G3) if ReJ(U) and S is a sieve on U s.t. for each f:V~U in R
we have f*S€J(V) then S€J(U).
A small category equipped with a Grothendieck topology is called a
'site I and is usually denoted (C,J). Grothendieck construed these
sites as "generalized topological spaces".
Thus, equipped with the notions preslJeaf and covering sieve for an
arbitrary category C we proceed to investigate how we may put these
together to arrive at a sheaf over a generalized topological space, As
I mentioned above, the representable presheaves are part lcular1y
important - the reason for this is essentially because sieves (which
have been our way of working with covering families), in the classical
case, may be identified with subpresheaves of representable presheaves
and in fact this identification holds over for an arbitrary
category.
First let us consider the classical case. Let R be a sieve on UEO<X),
We can identify R with the presheaf R(-):O(X)OP~S defined by
R(V) = 1 if VeR
o otherwise.
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This prescription uniquely determines the action on arrows. Let vHV
i.e. fVo.J:R(VHR(W) is a o (X) "·P-arrow. Suppose W is not in R. Then
since R is a sieve V is not in R. Hence fvo.J is defined and in fact is
the empty function 0. On the other hand, if W€Rthen R(V)~0 and hence
if V€R, fVo.J:l~l. Otherwise fVo.J=0.
Notice that the above identification relied an the fact that hom-sets
in the category O(X) are either empty, i.e. hom(V,V)=0 iff V~V; or
contain just one arrow, t ,e. we can construe them as the terminal
abject 1. Hence the representable presheaf ho can be regarded as the
functor hu(-):O(X)OP~S defined by
hu(V) = 1 if V~U
o otherwise
Here again the prescription uniquely determines the action on arrows.
Jotice that hu can be identified with the maximal sieve on U. Now
given a sieve R on U, for each VeO(X) we have R(V) ~hu (V) and it
follows that R is a subpresheaf of hu. So sieves on U are
subpresheaves of hu. Conversely, subpresheaves of hu can be identified
with a sieve over U. Let F be a subpresheaf of hu. Define a function
RF:0(X)~{0,1} by RF(V)=l iff F(V)~0. First nate that the set
RF·={V€O(X):RF(V)=l} is a collection of subsets of U. We next show
that RF· is a sieve an U. Suppose YfO(X), W~Vand VERt·. Since vHV
there is an O<X),=,p-arrow fvw: V~V. Consider the function
hu:hu(VHhu(W). F is a presheaf of ho . So if hu(W)=l, it must be the
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case that, given that F(fvw) is a restriction of hu(fvw), then FeW)=1.
But hv(V)=l if hu(V) does. Ve know that VeRF' so by definition Rr <V)=l
and thus F(V)=!. Since F(V)~hu(V) it follows that hu(V)=l. And so
F(V)=1 and we have VeRF·.
The next step is to formulate the notion of an F-compatible family for
a 'covering' R. A SO(X)op-arrow f:R~F determines for each V€R
<i.e. R(V)=l) a function fv:l~F(V) such that for Y(V (hence R(V)=!)
the the following diagram commutes
l---~F(W)
[diagram 13]
Conversely, any family of such arrows inducing the given commutative
property constitute the components of an arrow f:R~F.
Bow let f:R~F be given for a sieve R. The set {~v:~v=fv(0) and VeR} is
such that ~veF(V). For V,VeR since V6V(V and V6V~V we have
fvw(0)=~vw=Fvw(~v)
fvw(0)=~vw=Fvw(~w)
Thus ~VfFV6W=~wfFV6V and f:R~F determines an F-compatlble family for a
sieve R. Conversely, given an F-compatible family for a sieve R we can
define a presheaf f:R~F by defining fv:1~F(V) by fv(0)=~v for each
VeR. So presheafs of the form f:R-tF can be identified with F-
compatible families for R.
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Now we may say that a presheaf F is a sheaf if for any UEO(X), any
covering sieve R, i.e. R€J(U) and any arrow f:R-IF there is a unique
element IY€F<U) such that IYfFV=lYv=fv(121) for each VER. Suppose we are
given an arrow f:R-IF with REJ(U) and hence a subpresheaf of ho . Then
we can define an injection from F(U) into arrows of SI:)( x ),.1' by sending
O'EF<U) to the map g:hu-lF defined by gv(I2I>=O'fFV for each V~U. So the
condi tion that for all VER, given O'EF(U>, we have 0' ft·V=O'v is that the
coresponding g is an extension of f to ho , Alternatively, that for-
VER, the following diagram comuutes
[diagram 14]
The above analysis of the classical notion of sheaf allows the
following reformulation of the original definition:
(*) A presheaf F on a topological space X is a sheaf iff for each
U€O(X) and each covering sieve R on U, any arrow f:R-IF in sn.~."" has
a unique extension to an arrow g:hu-lF.
Now we have seen that in the classical case sieves are identifiable
with subpresheaves of representable presheaves. This identification
also holds if we substitute a category C for O(X). For let R be a
sieve on a C-object U. Ve define the following subpresheaf F" of h",
FR(V) = {a: a€R and dom(a)=V} . For a C-arrow f: V-IV! the function
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since R is a sieve is a member of Rf· (V). Conversely given a
subpresheaf G of hu we can derive a sieve from the union of sets
W(V): V a C-object). Thus by direct analogy this leads to the
following generalization of a sheaf for an arbitrary site (C,J):
(tt) Let (C,J) be a site, F a presheaf on C, F is said to be a sheaf
for a topology J, or a J-sheaf, if for any object U of C and any
RIOJ (U), each arrow f: R-+F in sec."" has a unique extension to an arrow
g r ho+F in SeaP.
The category Shv(C,J) takes as object all J-sheaves on C and as arrows
all the arrows ar ie ing between them in SC<~p. It can be shown that
Shv(C,J) is a tapas. Categories equivalent to one of this form is
called a Grothendieck tapas. Clearly, a Grothendieck tapas is a
"generalized category of sheaves" over a "generalized topological
space". We now proceed to explicate Lawvere and Tierney's
generalization of this notion.
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(ii.b) Lawvere and Tierney's generalization of the notion of sheaf to
an arbitrary topos.
Grothendieck had provided a topology for categories SC<'f" where a small
category C now replaces O(X), the open sets of a topological space X.
Lawvere and Tierney's first task is to provide a generalization of
this topology for categories E, where E is an arbitrary topes, now
replaces sec.p. This was achieved through an observed correlation
between Grothendieck topologies over gceop and certain characteristic
arrows of subobjects of the truth value object Q in this category.
In the category SC:op, Q is a functor Q:COP-tS. For a C-object U,
Q(U)= {R:R is a sieve on U}. Let f: V-tWbe a C-arrow. Then we have
Q(f):Q(WHQ(V) defined by Q(f)[Rl=ff(R)={cx:W-tVlf·cxf!R>' So by (G2) if
Rd (W) then fHR)fJ (V) for a Grothendieck topology J. The terminal
object 1 is the constant functor 1(U)=0 for each C-object U. The arrow
true:1~Q has components trueu:0-t{a:cod(a)=U}. O(U) are the local truth
values over U and trueu is the maximal truth value.
A Grothendieck topology J is a function J:CoP-fS where J(U) is a family
of sieves. Thus J(U)~Q(U). J 1s implicitly a functor. For let f:V~W be
a C-arrow. How do we construe J (f) : J (WHJ (V)? In the classical case,
i.e. where V~W, for a covering sieve RfJ(Y) the natural target for R
is the restriction of R to V, i.e. V.R, which by (C2) is a covering
sieve. Thus by extension we make J(f)[Rl=f.R which by (G2) is a member
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of J (V). Clearly then a Grothendieck topolology is a subpresheaf
(subobject) of Q. So switching attention to the corresponding
characteristic arrows Lawvere and Tierney were able to formulate
necessary and sufficient conditions reffering to those kinds of
entities found in an arbitrary topos. In fact they demonstrated that a
subobject of Q is a Grothendieck tapas iff its characterist Ic arrow
j:Q-IQsatisfies
(LTD j. true=j
(LT2) j.j=j
(LT3) j .&=&. <jxj)
Accordingly then, for an arbitrary tapas E, a Lawvere-Tierney
topolology is defined as an arrow j:Q-IQ satisfying (LTI-LT3). In
anticipation of the discussion below on 'tapas as variable sets' note
that Lawvere construed j:Q-IQin terms of modality and that it conveyed
the idea of a property holding locally. As he puts it in his 1972
"j:Q-IQ may be thought of as a modal operator to be read "it is
j-Iocally the case that.." [p.9] Goldblatt adds that "The 'local
character' of properties of sheaves gives rise to a semantical theory,
due to Andre Joyal, that incorporates aspects of Kripke's
[IntuitionistJ-semantics, together with the principle that the truth-
value of a sentence is determined by its local truth-values." [1979
p.386.J late that here again is an example of the transition from the
local to the global characteristic of sheaves.
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A sheaf for a Lawvere-Tierney topology is arrived at by employing a
generalization of another notion familiar to topologists, namely: a
uniform closure operation. However this new notion differs from a
Kuratowski closure operation in that it commutes with finite
intersections rather than finite unions. Johnstone takes this point of
difference as undermining the sense of 'generalization' inherent in
the conditions (LT1>- (LT3) stating that II It is perhaps unfortunate
that the word "topology" has survived the process of repeated
generalization ... for there is very little connection between a
topology in the sense of ... [Lawvere-Tierney) and a topology on a set."
[1977 p.78]
Though, of course, there are no absolute standards to warrant these
judgements on generalization, I believe the details in the above
development have gone some way in displaying the I connection'. For
example, note that there is an induced natural bijection between
Grothendieck topologies on a category C and Lawvere-Tierney topologies
in SCoP. In any case, Bell comments that
.. it is a point of genuine historical interest that the characteristic
properties of closure operations derived from the notion of covering
were discovered almost exactly half a century after the isolation of
the characteristic properties of closure operations derived from the
notion of neighbourhood [1982 p.333)
A closure operation on an E-object X Is a function K:Sub(XHSub(x)
satisfying: 1> if YH' then K(YHK(Y')j Ii> KK(Y)=K(Y)j iii> Y~K(Y).
Let Y€Sub(X), f:Z~X an E-arrow and f*[Y) the pullback of Y along f as
in the following diagram:
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[diagram 15]
Thus f*[YJ€Sub(Z), i.e. f*[Y]\Z. A uniform closure operation on E is
an assignment of a closure operation on each E-object X such that for
Y\X and an arrow f:Z~X we have that f*(K <Y) 1=K <P( Yl ). Now suppose K
is a universal closure condition. So, for example, we can apply K to
true: l-iQ, since truecSubQ. Thus K( true)€Sub(Q). It turns out that the
characteristic arrow of K (true), 1. e. XK( t..",_"e): Q~Q, is a Lawvere-
Tierney topology. Conversely, a topology j:Q~Q may be converted into a
uniform closure operation by defining K(Y) to be the subob,ject
classified by j 'xv: X~Q where Xv is the characteristic arrow
classifying Y. In fact there is a bijection between Lawvere-Tierney
topologies and uniform closure operations and characteristically this
facilitates the formulation of the desired generalization of sheaf.
First a definition: for a topology j:Q~Q and its induced uniform
closure operation K a subobject Y of X is 'j-dense' if K(Y)=X. Now in
the case of a Grothendieck topology (C,J) on a category SC..~.in terms
of its Lawvere-Tierney topology j:Q~Q the following may be
demonstrated. Given a monic C-arrow 0': R~X which is j-dense and an
arrow f:R~F if there exists a unique g:X~F such that g'O'=fthen F is a
J-sheaf. Conversely, this is also a necessary condition on J-sheaf.
It is this characterization of a sheaf over a Grothendieck topology
that is carried over to an arbitrary topos E.
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(II) An E-object X is a j-sheaf iff given a j-dense monic <r;R....X and
arrow fR....F, there is a unique g:X....F such that g°<r=f.
Let Shj (E) be the category with objects the j-sheaves of E and arrows
all E-arrows between them. In abstracting the sheaves of E we preserve
the essential structure of E, that is, Sh.t (E) is an elementary tapas.
In this sense we may claim to have constructed an inner model or a
site of mathematical activity within the original site. On a formal
level we have the straightforward inclusion functor I: Sh.l <EHE. But
the intriguing aspect here is that of the passage from one site to
another by way of a topology-induced category of sheaves. How do we
analyse this, or more specifically, gi ve a uniform account of th1s
passage? Can we utilise the different topologies to construct s1 tes
with certain desired properies? In the categorial context the
questions here point to the consideration of a functor from E to
Shj (E) with certain universal properties. In other words, an adj oi nt.
This functor turns out to be the left adjoint of the inclusion functor
I and is known as the 'Sheafification functor'. The functor
Sj:E ....Shj(E) has the characteristic property that for each E-object X
there is an E-arrow ix: X....S.1(X) such that, for each j -sheaf Y and arrow
f:X ....y, there is a unique arrow g:Sj(X) ....y such that f=gOiK.
At this point we are in a position to begin to appreciate a most
remarkable result. Cohen's forcing technique, a uniform method of
controlled passage from one classical site of mathematical activity to
another, is in fact a particular case of the more general and
insightful process of sheafification. Koreover, in the categorial
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setting. the full naturality of the forcing technique is appreciated
and can be. and in fact has been, further developed with the aid of
the powerful heuristic afforded by its anal YSi6 in terme of
sheafification.
Recall that negation was represented internally by the arrow II: Q-iQ.
Composed with itself this yields the 'double-negation' arrow denoted
##:Q~Q. This is proved to be a Lawvere-Tierney topology and is
generally referred to as the double-negation topology. Note that, 1n
propositional logic. for example. a forJll.lla a is claSSically vel Id
iff ##a is intuitionistically valid. Purthermore. based on this
relationship. the transition of a formula a into 'llex 1s a standl'ud
means of interpreting classical system into intuitionistic systens.
[See, for example, Godel' s 1933 proof of the conSistency of Peana
arithmetic relative to its intuitionistlc counterpart. ) This
connection of ##:Q~Qwith intuitioni •• prompted KacLane to comment of
the double-negation topolology that -Thus the topologist Brouwer meets
the intuitionist Brouwer.- [1979 p.l0l01 Purthermore the move to
double-negation is evident in Cohen'. stipulation of the 'weak-
forcing' relation - which i. clearly analogous to the clauses of
Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic.
The topology II: Q~Qprovides us with a aheafification functor Sh.... (-)
and thus given a topos E the transition 1s made to Sh....<E). In fact
this is Cohen Forcing! It 1s the sheafif1cation functor of this
topology that Tierney located as being embedded in Cohen'5 ford ng
technique and employed in his categorial analysts and proof of the
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continuum hypothesis. Moreover, Cohen's forcing technique is a
particular case of the general method of shifting from one site of
mathematical activity to another by means of a sheafificat10n functor
for any given topology.
Following Tierney's categorial proof of the independence of the
continuum hypothesis the most notable independence result demonstrated
in the categorial context is Bunge's proof of the independence of the
Souslin Hypothesis [19741. But it must be acknowledged that there has
been a dearth of classical independence proofs using categorial
methods. In this connection at the end of his 1972 Tierney makes the
following, somewhat downbeat, statement
In closing, we might make a few remarks as to possible future uses for
these sheaf theoretic methods - at least in so far as independence
results in logic are concerned. Probably it is fair to say that though
one can develop other logical constructions on topos that enable one
to establish further classical independence resul te, for example AC
can be handled in this way, it seems unlikely that these methods,
using partially ordered sets, will yield many interesting new results
in this area - largely because moet of them have probably been
obtained by more standard techniques.
However, in this treatment we are able to deal with arbitrary
categories of forcing conditions, not merely partially ordered sets,
and this should prove to be a useful technique in model theory. For
example, elementary theories themselves might prove to be interesting
sites. Also ...most topos are non-classical - in that Q is not Boolean
- and one can make use of this instead of discarding it by passing to
II-sheaves. For example, it seems that the topological interpretation
of intuitionism can be thought of simply as mathematics done in
Sheaves(T) where T is a topological space. lany independence results
in intui tionistic algebra and analYSis should be provable by topos
methods, though only the surface has been scratched to date.
[1972 pp.40-411
In the opening of this chapter it was stressed that it was the
information on sites of mathematical activity and the transition from
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site to site that was the centre of foundational interest with respect
to Cohen's results. In this case, it is not important that no stream
of new classical independence results has been forthcoming using
categorial methods. Although, as a matter of fact, Scott was
optimistic in this respect, stating n ••• new models in intuitionistic
logic have not as yet resulted in new independence proofs in cl~ssic~l
set theory. I think we can look forward to same new insights in this
direction, nevertheless, when the mare abstract models are better
understood.- [1977 p.xviii) The important paint is that we have
attained insight into the nature of mathematical activity relative to
the variety of sites. Moreover, although Cohen proceeds from classical
site to classical site, his construction implicitly contains a passage
through an intermediary nan-classical site. This paint 1s expanded in
the next section. But what the categorlal explication of forcing
reveals is that mathematical activity is naturally set-theoretically
founded but in a denser and richer array of possible universes.
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(ii.c) Forcing and Lawvere's notion of 'variable set'.
In this final section I present a brief discussion of Lawvere's notion
of 'variable set' focusing on its heuristic for forcing.
The moving force behind the developments within tapas theory.
especially in connection with foundational and philosophical matters.
is William Lawvere. The idea underlying his work in this area is that
the shift from ZF set theory to topos theory represents a
generalization of set theory but in the specific sense that the former
are 'constant sets' whilst a tapas iSt in general. a universe of
'variable sets'.
Recall that in listing the motivations of his work about the time of
the completion of his doctoral dissertation Lawvere mentions the
following five developments: Robinson's non-standard analysis; Cohen's
independence proofs; Kripke's semantics for the intuitionistic
predicate calculus; Giraud's general theory of topo! and his own
elementary axioms for the category of abstract sets. Of these
developments he states: "...the subsequent unification of which has. I
believe, forced upon us the serious consideration of a new concept of
set n [1976 p.102J This new notion is that of a 'variable set' - the
notion of set inherent in tapas theory or, as we have seen. LST.
According to Lawvere:
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Traditionally. set theory has emphasized the constancy of sets. and
both Robinson's nonstandard analysis and Cohen's forcing method
involve passing from a system 8 of supposedly constant sets to a new
system S' that still satisfies the basic axioms for constant sets;
however. it is striking that both methods pass "inCidentally" through
systems of variable sets ... [1976 p.102J
These systems of variable sets are what I have referred to as the
sites implicit in Cohen's forcing technique.
For Lawvere the sites of constant sets are seen as 'limit points' for
those of variable sets. He observes that:
Every notion of constancy is relative. being derived perceptually ar
conceptually as a limiting case of variation and the undisputed value
of such notions in clarifying variation is always limited by that
origin. This applies in particular to the notion of constant set. and
explains why so much of naive set theory carries over in some farm
into the theory of variable sets. Our inversion of the old theoretical
program of modelling Variation within eternal constancy has something
in common with that of the intuitionists. though we consider Variation
generally. not only Variation of mathematical knowledge; the internal
logic of a topos is always concentrated in a Heyting algebra object.
[1975 p.136]
In addition. on the theme of the intuitionist connection. Lawvere
stated that
I would like to emphasize that recognizing the central importance for
mathematics of the Heyting predicate calculus (1. e.. intuitionistic
logic) in no way depends on accepting a subjective idealist philosophy
such as constructivism; objectively variable sets occur <at least
implicitly) every day in geometry and physics and the fact that this
variation is reflected in our minds in no way means that it is "freely
created" by our mindsj but it seems to have been the intuitionists who
first succeeded in formulating the logic that holds for at least a
certain definite portion of variation in general. [1976 p.106]
Now the set w partially ordered by membership constitutes a category
in the usual manner. Consider then the functor category 8'0'. An object
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in S'" is a functor F:w~S. Thus such an object is a sequence of sets
Xo , X,.X2 •... with an assignment of a sequence of functions fu,f"f;:, ..
such that for nEW we have f,,:Xn~Xn.l' If the members of ware
construed as moments of discrete time then an object of S'" are sets
varying Dver discrete time. Here w is referred to as the parameter. In
general. we can consider functor categories of the form S" with an
arbitrary parameter. i.e. sets varying over X. These kinds of objects
in set-valued functor categories are the paradigms of variable sets.
But in what sense are such objects themselves entitled to be
considered as sets? Yell. a topes is a generalized set theory so
objects in a topes are generalized sets. So the answer to the question
is that categories of the form SX are toposes! The idea can be further
generalized by noting that if S is replaced by an arbitrary tapas E,
the functor category EX is also a topos. (This latter feature can be
taken to be some further confirmation that E 1s a category of sets.)
Furthermore. if functor categories EX are universes of variable sets
then we now have a warrant for the construal of the generalized set
theory inherent in topos theory to be the expl1c1 t inclusion of the
variable sets for which the classical sites are the sets of zero
variation t .e. constants. The warrant is that every tapas E' is
equivalent to one of the form EX. So toposes are universes of variable
sets. Lawvere further explains that
...there has long been in geometry and differential equations the idea
that the category of families of spaces sJIOothly parametrized by a
given space X is similar in many respects to the category of spaces
itself. and indeed, fromthe point of view of phYSics, it is perhaps to
such a category with X -generiC- or unspecified that our stably
correct calculations refer. since there are always small variations or
further parameters that we have not explicitly taken into account; the
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"new" concept of set is in reality just the logical extension of this
idea.
With reference to the five developments mentioned above Lawvere
continues:
... the decisive one for the concept of variable set was the theory of
topoi; while nonstandard analysis, the forcing method in set theory,
and Kripke semantics all involved ...sets varying along a poset X, it
was Grothendieck, Giraud, Verdier, Deligne, X.Artin, and Hakim who, by
developing topos theory, made the qualitative leap - well-grounded in
the developments in complex analysis, algebraic geometry, sheaf
theory, and group cohomology during the 1950's - to consideration of
sets varying along a small category X and at the same time emphasized
that the fundamental object of study is the whole category of sets so
varying. Those insisting on formal definitions may thus, in what
follows, consider that "variable set" simply means an object in some
(elementary) topos (just as, using an effective axiom system to
terminologically invert history, we sometimes say that "vector" means
an element of some vector space). [1976 p.102. late here the implicit
rejection of the strict view of implicit definition)
Roughly speaking, Cohen's forcing method is a process by which we
start with a model of set theory S and then adjoin a 'new' subset of
the continuum c to form a model S* by more or less constructing the
closure of SU{c} under the required set theoretical operations. [See
Appendix for the details.] Both Sand S* are classical and if we pick
the appropriate c we ensure that S* has certain elementary properties
not satisfied by S, e.g the continuum hypothesis fails in S·, But as
the topos analysiS reveals, implicit in this process is the transition
of S into a site of variable sets whose variation is then halted at
some point of the parameter to form the new site of constant sets SOlo
with the desired properties. The parameter here corresponds to Cohen's
'forcing conditions'. For example, let P be the set of all finite
partial functions ordered by reverse inclusion. P is thus a
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well-ordered set and as such a category. From S we form the site of
variable sets SP. The internal logic here is intuitionistic. The
return to constancy is achieved by forming the site Sh....(Sf').
As Bell informs us:
It can then be verified that ..[Sh....(sP») .. is Boolean and is in fact
categorically equivalent to the Boolean extension VCR), where B is the
Boolean completion of P. Thus the process of constructing Boolean
valued models a la Scott-Solovay amounts to taking double negation
sheaves in an intuitionistic model consisting of sets varying over
some set P of forcing conditions. [1982 p.334)
But the important foundational pOint is that the procedure described
above employing Sand P are only specific examples of a very much more
general procedure involving the whole array of sites revealed by topos
theory. In these sites mathematical activity is offered a fertile
arena for the development and growth of mathematical concepts founded
upon a, perhaps still evolving, set theory. The exploration and
generation of mathematical concepts within these sites is the shape of
mathematical activity to come.
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APPEIDIX: A GUIDE TO FORCING
BY SAX FEIDRICH AND PETER KILNE
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THE METAXATHEXATICS
The emergence of formal axiomatic set theories naturally gives rise to
questions about the strengths and weaknesses of such systems,
particularly if they are to be regarded as foundations of mathematics.
Questions as to the power of the continuum and the status of the axiom
of choice are important issues in mathematics which have given impetus
to the work of set theorists. The system of Zermelo and Fraenkel <ZF)
has beco_ the most widely accepted first-order formalization of set
theory. The failure to answer these questions within ZF, together
with Godel's proof of the existence of formally undecidable sentences
of ZF brought the question of independence to the fore.
A sentence 0' is independent of a set of sentences t if rr is neither
refutable nor provable on the basis of I. Thus to show that 0' is
independent of t it suffices to show that tU{O') and tU{#O'} are both
consistent sets of sentences. By Godel's Completeness Theorem, for
first-order theories this is equivalent to the existence of models of
tU{O'} and tU{~}. By Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, however, we know
that in no recursively axiomattzable extention of ZF can we prove the
existence of a model of the extended theory. In particular ZF cannot
prove its own consistency.
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As an illustration of the limitative nature of this result we shall
prove a weak form of Godel's second incompleteness theorem:
THEOREX: If ZFI-Ex(Trans(x) & xl=ZF) then ZP is inconsistent.
PROOF:
least
Suppoae that ZPI-tx(Trans(x) & xl=ZF) Let Xo be such an x of
rank. Since <Xo,ftXoIXo)I=ZF then also
<_o,€tXolxo>l~ty(Trans(y) • yl=ZP). Let yo€xo be such that
<Xo,ftXo!Xo)I=(Trans(yo) & YolzZP). Since ~Tran6<z) & yl=ZF" is a
zFih-forJalla, it is absolute, and hence (Trans <yo) & yol=ZF holds.
Thus we have shown ZFI- rrx«Trans{x) • xl=ZF)~ty€x{Trans(y) & yl=ZF».
But Xo was of leaat rank and yoEXo~rank(yo)<ranlr(xo) - this is a
contradiction. (I)
Clearly, since ZF cannot prove its own consistency, it cannot prove
the consistency of any stronger systea. V. would appear to have
reached an impasse in the atteapt to prove independence. To get round
this Godel _de recourse to the technique of relative consistency
proofs, a method first applied by BeltraDd and Klein in order to show
certain hyperbolic geo_trie. consistent relative to Euclidean
geometry. The set of sentences tUT 1s consistent relative to the set
t if, for so_ foralla 0', (tUTI-,,''''H{EI-O''&#O').In model theoretic
terDe, in a relative consiatency proof one shows that if t has a model
so does EUT. Thus if we can demonstrate that EU{O") and EU{#v) are both
consistent relative to E, .. i. independant of I, provided I is
consistent. With respect to ZP, GOdel showed that ZF + AC, ZF + CH,
and ZF + GCH are all consistent relative to ZF.
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In his relative consistency proofs Gcde l used inner models.
Intuitively one starts by considering the extension of some monadic
predicate <in the language of set theory) and shows that this is a
proper class -model- of ZF together with some additional axioms. For
example, Godel defined the notion of constructibility in ZF and showed
that the constructible sets yield a -model- for ZF+V=L (i.e. ZF+'Every
set is constructible'). From ZF+V=L we obtain AC, CH, and GCH. In ZF
we cannot, of course, deal directly with proper classes. The
intuitive account is a heuristic for the formal procedure outlined in
the following theorem:
THBOREX: Suppose that there is a formula _(x) with exactly one free
variable x such that: (1) II-(Ex_(X»i (11) EI-I)'- for all 0' in 1:i
(iii) I'-T-. Then is T consistent relative to 1:.
PROOF: Suppose IU{T} is inconsistent, so there exists 0'1, ••• 0',., in r
such that (0'1&•••&vn~'T) is logically valid. Since I'-(Ix;(x», we can
obtain EI-(O'I&...&O'n ....T) ... [The proof that 1-(Ixl(xHa"), for any
logically valid sentence e, requires a rather tedious induction.]
Hence we obtain II-(O'l"a...&O'n ......',.-). So from (11) we obtain l:1-1T",
which contradicts (11i>. (.)
low we know that ZFI-(V=L ....CH) and so, if we are to use the method of
inner models to show the independence of CH, the natural thing to do
is to find an inner model in which V=L fails. Unfortunately, as the
next theorem shows, this is impossible.
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LEKXA. If A(x) is a monadic predicate in the language of set theory
such that it defines a transitive inner model A of ZF then L=LA~A. (.)
PROOF OF THEOREK. Suppose A is a transitive inner model of ZFC+V~L,
hence ZFCI-(V~1)A. As L is a DOdel of ZFC, ZFCI-«V;tUA)L_,
i ,e. ZFCI- (V~L)A.oL..By the leDlDl2lAAL=L. Hence ZFCI- (V~L)'_, which
contradicts GOdel's result (assuming ZFC is consistent). The
extension of this result to the case where A is a non-transitive inner
model follows immediately from Xostoweki's Collapsing Lemma applied to
proper classes. (*)
Any model
membership
of set theory must assign an interpretation to
definition of inner model €
the
issymbol e. In our
interpreted as the restriction, to the domain of the model, of the
membership relation in V (the set-theoretic universe), where the
domain is the extension of some monadic predicate in the language of
set-theory. A model in which E is 60 interpreted is termed a standard
model. The impossibility result just proved applies only to standard
inner models. When we come to Boolean-valued models we can have a non-
standard inner model in which V;tLis true.
Cohen decided to concentrate on finding standard transitive models in
which V=L fails. The advantage of considering standard transi tive
models is that one _y utilise the any absoluteness results in
determining their properties. For example, the absoluteness of
ordinals (1. e. the property of being an ordinal> makes the
verification of the axioll of infinity straightforward. In
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contradistinction to the method of inner models Cohen attempted to
"expand the universe".
*
Clearly we cannot hope to start with V and expand outwards, for V
contains everything. Our strategy is as follows: as we are carrying
out a relative consistency proof we are entitled to assume that there
is a model of ZFC, indeed of ZPC+V=Ljour decision to work with
standard transitive models leads us to the stronger assumption that
there 1s a model of ZPC+V=Lof this kindj we expand this model to
obtain a model of ZFC+V~L. [That this is a stronger assumption will
be demonstrated below. Although this stronger assumption is not in
fact necessary (see below) we Bake it at this point because by doing
so we gain an insight into the heuristics of forcing.] By the strong
form of the Downward Lowenheim-Bkolem Theorem and Xostowski's
Collapsing LellJlll we obtain a countable transitive standard model of
ZFC+V=L.
We DlJst take as a starting point a countable transi t1ve standard
"ground" model because:
THEOREX: Froll any extension of ZF which is consistent with V=L one
cannot prove the existence of an uncountable standard model in which
ZF+AC+V~Lobtains.
PROOF: [See Cohen 1966 pp. 108-9]. (*)
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This theorem shows that both the ground model and its expansion have
to be countable. Further the following theorem tells us why we should
expand the ground model to a model containing the same ordinals:
THEOREK: Let ao be the least upper bound of the ordinals in the
ground model. Hence the ground model has rank ao (by absoluteness of
the rank function). It is consistent to assume that there is no
standard transitive model of rank greater than ao.
PROOF: If there is no such model we are done. If there is one let
al be the least ordinal greater than ao for which there is one. By
absoluteness considerations any such DOdel of rank a1 satisfies
•(lTa)ao'Ix(Trans (x)&xl=ZF&rank(x)=a»·. (.)
Given a ground model X the forcing construction provides a method for
expanding J( to countable standard transitive models <generic
extensions of J() containing exactly the same ordinals. Let I be such
a generic extension. By absoluteness of ordinals and of constructible
sets:
LN = {xfJ:L(x)} = {x:IafJ.La(x)} = {x:IaeX.L~(x» = LM(K~I.
Clearly where J(~J (and fortunately this is the case in general) N will
satisfy V~L.
In the above we have assumed the existence of a standard transitive
mode1 of ZFC. We now show that this is rather more than we are
enti tled to ina relative consistency proof from ZF. Let M be a
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sentence in the language of set theory stating that ZF has a model,
and SI that ZF has a standard transitive model. Given the
completeness theorem I is equivalent to CON(~ZF·). To show that not
ZF+I'-SI we use the following result due to Cohen and others
[Wilmers and Suzuki, p.l5]:
THBORBX: Every standard transitive IIOdel of 2F contains an element
which is a model of ZF. (.)
Let A be a standard transitive DOdel of least rank.
AI=ZF+X+#SX.
Clearly
Despite this result the Platonist will have no qualms about accepting
SX. Platonistically he could "prove· the Reflection Principle for all
axioms of ZF siJlUltaneously. This, of course, cannot be formalized
within 2F. By the Reflection Principle provable in 2F every finite
set of axioms of ZF has a standard transitive model. It would appear
that by applying the Coapleteness Theorem we should obtain a model of
2F. But 1f we forDalize the model theory within ZF we introduce the
possibility of non-standard axioms, i.e. axioms corresponding in our
coding to non-standard integers, whereas the Reflection Principle
holds only for standard axloE. (Our coding may in fact "misbehave"
to the extent of giving ue non-standard ·proofs· of inconsistency.
[cf. Drake, p. 96]
Having formalized model theory we obtain the following as a theorem of
2FC: TTx[(Trans (x)&xl=2FC&1 xl=(0) ~ ty<x'y&Trans(y)&yl =ZFC+V~L&I yl=w)] .
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The proof of the theorem is facilitated by the forcing construction.
Ye have not yet succeeded in our aim of proving in ZFC that
COI (ZPCHCOI (ZFC+V;eL) since we need to adjoin SX to ZFC in order to
obtain Lx(Trans(x)&%I=ZPC&lxl=w).
Obviously we lIUst, in order to achieve our aim, avoid appeal to SM.
Shoenfield proposed a for_l veraion of the Platonist's claim in
regard to the Reflection Principle. To the language of set theory we
add a constant sy.bol 'c'. Ye form the theory T by adjoining to ZFC
(1n the original language) the sentence ATrans(c)&1 cl=e ", and the
relativization to c of every axio. of ZPC.
THBORBX: T is a conservative extension of ZFC.
PROOF: Suppose TI-r where r is in the original language.
So 1- (Tl&T2(c)&lcl=W&Trans(c»~r (where Tl,T2EZFC)
Thus 1- rrX«T'&T2(~)&Trans(x)&lxl=w)~r) and
1- [rrX«Tl&T2(X)&Trans(x)&lxl=w)~r)]~[Lx«Tl&T2(x)&Trans(x)&Ixl=w)~r)]
Hence 1- LX«Tl&T2(X)&Trans(x)&lxl=w)~r
low ZFCI-Tl and, by the Reflection Principle,
ZFCI-LX(T2(x)&Trans(x)&lxl=w) ~ v
Thus ZFCI-Ix«Tl&T2CX)&Trans(x)&lxl=w)
Hence ZFCI-r (.)
Shoenfield's approach is perhaps the DOSt elegant in that it permits
us to retain the heuristics of the forcing construction. viz.
expanding a given model of ZFC, whilst avoiding making recourse to SM.
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Cohen's proposal for avoiding SX is that within ZFC we can apply the
forcing technique to give us a model of any finite set of axioms of
ZFC+V~L In order to show that a finite set ofaxiome t of ZFC+V~L
obtain in a generic extension I of a ground model X we require that
only a finite set ofaxiome t' of ZFC hold in X. Analysis of the
forcing construction will indicate which axioms must belong to t'. In
ZFC the Reflection Principle guarantees the existence of a lOOdel of
t'. Clearly we lose nothing by taking such a model and expanding it,
since all the axioms of ZFC required in the forcing construction to
show that t holds in the expansion obtain in the model. If
not-COW(ZFC+V~L) then a finite subset of ZFC+V~L would be inconsistent
and have a model in ZFC!
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THE HEURISTICS
In this section we give a heuristic account of what we have referred
to as "the expansion of the ground model". The ground model 15 a
model of ZF+V=L. The task is to somehow expand the ground model to a
model in which V+L fails, i.e. a model which contains a non-
constructible set and satisfies the axioms of ZFC. Mathematically we
can view this as the addition of a non-constructible set to the ground
model followed by "closing up" under the eet-theoretic operations.
The problem is that we mean the set-theoretical operations relativized
to ){[GJ, i.e. the JlDdel we are trying to obtain, The following
theorem provides a characterization of a transitive set closed under
the set theoretic operations:
THEOREX: A transitive set H which satisfies the following conditions
is a model of ZF: (a) c.>€J(i (b) every class in H, t ,e, every subset of
X defined by a formula of ZF relativized to X, which is included in a
set in X is itself a set in Xi (c) for any formula ; whose
restriction to X is a functional relation in X, the image under ;'"of
any set in M: which is in the domain of ;M is itself a set in M; (d)
for any set aEX, P(a)b.J(is included in a set in J(, (I)
Since ZFC+'Every finite set of integers is constructible', the best we
can hope for is to find anon-construct! ble infinite subset of (.I.
This is readily accomplished by means of a generic filter.
I
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We can identify every subset of w with a function from w to 2, and
conversely. By absoluteness wand 2 belong to any standard transitive
extension of the ground model. As shown above, if the ground model
and a generic extension have the same ordinals they have the same
constructible sets. If, in such a case, there is a function from w to
2 in the generic extension which is not in the ground model, then
clearly it yields a non-constructible subset of w. If the function,
f, is to be non-constructible necessarily it cannot be the
characteristic function of any finite set of integers nor of w itself.
Hence TTnf:wl:JDe"w(a)n&f(JI)=l-f(n»must be satisfied. Jl!oreoverf must
also differ from the characteristic function of any subset of w
specificable in advance, i.e., any constructible subset of w in JII, the
ground mode 1.
Any function froD W to 2 can be approximated by finite partial
functions, 1.e. functions into 2 with domain a natural number. If
f€2t.>then Ilnef rn is such an approximation (ftnf2<w). Let Fn(w,2)=2('"
the set of all finite partial functions from w to 2. By
absoluteness Fn(w,2)€X. Furthermore, Fn(w,2) can be partially ordered
by reverse inclusion and the corresponding partially ordered set
P=<Fn (w. 2) ,~> belongs to X. It is easy to verify that the union of
any filter F over P is a function from a subset of w into 2. If the
function f which we seek is to be the union of a filter F. F must
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Let Dn=<p€Fn(w.2):n€dom(p)}, for nfW. rrn€w(F6Dn~0);
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(1i) Let Ro={peFn(w,2):OeRan(p)}, Rl={peFn(w,2):leran(p»).
Ft>Ro,c0,cF.!:IR",;
(iii) Let h be a constructible (in }lD function from w to 2 and Ie
Eh={peFn{w,2):Enew(p(n);eh{n)}. For no such h is Eh6F=0.
The sets Dn,Ro,Rl and Eh which F is required to intersect have in
common the property of being dense in P. In proving that the generic
extension of X is indeed a model of ZFC, F is required to intersect
further dense subsets of P in M. One could in principle list all the
dense subsets in X of P of which F is required to intersect, but in
the light of the following theorem this is unnecessary.
THEOREX: If M is countable and peFn(w,2) then there is a filter F
over P, with psF, which intersects every dense subset of P inM. <*)
(Such a filter is said to be P-generic over M.)
The last theorem can be generalized to the case where P is an
arbitrary partial-order in M. However, only if P is atomless can we
guarantee that the generic filter does not belong to M. This theorem
is in turn a special case of the following theorem.
THEOREM: Let P be an arbitrary partial order, pedoro(P), and
D={Dn:new} a countable family of dense subsets of P. Then there is a
filter F over P such that peF and Ft>Dn#12I(new). (*)
Henceforth we shall use 'G' to refer to any given P-generic fj 1t r
over M.
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THE :MECHANICS
In the terms of our heuristic the next step after having obtained a
generic filter G on the basis of I and P, is to produce a model of
ZFC+V~Lby ·closing up· XU{G}under the set theoretic operations. The
problem is to prove the existence of such a model, i.e. to prove the
existence of a transitive ·generic extension· K[G] of K such that
J([G11=ZFC,K'XIGl and GdRG] where X and J[G] have the same ordinals.
The way this is achieved in forcing proofs is to "construct" K[G] in
such a manner that its properties are completely determined by the
properties of X, P and G.
It is at this point that the forcing technique comes into play. And
here also is the creative leap in Cohen's work. Since its
introduction in his papers of 1963, 1964 and 1966, the technique has
been greatly streamlined [cf. Kunen, p.2351, sometimes to the paint
that the definition of the forcing relation emerges for apparently no
more reason than that it works. Of course, since forcing is a
mathematical technique for producing independence proofs, one cannot
hope to derive it from set theoretic principles, nor do we think that
it can emerge in any completely natural manner from a beurist ic
account, 1. e., without, for instance, the appeal to the generalized
notions discussed in Part III. We shall, however, given the
present framework, sketch the general strategy and then indicate how
it is realized.
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We know that the domain of the generic extension has to be countable
and hence we require only countably many names in order to refer to
its members. Let us call such a set of constant terms T={Tn:nEW}. We
can encode into X in the familiar way expressions of the language
L<ZF)UT. Forcing is a relation which holds between elements of P and
encoded sentences. If 1(X1 ... ,Xn) is a formula of L(ZF) with just the
indicated variables free, and 1'1... Tn€T, then that pEP forces
~1(T1 ... T")A is written as pH-1(T1 ... T").
defined by the following:
The forcing relation is
pH-;<T1 ... Tn) iff TTG(Gis P-generic over X & p€G~J([G]I=;(T1 ... 1',...».
(J.B. where the designata of 1'1... Tn) depend essentially on G in a
manner to be discussed presently. )
This definition is due to Shoenfield and is a simplification, for
expository purposes, of the forcing relation used in carrying through
the details of independence proofs.
Since in general not all the generic filters over a partial order P in
X belong to X the forcing relation given above cannot be defined in X.
But in order to prove for certain axioms of ZFC that they obtain in
X[ Gl we require a JKKl1fied forcing relation, H-* (" forcing star") I
definable in X. According to Kunen: -There are as many different
<equivalent) definitions of H-* as there are texts on set theory."
The important point is that
pH-;(T1 ... 1,...) iff pH-*;(T1" .Tn).
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The deUni tion of H-* mirrors the semantic definition of truth in a
model, though. since in general G is not defined in H, it cannot
provide a definition of truth in J([ GJ for any particular generic
filter G. Rather it provides all that is needed for determining the
properties of every generic extension simultaneously.
able to prove the crucial
In fact we are
So far we have talked freely about X[GJ. both as an extension of H
which we must prove to a model of ZFC. and as an extant model of ZFC.
We have also said that the designata of the names T depend on G and
have considered the names in relation to one particular model 141GJ.
An important aspect of the forcing technique is the relationship
between the method of encoding T and the determination of the domain
of a generic extension. Diverse methods are used to produce the
encoded names (henceforth referred to as elements of the label-space
in J() and likewise to produce the do_in of J([ GJ. We shall describe
some examples below. First we shall discuss some general
considerations which motivate all these methods.
(i) Let L be the label space in X.
being the image of Lunder
Va[ LJ=domJ([GJ. As the gener-Ic
Wecan view the domain of M[G] as
a bijective function 'fG. i. e.
extension is a standard mode1,
Va(l)e:V'a (m)eX[GJ1=(T1e:Trn). where l,_L and I,m are the codes of
T1, ;".e:T. Consider the binary relation induced in L by the E-relation
in JUG]: {(l,m>:V'Cl(l)E1(3(m), 1,JII£L}. Call this relation Eu. Clearly En
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is a well-founded relation. Thus if we could somehow define En
independently of K[Gl, we would obtain K[G] as the Kostowski-collapse
of the structure <L,ea>.
<11> Since KOITGl for every generic extension K[GJ, <-;",-' [GJ ,E(~> is a
model of set theory isomorphic to X, whose domain is a subset of L.
For generic filters G,G' <YGl-'[Xl,EG) is isomorphic to <1(~·-1[K],Eo·>,
Simplicity considerations lead us to identify these structures, thus
we obtain a subset L...~L which serves as a set of standard names for
elements of X in every generic extension.
(iii) It is important to note that although the designata of the
names T depend on G, the encoding of T into X cannot depend on G.
This is because in general it is not the case that GeM but H-· has to
be definable in X.
<1v) As G~P, all its members belong to H, and hence have standard
names. The name of G has to be definable in X, and so cannot depend
on G itself. We could fix an element f of L such that TIG(fo<r)=G), If
r is chosen so that it is in some way composed from the standard names
of all its "potential- members, i.e. those names p' <where p ' is the
standard name of p) such that l:G<YG(p')eG), then since TTG(G(P) and
TIPEPtG(peG>, r={K(p'):peP) where K(p') is some function of p',
Suppose pEG, then YGl-1<p>=p', p'eGf and r=1Gl-1 (G). Hence 1(!;J<P')eG.
Therefore G=1a<r>=<Ye(p'):peG). [Notice that 1B(P') is independent of
G. ]
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To emphasize the connection with the potential Mostowski collapsing
function on the appropriate set, (L,€e;>, we can rewri te G='f(~ (r) as
{'fG(p'):p'€<af>.Ideally we would like a uniform definition of the 1Ci'S
on L with properties similar to the above particular case. Our first
example illustrates how this can be achieved.
EXAXPLE(l) (Cf.Kunen 1980): The label space is defined by transfinite
recursion: IfL iff L is a relation, and rr<m.p>El(~L & pEP). (N.B. The
defini tion of the label space has P as a parameter and is clearly a
definable class in X.
For each G. P-generic over X, 'fa is defined by:
'f<a(l)= {'f6(m):Epe-G«m,p>fl)}
'fa is also defined by transfinite recursion and 'fo[Ll=X[Gl.
Let us define the following two functions, where we assume P has a
maximal element 1p, from X into L. by transfinite recursion in M:
It is easily shown that 'fa(m*)=1a(m')=m, and thus both functions may
serve to produce a class of standard names in 1(, Clearly in this
example 16 is not a bijection. (Thus in effect, we have more names
than we need.) The induced relation fa is given by:
~G iff Epe-G«m. p)El)
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This relation is well-founded and set-like on L (and hence we can
obtain the Xostowski-collapse) but since Eo is not extensional the
structure (L,£o> is not isomorphic to mGl.
Taking f=«p' ,P>:pEP) then TIG(1G(f)=G).
Vithout invoking forcing we can show that lGl satisfies the axioms:
Extensionality, Foundation. Pairing and Union. H-* is used to obtain
Replacement, Power set and the particular axioms under investigation
(e.g. V~L). Given the general forcing technique described above, the
problem of producing particular consistency results reduces to the
construction of a suitable partial order in X.
The following theorem shows the sense in which XIGl is the closure of
XU{G} under the set theoretic operations.
XlllXALITY THEOREX: TIlif X<I, Gel and II=ZFC then X(GJ~J. (.)
EIAXPLE(2): (Cf. Cohen 1966.) Cohen's approach is to take the
Constructive Hierarchy as priDitive rather than the Cumulative
Hierarchy. He takes as his ground model the intersection of all
countable standard transi tive DDd.els. By absol uteness of
constructibility this is an initial segment of the Constructible
Hierarchy, i.e., X=U{La: ~<a) for some countable limit ordinal a. Let
a=ran(UG) where G is P-generic over X and not GeM. Cohen defines M[G)
by ·relative constructibility·. We know that a~w and a is unbounded in
whence r-ci oo=«. Define L(O,a>=wU{a}, L(,¥,a)=D(U.-.<·"L(S,a» ('00)
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where D(X) is the set of subsets of X which are definable by formulae
relativized to X using parameters in X. X[G] = Uru<",L(8,a).The proof
that XIGJI=ZFC closely parallels Godel's proof that the Constructible
Hierarchy is a model for set theory. That X[G] satisfies the
Xinimality Theorem follows immediately from these considerations.
To the language of ZF we add a single new constant A, which serves as
a name for a. To each element of ]([Gl there corresponds a formula of
this extended language and a set of parameters which define that
element. Cohen makes use of this fact when he inductively defines the
label space. Although Cohen's approach, particularly in regard to the
details of the ramified language, lacks the smoothness of development
of later accounts, it is more closely related to the heuristics of the
forcing technique and is therefore, we feel, worthy of study for other
than purely historical reasons.
N.B. When we defined forcing we defined what is sometimes called weak
forcing. Cohen's original definition is of strong forcing (H-,,). The
two notions are related thus:
The logic of strong forcing is intuitionistic, e.g. it is not the
case that pH-eli; -t pH-c:;. The logic of weak forcing is classical.
Kunen attributes the invention of weak forcing to Shoenfield, while
Shoenfield credits its introduction to Feferman.
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EXAMPLE(3): (Cf , Shoenfield 1971). Shoenfield defines the structure
<X,co> where X is the domain of our ground model and €e is defined by:
X€GY iff Ep€G«x,p>€y), for all x,YEK.
X[G] is the Xostowski-collapse of this structure.
Having first defined the model Shoenfield then introduces the "forcing
language-. He takes as his label space the whole of X, i.e. L=K. This
is a technical error, however, for it leaves no room, so to speak, for
the encoded formulae of L(ZF)UT, and in consequence forcing is not
definable in K. In order to allow the definability of forcing we must
restrict L so that we can encode the language.
Shoenfield's approach is instructive because it brings out the fact
that XlGJ can be constructed independently of L. His mistake (easily
rectified) lies in failing to allow for the encoded formulae of
L (ZF)UT, not in the fact that he has too many names in his label
space. For example Burgess (1977) defines a label space which is a
proper extension of Kunen's. Conversely, we may restrict Kunen's
definition by requiring that L be a function .
•
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With respect to X, but viewed from the outside (since EEl is not
definable in X), L is a class with a non-standard E-relation defined
on it. The structure {L,le> is not a model for set theory as lo is not
extensional. If instead of X we consider the set theoretic universe V
(which is what 'X-people' take X to be) and make our definitions
accordingly, then <L,E'e> is similar to an inner model with a non
standard £-relation. In fact, <L,Ee> satisfies every axiom of ZF other
than Extensionality.
Extensionality: 1=.
By taking equivalence classes we can obtain
iff 1e(1)=1e(m), l,~L. Let L'={[ll:l£L} and
define E'G by [UE'G[m] iff 1e<l)E1&{m), l,~L. The structure <L',l'el>
satisfies ZF+V;tL. Unfortunately the equivalence classes are proper
classes. Ve cannot apply the Xostowski Collapsing Lemma to <L,le> in V
because le is not set-like on L. Alternatively we can obtain
Extensionality by defining a new equality relation, =<:1, on L:
l=G. iff 1e(1)=1e<.>, i.e. iff 1=•. The structure (L,£<:I,=<:I)satisfies
ZF=V~L.
The definition of (L,£e,=6> in V, known as the syntactic model
approach, parallels the definition of VB, the Boolean-valued universe
for some complete Boolean algebra B in V. Historically, this latter
approach was developed first. The definition of H- owes much to
Shoenfield who realized that one could do the Scott-Solovay
construction (Boolean-valued universe) directly with a partial order.
Our final section briefly mentions some parallels between forcing as
described above and the Boolean-valued model approach to independence
proofs.
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THE BOOLEAI COllECT lOIS
If, working in V, we define L, the label space, using the restricted
version of Runen's definition, so that every member of L is a
function, and further, require that the partial order be a complete
Boolean algebra B, then the label apace consists of the hereditarily
B-valued functions. This clan is referred to as the Boolean-valued
unfverse va.
By means of a particular inductive mapping, [.Je, every sentence ~ in
the forcing language is assigned a 'truth-value', [~JB, a member of B.
This truth-value definition cannot be given in set theory although the
truth-value of any particular 0' can be determined within set theory.
[Cf Rosser 1969 Chapter 10]. It can be shown that any sentence which
1s a theorem of ZFC has truth-value 1a. Thus, if we can find a
complete Boolean algebra B such that Oe([O']B(le, then 0' is independent
of ZFC. Alternati vely it _y be JIOre practical to find two Boolean
algebras, B,B', such that [0']8(lB and [0']B'(18', in order to obtain
the independence result.
In order to show that X[GJI=ZFC we needed to introduce H-*. OstenSibly
we can show that yel=ZFC without recourse to forcing (where
yel=cr iff [..)1'=1). However the inductive definition of the map [.)E'
mirrors the definition of H-* and we obtain the following theorem:
THEOREX: [O'JB = V{p€B:pH-*} and further, pH-*cr iff pHpJB. (.)
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In fact if we define H-* by pH-*O' iff pH 0') E: then H-* satisfies the
usual forcing conditions.
By selecting the right Boolean algebra B we can show that, say,
VBI=ZFC+V;tL. This formal proof of independence nowhere mentions a
generic filter over. Analogously, given a partial order P such that
there exists a G P-generic over K such that not GEM, we could show
that I:p€P(pH-*V*L), without mentioning G or its name r. G is, then.
only required when producing a transitive standard model of ZFC+V~L.
In order to construct a Boolean-valued set-model we start, as before,
with a ground JlDdel ]( and the Boolean algebra B such that B€M and
KI='B is a complete Boolean algebra', We then relativize our
discussion to ]( and farm L, the label space: L = VB6X. we now have a
Boolean-valued universe inside X,
We can prove that for any G P-generic over X, if not pEG then there
exists a qcG such that p and q are incompatible, i.e. there does not
exist an r such that r~p and r~q (p,q,rEP). In the case when P is a
complete Boolean algebra we show that G is an ultrafilter. Indeed we
can prove the fallowing equivalence theorem:
THEOREX:Let G~B where B is a complete Boolean algebra in M. G is
B-generic over X if, and only, G is an ultrafilter and the canonoeal
hOJIDmorphism, hG:B-t2, preserves all suprema in X, i.e. is sueh that
for all XEX if x(B then hG = V{hG(Y):YEx). (.)
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Now, the Rasiowa-Sikorski Theorem tells us that if {Sn:new} is a
countable family of subsets of some Boolean algebra B (not necessarily
complete) such that for each ne:w the supremum of Sn exists in B, then
there is a homomorphism h:B...2 such that h(VS,.,)= V{h(s):se:S,,).Hence
the Rasiowa-Sikorski Theorem is the generic filter existence theorem
for Boolean-valued models.
The Boolean-valued model approach and the forcing approach both yield
the same independence proofs because:
LEHKA: if i:P-tQ is a dense embedding, then P and Q yield the same
generic extensions. (*)
THEOREX: Every partial order can be densely embedded in a complete
Boolean algebra.
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CORRIGENDA
delete 'it' .
'Zermelo's 1908a'.
'quotation' .
'present description'.
delete sentence beginning 'But I judge
,fa11 short'.
'p. 23'.
'Zermelo's 1908a'.
'self-evidence and its necessity'.
'maybe'.
delete 'doubt'.
'adjoints etc. '
'Or, on the other hand, as in L.S.T., we might find
versions of the language and theory based on it,
giving us ....'
"Mathematics without foundations".
